What happened
On Monday, July 24, 1967, at approximately 17:15, a Piper PA-18 LN-HAM, registered to Nor-Wings A/S of Tromsø, departed from Tromsø Langnes Airport for instructional flight training. The aircraft was occupied by an instructor and a student pilot. Throughout the afternoon, the pair completed five landing circuits, maintaining continuous radio contact with the Langnes control tower.
During the fifth circuit, the aircraft landed on Runway 19 and rolled approximately 200–300 meters down the runway before accelerating for takeoff again. The plane became airborne after utilizing roughly two-thirds of the runway length and climbed southward. It passed over the control tower at an altitude of 50–60 feet around 17:45, at which point visual contact was lost by the tower personnel.
An eyewitness positioned near the end of the runway observed the aircraft passing overhead at an altitude of 80–100 meters. The witness noted that the engine sound weakened significantly, indicating a loss of power, and the airspeed appeared to decrease noticeably. The aircraft then flattened out and initiated a sharp left turn. As it completed approximately 180 degrees of this turn, the plane suddenly entered a steep dive and struck the water surface 250–300 meters south of the witness's position, slightly east of the runway centerline extension.
The aircraft came to rest at an angle in shallow water, with its nose pointing downward toward the seabed. Bystanders quickly rescued both occupants from the wreckage using a nearby boat. The control tower personnel did not witness the crash and were initially unaware of the accident, leading to delays in emergency response coordination.
The investigation
The Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority (NSIA) examined the wreckage, which was heavily deformed upon recovery. Both wings were broken at the roots; the right wing's leading edge was bent upward, suggesting a steep impact angle with the water. The nose section, including the engine and cowling, had shifted upward and backward. The propeller remained attached to the engine, with one blade bent rearward. The tail appeared intact, but the cabin floor was crushed inward, and the roof was torn off.
Investigations confirmed that there were no technical failures in the aircraft, engine, propeller, or control systems that contributed to the accident. The fuel selector was found on the left tank, and the throttle was in the full open position. The flight timer showed 792.22 hours of total time.
The instructor held a valid commercial pilot certificate and instructor rating, with approximately 31 hours of instructional experience. The student pilot had resumed training after an 18-month break and had accumulated roughly 4 hours of flight time since returning to the program. Weather conditions at the time included light west breeze, broken clouds at 3,500 feet, rain showers, and visibility of approximately 15 km.
Findings
The primary cause of the accident was determined to be improper maneuvering by the instructor. The student pilot reported that during the final takeoff, the instructor simulated an engine failure at an altitude of approximately 250 feet. When asked where he would land, the student indicated a grassy area to the left. The instructor responded by taking control and executing a very sharp bank, nearly 90 degrees, while stating, "Now you will see how it is done."
The student pilot reacted by grabbing the controls and attempting to level the aircraft by turning right and pulling back on the stick. However, this input was ineffective due to the low altitude and airspeed, resulting in a stall and subsequent crash into the water. The NSIA noted that the student's reaction of banking right while pulling back would likely have worsened the situation rather than recovering from the stall.
The investigation highlighted that Nor-Wings A/S did not teach students to turn back to the runway during simulated engine failures at altitudes below 500 feet, a practice considered unsafe. Standard procedure dictates landing straight ahead or making only slight turns to find a suitable landing area. The witness account confirmed the engine sound weakened and did not recover before impact, contradicting any theory that full power was applied during the dive.
Additionally, the control tower personnel lost visual contact with the aircraft immediately after it passed overhead, failing to monitor its flight path continuously as required by ICAO standards. This lack of observation delayed the recognition of the accident and subsequent emergency response. Delays in ambulance dispatch due to staffing issues at the hospital further complicated the aftermath.
Safety action
The incident underscored the dangers of attempting to return to the runway during simulated engine failures at low altitudes. It reinforced existing safety guidelines that such maneuvers should be avoided, with emphasis placed on landing straight ahead or selecting alternative fields. The event also highlighted the critical importance of continuous visual monitoring by air traffic control personnel and efficient emergency response protocols.