Accident Details
A private pilot with 1,323 hours of flight time had successfully completed a biennial flight review approximately one hour before the accident flight. The flight instructor administered a two-hour oral quiz emphasizing fuel system knowledge prior to the review flight. The instructor and pilot preflighted the airplane, confirming the left main fuel tank was full and the right main tank was nearly full, and departed with the fuel selector in the Left Hand Tank position for the 1.2-hour review flight. After the review, the instructor further quizzed the pilot and advised him to check fuel before departing on a local flight for multiple touch-and-go takeoffs and landings. There was no record indicating the pilot refueled before the accident flight.
During the accident flight, while in the traffic pattern turning from downwind to base leg, witnesses observed the aircraft bank left and go straight down after hearing a loud bang, sputter, and hesitation from the engine, which then went silent.
Postaccident Examination
Examination of the aircraft revealed that the left main fuel tank, right tip tank, and center tank were intact, while the right main fuel tank and left tip tank were breached. After leveling the aircraft, approximately 5 gallons of fuel was drained from the left main tank, 2 gallons from the right tip tank, and 1 gallon from the center tank. The fuel selector handle, which was placarded, was found halfway between the OFF position and the Right Hand Tank position. The fuel screen was clean. The fuel gage indicator selector was in the #2 (Left Hand Tank) position.
Fuel System and Previous Flight
The airplane's fuel system consisted of two 20-gallon main tanks in each wing (17 usable each), one 10-gallon auxiliary tank, and two 15-gallon wing tip tanks, all of which were usable. There were no records indicating when the airplane was last refueled prior to the instructional flight. Manufacturer instructions state that the pilot must feel for the detent position when operating the fuel selector. A 1999 FAA airworthiness directive, issued due to reports of engine stoppage from incorrect fuel selector positioning, required a placard warning of no-flow conditions between detents; this directive was rescinded in 2000. Examination of the airframe and engine found no anomalies that would preclude operation before the accident.