Casualties unknown

2006-02-12: Cessna 501 (N501DR) — David Roeberg — Fort Pierce, FL

Fort Pierce, FL, US

On February 12, 2006, a Cessna 501 (registration N501DR) operated by David Roeberg was involved in an aviation accident near Fort Pierce, FL. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: mechanical binding of the normal brake system, rendering directional control impossible. Contributing factors were the improper overhaul, inadequate quality control procedures by the overhaul facility, and the rough terrain. This summary draws on records from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive.

Sourcesthe U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archivePrimary reportUpdated 1781061362Data APIEditorial standards

During landing roll, the pilot lost directional control and the airplane swerved off the runway. Investigation revealed binding return mechanisms in both brake assemblies and that normal brake travel was not set.

Accident Overview

During the landing roll, the pilot was unable to maintain directional control, causing the airplane to swerve side-to-side before departing the right side of the runway.

Pilot Report and Brake Condition

The pilot stated that overhauled brake assemblies had been installed prior to the accident. He reported that the brakes felt "spongy" and that the pedals went "almost to the floor, requiring two or three additional pumps for a hard pedal." The pilot was informed that this condition was "normal" because the airplane was not equipped with power brakes or anti-skid.

Maintenance Findings

The brake assemblies were removed and sent to the overhaul facility for examination. Inspectors found that both brake assemblies each had one return mechanism binding. The return mechanism featured a self-adjusting friction bushing designed to slip along the return pin at a predetermined spring pressure. When brake pressure was applied, the pressure plate extended toward the number one rotor, pulling the return pins through the swage and tube assemblies and compressing the return springs. Although the swage was intended to move through the tube freely, one swage on each brake was not moving as designed.

Additional Observations

The investigation noted that the brake travel was greater than normal because the "normal travel" setting had never been established. The binding of the return mechanisms likely prevented proper brake operation, contributing to the pilot's inability to maintain directional control.

Conclusion

The binding of the return mechanisms in both brake assemblies, combined with the absence of a properly set normal brake travel, resulted in the loss of directional control during the landing roll and the subsequent runway excursion.

Investigation report by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive. Original record: https://carol.ntsb.gov/event/20060224X00231. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), United States.