What happened
On 22 June 2018, an A-29 (tail number PT-ZNV-221) crashed at the Red Rio Bombing Range within the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. The aircraft, owned by Embraer and operated by Sierra Nevada Corporation in support of the 586th Flight Test Squadron, was conducting a continuation training sortie for the Light Attack Experiment Phase II.
The incident began following the release of a GBU-12 weapon from the left outboard pylon. Following the release, the pilot attempted to execute a planned 180-degree right turn. During this maneuver, the pilot applied right aileron and rudder inputs while maintaining 1.47 positive g’s, which exacerbated an existing right-rolling tendency caused by the asymmetric weight of the weapon release. This sequence triggered a rapid roll into an uncontrolled spiral dive. The crew made four attempts to recover the aircraft, but the descent continued until impact. While the weapon systems officer successfully ejected with minor injuries, the pilot died instantly upon impact following a delayed ejection initiation.
The investigation
The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) examined the flight dynamics, crew performance, and aircraft systems. Investigators analyzed the sequence of events from the departure of Holloman AFB through the weapon delivery and subsequent loss of control. The board also reviewed maintenance records, crew qualifications, and the functionality of the Martin-Baker ejection seats used in the aircraft.
Findings
- The primary cause of the mishap was the pilot's overcontrol of the aircraft, which induced an inadvertent spiral dive, alongside a failure to apply sufficient recovery inputs.
- A critical factor in the fatality was the delayed initiation of the ejection sequence by the crew. The weapon systems officer initiated ejection at approximately 2,600 feet AGL, while the pilot did not initiate until roughly 700 feet AGL—well below the flight manual's recommended 5,000-foot minimum for uncontrolled flight.
- The crew's decision to attempt a 180-degree turn at low airspeed without compensating for the asymmetric weight of the released weapon contributed significantly to the loss of control.
- Contributing factors included crew fixation on recovery procedures, a failure to communicate altitude or "bailout" commands, and the use of the ejection seat in SINGLE mode. The board noted that if the seat had been operated in AFT mode, the pilot's ejection would have been automatically triggered 0.4 seconds after the weapon systems officer, potentially increasing the chance of survival.