Accident Overview
During the first officer's initial training, the captain elected to demonstrate 'a more efficient reversing technique' using a touch-and-go. The airplane departed the left side of the runway at the 4,000-foot marker, dragging the left wing and lower left reverser bucket. It continued for 2,000 feet before coming to rest.
Evidence from Onboard Systems
Evidence indicated that neither thrust reverser was stowed and that the flaps were at full deployment. McDonnell Douglas Letter #4 states that reverser buckets will not stow with engine pressure ratio (EPR) above approximately 1.2. The digital flight data recorder (DFDR) showed no indication that the airplane completely lifted off the ground once the initial landing was made. It indicated a constant decay of airspeed from the initial touchdown until the airplane stopped.
Environmental and Airplane Manual Considerations
There was a right crosswind at the time of the accident. There was no physical evidence that the nose wheel was in contact with the runway when directional control was lost. The airplane flight manual indicates that increasing amounts of reverse thrust significantly reduces rudder effectiveness.