Accident Summary
On 21 November 2019, at approximately 1506 Zulu (9:06 a.m. local time), two T-38C Talon aircraft collided during an attempted formation landing on Runway 35 Center at Vance Air Force Base, Oklahoma. Mishap Aircraft 1 (MA1), tail number 65-0395, was flown by Mishap Student Pilot 1 (MSP1) and Mishap Instructor Pilot 1 (MIP1). Mishap Aircraft 2 (MA2), tail number 67-4950, was flown by Mishap Student Pilot 2 (MSP2) and Mishap Instructor Pilot 2 (MIP2). Both aircraft were assigned to the 25th Flying Training Squadron, 71st Flying Training Wing. MIP1 was an Active Guard Reserve officer assigned to the 5th Flying Training Squadron but flying with the 25th FTS. MIP2 was assigned to the 25th FTS. MSP1 and MSP2 were assigned to the 71st Student Squadron and flew with the 25th FTS.
Sequence of Events
Immediately after touchdown, MA1, flying in the left wing position, became briefly airborne, rolled rapidly to the right, then touched down once more in a right bank. MA1 entered a skid and crossed the runway centerline from left to right toward MA2. MA1 lifted off the runway again and struck MA2 with its right main landing gear. The collision caused MA1 to roll over the top of MA2 and impact the ground in a nearly inverted attitude, fatally injuring MIP1 and MSP1. MA1 slid approximately 700 feet before coming to a stop in a grassy area. Following the collision, MA2 departed the prepared surface, remained upright, traveled through the grass, and came to a stop. MIP2 and MSP2 shut down and safely egressed their aircraft.
Causes and Factors
The investigation board president found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the causes of the mishap were MIP1 failing to take control of MA1 as a precarious situation developed and MSP1 subsequently making an inappropriate flight control input. During the landing sequence, MSP1 prematurely initiated an aerodynamic braking maneuver immediately after MA1 initially touched down, causing MA1 to lose contact with the runway surface. Almost simultaneously, MSP1 applied and held right rudder in an attempt to steer MA1 away from the left edge of the runway. MSP1’s use of rudder under these conditions—airborne, configured for landing, and at an increased angle of attack—caused MA1 to roll and yaw to the right and placed MA1 on a collision course with MA2. The board president found that MIP1 could not have successfully prevented a collision after MSP1’s rudder input had taken effect, but that MIP1 would have already intervened to take control had he made an accurate real-time risk assessment in the preceding moments. Additionally, a factor that substantially contributed to the mishap was that MSP1 lacked an effective visual scan during the formation approach. Due to his focus on MA2, MSP1 did not adequately crosscheck his runway alignment prior to touchdown. Instead, he used rudder in an attempt to steer MA1 as his premature aerobrake lifted the weight from MA1’s wheels after initial touchdown.