History of Flight
On January 25, 2009, at 0745 eastern standard time, a Remos Aircraft Remos GX, special light sport aircraft, N9GX, was substantially damaged during impact with terrain after experiencing a loss of control during the initial climb at Sebring Regional Airport (SEF), Sebring, Florida. The certificated commercial pilot was seriously injured and the passenger was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the local aerial photography flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.
According to the national service manager for Remos Aircraft, who took off in another company airplane in-trail of the accident airplane, the purpose of the flight was to obtain aerial photographs of the manufacturer's airplanes for an article in an aviation magazine.
After takeoff from runway 18, he observed the accident airplane, which had the photographer in the right seat with the right cabin door removed, roll to the right when it was 25 to 50 feet above ground level (agl). He also observed that the rudder was fully deflected to the left, the accident airplane was in a slip to the right, and both the left and right ailerons were drooping trailing edge down. As the witness continued to observe, the airplane reached an altitude of approximately 100 feet agl, then began to descend while continuing to turn right, eventually completing an approximate 270-degree turn and reaching a bank angle of about 80 degrees right wing down. The right wing made ground contact with the airport parking apron right wing tip first, followed by the nose. The airplane then skidded around to the right, slid across the apron, and came to rest in a depression next to taxiway "A," which paralleled runway 18.
Personnel Information
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued on July 23, 2008. He reported to the Safety Board that he had approximately 1,600 total hours of flight experience and "2 to 3 hours" of flight time in the accident airplane. Review of manufacturer's records also revealed that the pilot had accrued approximately 100 total hours of flight experience in the accident airplane make and model.
Aircraft Information
The accident airplane was a high wing single engine monoplane of carbon fiber composite construction. It was powered by a Rotax 912 ULS engine that produced 100 horsepower. It was certificated as a Light Sport Aircraft and was equipped with a folding wing system.
According to FAA and maintenance records, the airplane was manufactured in 2008. The airplane's most recent conditional inspection was completed on January 8, 2009. At the time of the inspection, the airplane had accrued 15 total hours of operation.
Meteorological Information
The reported weather at OBE, approximately 29 nautical miles southeast of the accident site, at 0745, included: calm winds, visibility 5 miles in mist, sky clear, temperature 8 degrees Celsius, dew point 7 degrees Celsius, and an altimeter setting of 30.19 inches of mercury.
Airport Information
According to the Airport Facility Directory, SEF was a public use airport. It had two runways, oriented in an 18/36 and 14/32 configuration. Runway 18 was asphalt, in good condition, 5,234 feet long by 100 feet wide. The runway had basic markings in good condition. It was equipped with medium intensity runway edge lights and a precision approach path indicator.
Flight Recorders
The airplane was not equipped with a flight recorder. It was, however, equipped with a Garmin GPS-496 which recorded flight and navigation data in the unit's non-volatile memory (NVM) and a Dynon EMS D-10 which collected and stored engine parameter data. Review of the data from the two units confirmed that the engine was running at the time of the accident and also confirmed that the witness's observations regarding the flight path were accurate.
Wreckage and Impact Information
Examination of the accident site revealed that after impacting the apron, the airplane traveled 262 feet in an easterly direction before coming to rest on a 194-degree magnetic heading. Near the beginning of the wreckage path were three distinct propeller strikes. The wreckage path contained multiple fragmented portions of the airplane structure, including the right wing, which had separated into two parts; the right wing flap assembly separated from its mounts; and the right aileron assembly, also separated from its mounts with a portion of the roll control system still attached. The lower and upper engine cowling and propeller spinner were also discovered in the wreckage path.
Both propeller blades were found outside of and perpendicular to the main wreckage path. One blade was discovered 14 feet to the south, the other 138 feet north. Both composite blades were separated at the root and displayed chordwise scratching on their leading edge erosion strips, portions of blade surfaces, and on blade tips that had broken off.
Examination of the engine revealed no evidence of any preimpact failure or malfunction. Further examination of the engine and firewall area revealed fuel lines that were not fire sleeved, an aluminum fuel divider, a large opening where wiring passed through the firewall into the cabin, a plastic connector box, and unsealed firewall carry throughs.
Examination of the airframe revealed no evidence of any preimpact malfunction or failure. The aft fuselage was inverted and angled to the right of the longitudinal axis by approximately 40 degrees, almost fully separated from the aft portion of the cockpit area, and exhibited a vertical crack on the aft side of the vertical stabilizer. The left wing was still attached. The left flap panel, left aileron, and elevator remained attached to their pivot points. The rudder was separated from its upper pivot point but remained attached to the vertical stabilizer by its lower pivot point.
Examination of the horizontal stabilizer, left wing, and fragmented right wing revealed that the stabilizer and wings could be removed and folded. The stabilizer-securing bolts and wing-securing bolts were present along with their securing pins.
Examination of the flight control system revealed that the airplane utilized cables and pulleys to connect the rudder to rudder pedals, and push-pull rods and bell cranks to link ailerons and elevator to control sticks. Ailerons and elevator could be disconnected through quick release rod-connectors. Control continuity was established to the elevator and from the right aileron bell crank assembly to a break in the threaded portion of the rod end (tensile overload), and to the right aileron's quick release connector, which was found connected and locked. Control continuity could not be established to the left aileron. There were no mechanical failures of the left aileron bell crank or push-pull rod, but its quick release rod-connector was not connected to the quick release connector fork.
Tests and Research
At the time of the accident, the US Sport Aviation Expo was being held at SEF, and Remos had two airplanes on display: N9GX (the accident airplane) and N78GX. On the day before the accident, the pilot and national service manager had been demonstrating the wing folding mechanism in the display area for prospective customers.
According to the national service manager, on the morning of the accident, he and the pilot pulled both airplanes from under a display tent. Both had their left wings in the folded position. When they pulled N9GX out, he was at the left wing root. He inserted the left wing's main wing securing bolt, installed the securing pin, and then went to N78GX. He did not, however, connect the pushrod connection for the aileron before going to N78GX, nor did he advise the pilot that the coupling was not connected.
According to the pilot, he remembered greeting two representatives from an aviation magazine that morning outside the display tent. He remembered being at the left wingtip of N9GX with the manager at the wingroot when unfolding the wing. He thought he saw him go inside the airplane and assumed he was connecting the aileron. He next remembered being ready for takeoff and then "something was amiss with my controls," followed by a "swirling of the airplane."
Pilot Operating Handbook
According to the Pilot Operating Handbook (POH), Section 7.1, "Preflight Check," a check for free and full travel of all control surfaces was required. Section 8.8, "Connecting folded Wings to Fuselage," stated that after connecting the wings, "the pushrod connection of the ailerons MUST be established." Section 9, "Required Placards and Markings," indicated that the starting checklist on the center console included checking flight controls.
Additional Information
In order to improve safety, Remos Aircraft took the following actions:
1. On January 30, 2009, Safety Directive SD-004 was issued to all owners, discussing the importance of connecting all quick release connections to ensure control continuity before every flight. A temporary POH update and additional temporary placarding were included. 2. On March 25, 2009, Safety Directive SD-005 was issued, containing permanent placards (decals) to emphasize the importance of connecting any quick release connections. These were placed near all locations of quick release connections. 3. The REMOS GX POH and checklists were revised, with special emphasis on steps to assure control continuity, including boldfacing and coloring. 4. The quick release mechanism on aileron pushrods and elevator control system was modified for enhanced safety. 5. An internal procedure for two-person airplane setup was published for demonstration and airshow purposes. 6. Fire sleeves for fuel lines were improved for end-to-end fire integrity. 7. The blue anodized aluminum fuel divider was replaced with a stainless steel version, and aluminum fittings passing through the firewall were replaced with stainless steel versions. 8. The existing breach in the firewall allowing plastic sleeved wires to pass through was replaced with United States Military Standard (MIL SPEC) connectors. 9. All firewall carry throughs for Bowden wires, fuel lines, etc., are now made of stainless steel and sealed with fireproof sealant. 10. Heating and ventilation inlets and their routings through the firewall are now stainless steel, and air hoses for the cabin air system are fireproof aviation grade.