Douglas DC-4 accident at Stephenville, Newfoundland, 3 Oct 1946

Accident narrative

**The flight**

On October 3, 1946, an American Overseas Airlines Douglas DC-4 departing Harmon Field in Stephenville, Newfoundland, crashed into a steep ridge shortly after takeoff. The aircraft was demolished by the impact and subsequent fire, and all 39 occupants were killed instantly.

The flight was bound for Shannon, Ireland. The crew consisted of Captain William Rogers Westerfield, Copilot Robert Beckman Lehr, senior navigator John T. Tierney, Jr., junior navigator Jerome Lewis, flight engineer Mark Spelar, radio officer James N. Berry, purser Herbert D. Ewing, and flight stewardess Peggy Ann Burleigh.

Captain Westerfield possessed an airline transport pilot rating and had accumulated 3,926 hours of flying time, including 1,561 hours on DC-4 equipment. Copilot Lehr held a commercial pilot certificate and an instrument rating, with 1,707 total hours, of which 805 were in the DC-4. Both pilots were properly certificated, and the captain had qualified over the route, which included several previous operations into and out of Harmon Field. The aircraft’s weight was 200 pounds under its approved maximum takeoff weight of 71,800 pounds, and the load was distributed within approved center of gravity limits.

**The sequence of events**

Before the scheduled departure, the flight crew was briefed on the weather at the United States Army Air Forces Operations at Harmon Field. At approximately 0445, the captain requested takeoff clearance and was instructed by the control tower operator to proceed to Runway 30. As the aircraft taxied, the tower anemometer indicated a 9 mph wind from 90 degrees. The tower operator advised the flight that a runway change was necessary and cleared the aircraft for takeoff on Runway 7.

At 0500, the aircraft departed on a magnetic bearing of approximately 70 degrees. The weather was reported as a 5,000-foot overcast ceiling, 10 miles visibility, and a 10 mph northeast wind. Neither the moon nor stars were visible through the overcast, and the unlighted terrain in the vicinity of the airport could not be seen.

About one minute after takeoff, the tower operator requested a ceiling check. The flight replied "wait." This was the last radio contact. Approximately two minutes and 30 seconds after the aircraft left the ground, witnesses observed a glow of fire about seven miles from the field, almost directly in line with Runway 7. When several radio attempts failed, search operations were initiated by AAF personnel.

**What the investigation found**

The first search party arrived several hours later. The aircraft had crashed against an 80-degree hill slope at an elevation of 1,160 feet, 7.1 miles from the takeoff end of Runway 7, on a magnetic bearing of 76 degrees 45 minutes. Marks on the hill indicated the aircraft was in approximately straight and level flight at the moment of impact. Fire broke out immediately, burning severely for about nine hours. Investigators observed no evidence of structural failure or malfunctioning prior to impact. Maintenance records and testimony from company personnel indicated the aircraft and powerplants were functioning properly prior to and during takeoff.

The terrain northeast of Harmon Field rises to an elevation over 1,800 feet through an azimuth extending from approximately 20 degrees to 90 degrees magnetic. Directly in line with Runway 7 is a depression slightly under 1,000 feet. The Board noted that the horizontal distance across this pass was insufficient for a normal and safe climb procedure, and navigating it in darkness would be very difficult. Therefore, the pass had to be disregarded for determining a safe climb.

The Civil Aeronautics Administration had approved the operation into Harmon Field based on transport category requirements, which typically involved surveying an area within a three-mile radius of the airport. The high terrain lay beyond this surveyed area. At the time of the flight, no takeoff restrictions or special procedures for climbing after takeoff from Harmon Field had been established. However, the AAF Air Transport Command restricted its own DC-4 operations to over-water takeoffs when the wind velocity was less than 10 mph, and tower personnel testified it was general practice for flights using Runway 7 to make a right turn shortly after takeoff.

The Board concluded that with a normal rate of climb from Runway 7, a safe margin of clearance over the northeast terrain could not be obtained. Safe procedure required a turn shortly after takeoff and a climb away from the high terrain. The navigational data carried in the cockpit adequately described the obstructions, providing the pilot with the information necessary to determine a safe climb. Because the direction of climb—which was 35 degrees to the left of the proposed route—was maintained toward the high terrain, the Board concluded the captain was not alert to the necessary procedure.

The Board noted that modern air carrier operations burdened pilots with evaluating an increasing number of details, particularly during takeoff and climb. It stated that provisions must be made to assure the execution of safe climb procedures, relieving the pilot's burden by clearly defining the required maneuvers for night or instrument conditions.

**Probable cause**

The Board determined that "the probable cause of this accident was the action of the pilot in maintaining the direction of take-off toward higher terrain over which adequate clearance could not be gained."