Background
On 18 January 2023, an MQ-9A Reaper (tail number 11-4123) assigned to the 432nd Wing, Creech Air Force Base, Nevada, and on loan to Integrated Innovation, Incorporated (i3), was being operated by a Launch and Recovery Element from i3. The mishap crew consisted of a Mishap Pilot (MP), Mishap Sensor Operator (MSO), and two safety observers.
Sequence of Events
During pre-flight ground operations, the MP failed to recognize that the Angle of Attack (AOA) was outside Technical Order parameters during safety checks. During the initial engine run-up, all instrument indications were good. The calculated rotation speed was 78 KIAS, but no verbal acknowledgment of rotation speed was heard. At 82-83 KIAS, the MSO called "ABORT!" The MP acknowledged and initiated abort procedures at 91 KIAS, but the aircraft became airborne at 92 KIAS, climbing to 18 feet AGL.
The MP then directed the MSO to "Kill the GDT" (Ground Data Terminal). The MSO toggled the kill switch while the aircraft was stalled at 67 KIAS and 2 feet AGL over the runway centerline. The aircraft lost remote connectivity with the Ground Control Station and impacted the runway, driving off the paved surface. The radome, Multi-Spectral Targeting System, lower data-link antenna, all three landing gear, and engine were destroyed. No injuries or fatalities occurred, and no civilian property was damaged. The loss was valued at $16,111,000.
Investigation Findings
The Accident Investigation Board President (AIBP) determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the cause of the mishap was the MP's decision to "Kill the GDT" causing lost link while the aircraft was 2 feet AGL and 67 KIAS. Three factors substantially contributed: (1) the MP failing to recognize AOA checks were out of Technical Order limits during ground operations; (2) the MSO's failure to verbalize "ROTATE" at rotation airspeed; and (3) the MSO's failure to recognize the aircraft was beyond rotation airspeed during the abort command.