Flight Details
The aircraft was operating a company charter flight from Dar es Salaam to Morogoro, where it was scheduled to pick up passengers for Tabora. The pilot was the sole occupant. The flight departed Dar es Salaam International Airport at 0418 hours local time.
Communication Timeline
At 0419:49 hours, the aircraft reported its estimated time for the terminal control area (TMA) as 0439 hours and for Morogoro as 0449 hours. At 0425:13 hours, the pilot reported maintaining flight level 60 (FL060). Dar es Salaam Approach advised him to maintain that altitude and report on reaching the TMA boundary.
The pilot then contacted the Ngerengere military base on 118.25 MHz requesting permission to transit the military area (HT) P6 (A) UNLI/GND. Permission was denied because the area was active. The pilot subsequently stated he would proceed to Morogoro by flying south of the prohibited area. The last communication with Ngerengere was at 0439 hours, when the aircraft was south of that location.
At 0440:08 hours, the pilot called Dar es Salaam Tower on 118.3 MHz, transmitting blind, and revised his TMA estimate to 0441 hours at FL60, and his estimated time of arrival for Morogoro to 0451 hours. He stated he would call on top of descent. The tower acknowledged at 0440:31 hours, after which a series of microphone clicks were heard. No further communication occurred.
Wreckage Discovery
At 0850 hours, the aircraft owner alerted Dar es Salaam Control Centre that 5H-TZD had not landed at Morogoro. An alert phase was declared and the Rescue Coordination Centre activated. The wreckage was discovered by villagers on top of Palapala mountains on 5 May 1996. The search and rescue effort took 11 days due to adverse weather, thick tropical vegetation, and the unknown route of the aircraft.
Probable Cause
The official investigation determined that the accident was caused by the aircraft colliding with high ground in bad weather. Contributing factors included the pilot's decision to initiate descent in weather conditions that allowed no visual contact with the terrain, reliance on GPS for navigation into Morogoro, failure to obtain en route and destination weather information, choosing a southern mountain track instead of the northern track in adverse weather, and continuing the flight in bad weather instead of diverting to an alternate.