Occurrence
On the day of the accident, the twin-engine aircraft departed Montreal-Saint-Hubert Airport at 0930 local time for a two-hour flight to Le Havre-aux-Maisons on the Magdalen Islands. Upon arrival, weather conditions were marginal with low ceiling, visibility up to two miles, rain, and wind gusting to 30 knots. During final approach to Runway 07, when the aircraft was 1.4 nautical miles west-southwest of the airport, it deviated south of the approach path. At approximately 1230 Atlantic Daylight Time, aircraft control was lost, resulting in the aircraft striking the ground in a near-level attitude. The aircraft was destroyed and all seven occupants were killed.
Aircraft and Crew
The aircraft was a twin-engine aircraft operated by Aéro Teknic. The pilot-in-command was Pascal Gosselin, founder and owner of Aéro Teknic. Also on board was Fabrice Labourel, acting as copilot. The passengers were Jean Lapierre, a political commentator and former Liberal federal cabinet minister of Transport; his wife Nicole Beaulieu; his sister Martine Lapierre; and his brothers Marc Lapierre and Louis Lapierre. All were traveling to the funeral of Jean Lapierre's father.
Investigation Findings
The official investigation identified the following causes and contributing factors:
1. The pilot’s inability to effectively manage the aircraft’s energy condition led to an unstable approach. 2. The pilot “got behind” the aircraft by allowing events to control his actions, and cognitive biases led him to continue the unstable approach. 3. A loss of control occurred when the pilot rapidly added full power at low airspeed while at low altitude, which caused a power-induced upset and resulted in the aircraft rolling sharply to the right and descending rapidly. 4. It is likely that the pilot was not prepared for the resulting power-induced upset and, although he managed to level the wings, the aircraft was too low to recover before striking the ground. 5. The pilot’s high workload and reduced time available resulted in a task-saturated condition, which decreased his situational awareness and impaired his decision making. 6. It is unlikely that the pilot’s flight skills and procedures were sufficiently practised to ensure his proficiency as the pilot-in-command for single-pilot operation on the MU2B for the conditions experienced during the occurrence flight.
The investigation also noted several findings as to risk, including risks associated with exceeding maximum takeoff weight, non-essential communication during critical phases, lack of flight recordings, plan continuation bias, unstable approach criteria, go-around preparedness, and search-and-rescue information. Other findings included that Transport Canada does not monitor foreign-registered aircraft duration, turbulence and icing were not factors, and that installation of an angle-of-attack system requires supplemental type certificate approval.