Accident Overview
On a cargo flight in instrument meteorological conditions, the flight crew approached Charleston Yeager International Airport (CRW) at 9,000 ft. The automatic terminal information service (ATIS) reported wind from 080° at 11 knots, 10 miles visibility, scattered clouds at 700 ft agl, and a broken ceiling at 1,300 ft agl. However, a special weather observation recorded about 7 minutes before the crew's initial contact with the CRW approach controller indicated changed conditions: wind from 170° at 4 knots and a ceiling of 500 ft agl. The controller did not provide this updated information to the crew and did not update the ATIS, as required by Federal Aviation Administration Order 7110.65X.
Flight Crew Actions
The controller advised the crew to expect the localizer 5 approach, which would have provided a straight-in final approach aligned with runway 5. The first officer acknowledged but requested the VOR-A circling approach, presumably because it aligned with the inbound flightpath and the localizer 5 approach would have been slightly longer. The crew's decision to fly the VOR-A approach was contrary to the operator's standard operating procedures (SOP), as the localizer 5 approach was available. The minimum descent altitude (MDA) for the localizer approach was 373 ft agl, while the VOR-A approach had an MDA of about 773 ft agl. With the cloud ceiling at 500 ft agl, it would have been difficult to see the airport at the VOR-A MDA; however, the crew did not have the special weather information. The controller was required to provide the updated weather report indicating the ceiling had dropped below the MDA, which could have prompted the crew to use the localizer approach. However, even if informed, the crew would not have been required to switch because the minimum visibility for the VOR-A approach was within acceptable limits. The controller approved the VOR-A request and cleared the flight direct to the first waypoint, descending to 4,000 ft.
Descent and Maneuvering
Radar data showed that as the flight progressed along the VOR-A approach, the airplane descended 120 ft below the prescribed minimum stepdown altitude of 1,720 ft two miles before the FOGAG waypoint. It remained level at about 1,600 ft until about 0.5 mile from the displaced threshold. At that point, the airplane entered a 2,500 ft-per-minute, turning descent toward the runway in a steep left bank up to 42°, in an apparent attempt to line up with the runway. Performance analysis indicated that just before impact, the descent rate decreased to about 600 fpm and pitch began moving nose-up, suggesting the captain was pulling up, but it was too late to save the approach. Postaccident examination found no airplane or engine malfunctions that would have precluded normal operation.
Pilot Performance and Operator Oversight
Video and witness evidence was not conclusive as to whether the captain descended below the MDA before exiting cloud cover; however, the descent from the MDA was not in accordance with federal regulations requiring that the aircraft be continuously in a position for a normal descent and landing. The descent rate also did not comply with company guidance of about 500 ft/min. Rather than continuing the approach, the captain should have conducted a missed approach and executed the localizer 5 procedure. No evidence indicated why the captain continued; however, his recent performance history, including an unsatisfactory checkride due to poor instrument flying, suggested marginal instrument skills. The first officer could have called for a missed approach but, based on text messages and interview statements, was not in the habit of speaking up. The experience difference between the captain and first officer likely created a communication barrier due to authority gradient. ATC data of three previous VOR-A approaches flown by the captain and airport security footage from one month earlier indicated that the captain's early descent below specified altitudes and excessive maneuvering were not isolated to the accident flight. The evidence suggested the crew consistently turned to final later and at a lower altitude than recommended by the operator's SOPs. The flight crew's performance was consistent with procedural intentional noncompliance, a longstanding concern highlighted on the NTSB's 2015 Most Wanted List. The operator had no formal safety and oversight program to assess compliance with SOPs or monitor pilots with previous performance issues.