Preflight
About 25 minutes before departure, the pilot contacted the Raleigh Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) to file an IFR flight plan. During the call, the briefing specialist asked if the pilot had Convective Sigmet 47E, which covered the departure airport and had been issued approximately 10 minutes earlier. The pilot replied that he had information about the sigmet but did not need any weather services. There was no record that the pilot obtained a preflight weather briefing from the two DUAT vendors. The departure airport had a computer with weather access, but it did not record who used it, and no computer printouts were found in the wreckage.
Departure and Inflight Events
The flight departed and shortly after takeoff, air traffic control communications were transferred from the local tower to Myrtle Beach Air Traffic Control Tower. The pilot established contact, and the controller questioned why the pilot was deviating without clearance. The controller asked if the pilot could accept a northerly heading; the pilot said he could not. The controller then vectored the pilot to fly a south-southwesterly heading for traffic, which the pilot acknowledged. The controller then advised the pilot to resume his own navigation after climbing through 2,600 feet.
The flight proceeded on a northwesterly heading. Radar plots indicated that at the altitude flown, the flight encountered VIP Level 5 (intense) echoes. The airplane was observed on radar in a right descending turn and crashed into a wooded area. The average rate of descent was calculated to be 4,085 feet per minute. A search began and the airplane was located the following morning.
Aircraft Equipment and Examination
The airplane was equipped with a stormscope and a moving map display with monochromatic weather depiction. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of in-flight breakup; all major structural components were found in the immediate vicinity of the accident site. The flaps were nearly retracted, and the landing gear was retracted. Examination of the flight control system for roll, pitch, and yaw showed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The engine and propeller also showed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The vacuum pump, which was impact damaged, had its drive coupling intact (not failed). No specimens were available for FAA toxicology screening.