Casualties unknown

2011-10-16: Vans RV-6 (G-ORVG) — Biggin Hill Airport, Kent, GB

Biggin Hill Airport, Kent, GB

On October 16, 2011, a Vans RV-6 (registration G-ORVG) was involved in an aviation accident near Biggin Hill Airport, Kent, GB. This summary draws on records from the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB).

Sourcesthe UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB)Primary reportUpdated 1785053200Data APIEditorial standards

A Vans RV-6 sustained tail wheel damage after the pilot braked hard to avoid an airfield security vehicle that pulled onto the taxiway from the fire training area. The driver did not stop at double white lines and was obscured by the setting sun.

History of the Flight

On 16 October 2011 at 1630 hrs, a Vans RV-6, registration G-ORVG, landed at Biggin Hill Airport, Kent, for a private flight. After completing customs formalities at the terminal building, the pilot received clearance to taxi the aircraft back to its hangar. The aircraft crossed the runway at the Link taxiway intersection and proceeded south on Taxiway A.

As the aircraft neared the airfield fire training area, the pilot observed an airfield security vehicle emerge from bushes and trees surrounding the area. The vehicle had left the fire training area and was driving on a connecting roadway toward Taxiway A. It entered a live taxiway immediately ahead of the taxiing aircraft without stopping on the roadway. The pilot braked hard in an attempt to avoid a collision, causing the tail of the aircraft to rise and then strike the ground forcefully.

The aircraft came to a stop approximately 10 ft away from the vehicle. A subsequent examination revealed damage to the tail wheel and surrounding structure. Neither the pilot nor the passenger sustained injuries.

Investigation

The airfield operator immediately initiated an investigation into the incident. The investigation identified the following contributory factors:

  • At the time of the incident, the driver was driving toward the setting sun, which obscured their vision.
  • The driver did not stop at the double white lines on the fire training area access to confirm that the taxiway was clear before entering.
  • There was no requirement at the time for vehicles leaving the fire training area to contact ATC for permission to enter Taxiway A.

Safety Action

As a result of the investigation, the airfield operator introduced a requirement for all vehicles leaving the fire training area to obtain permission from ATC prior to entering Taxiway A. No further safety action was considered necessary.