History of Flight
On February 17, 2009, at 1418 eastern standard time, a Cirrus SR20, registration N493DA, operating as a 14 CFR Part 91 instructional flight under call sign Connection 424, was substantially damaged when it collided with trees and terrain in Deltona, Florida. The flight originated from Orlando Sanford International Airport (SFB) at 1408. The commercial pilot flight instructor and commercial pilot receiving instruction were killed.
Two witnesses in the same neighborhood reported hearing an airplane flying overhead between 1430 and 1500. They observed the airplane flying eastbound at an altitude between 225 and 250 feet above the trees. Both witnesses stated the engine was heard to quit and the airplane made a sharp right turn, then pitched nose-down vertically and began spinning. Just before the airplane disappeared below the tree line, an orange or red parachute deployed but did not inflate. Shortly after, they heard an impact.
Delta Connection personnel notified the on-duty Delta Academy Manager at 1930 that the airplane was overdue. The FAA issued an alert notification at 2153. The wreckage was located at 0315 on February 18 by the Volusia County Sheriff Department.
Data downloaded from the multi-function display (MFD) and primary flight display (PFD) showed the pilots departed SFB at 1408. At 1413:30, maximum recorded airspeed was 115 knots, groundspeed 124 knots, and engine rpm reduced from 2,440 to 1,840 rpm at 1413:34. At 1417:10, the airplane was at 3,257 feet heading 078 degrees, then began pitching down. Indicated airspeed decreased to 60 knots. At 1417:19, altitude was 3,138 feet on heading 082 degrees at 75 knots. Engine rpm decreased to 1,050 at 1417:28, with airspeed 50 knots. At 1417:29, a 13-degree left wing down roll started, then reversed to the right. At 1417:34, at 3,131 feet heading 064 degrees, engine rpm increased to 2,500, airspeed 54 knots. The airplane entered a left-hand spin at 1417:35; PFD data ended at 1418:02.
Personnel Information
The commercial pilot flight instructor, age 23, held a commercial pilot certificate (June 9, 2004) with single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument ratings, and a flight instructor certificate (January 3, 2008) with airplane single-engine, multiengine, and instrument ratings. Last flight review June 13, 2008. He held a first-class medical (May 7, 2008) with no limitations. Initial DCA instructor pilot check ride in the SR20 was August 9, 2007. His logbook showed 1,625 total hours, 482.2 hours in SR20 as pilot-in-command, 1,299.1 hours as flight instructor (473.4 in SR20). In last 90 days: 182.1 hours (92.9 in SR20); last 30 days: 65.3 hours (31.7 in SR20); last 24 hours: 7.4 hours (2.5 in SR20).
The commercial pilot receiving instruction, age 30, held a commercial pilot certificate (February 13, 2009) with multiengine land and instrument ratings, and a private pilot certificate with single-engine land. Last flight review February 13, 2009. He held a first-class medical (June 3, 2008) with no limitations. Logbook showed 175.6 total hours, 132.2 hours in SR20 (35.8 as pilot-in-command). In last 90 days: 84.1 hours (38.1 in SR20); last 30 days: 26.3 hours. He was attending a DCA training course for commercial single-engine land add-on rating, on his second dual local flight with the instructor. The flight was scheduled 1330-1530 but was extended until 1930 at an undetermined time. Training syllabus included takeoff/climb, traffic pattern, systems, upper air work (slow flight, stalls, emergency/abnormal procedures).
Aircraft Information
The Cirrus SR20 (serial number 1839, manufactured 2007) is a four-place airplane with fixed tricycle landing gear, powered by a Continental IO-360-ES 200-horsepower engine. Last annual inspection January 5, 2009 (239.7 hours since); last 100-hour inspection February 2, 2009 (56.3 hours since). HOBBS meter at accident site indicated 1,643.7 hours; Flight meter 1,589.4 hours.
The DCA Manager of Safety and Security stated it is Academy policy to top off fuel before departure. The daily fuel log indicated the airplane was refueled twice on the morning of the accident, but not how much fuel was added. A Takeoff Data Card for N490DA at the site indicated 56 gallons on board at takeoff; a card for N493DA was not located. Actual fuel on board at the time of the accident could not be determined.
Meteorological Information
The 1453 SFB surface observation: wind 150 degrees at 6 knots, visibility 10 miles, clear, temperature 21°C, dew point 5°C, altimeter 30.20 inches of mercury.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The wreckage was located 13.24 nautical miles northeast of SFB in a wooded area. The airplane collided with treetops 30-35 feet high in a nose-down vertical descent, coming to rest on a heading of 305° magnetic. No debris line was observed.
The Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) safety pin was not located. The CAPS had been activated; the activation handle was separated from the handle holder, with the bracket bent downward and the activation cable separated from the cabin roof. CAPS activation cable continuity was confirmed from handle to firing pin actuator.
Engine cowlings were separated. The engine remained attached to the firewall except for the left aft mount. All accessories except the starter, left/right magneto, and secondary alternator remained attached; the primary alternator was partially attached. Nose landing gear leg remained attached to the engine mount; wheel and tire separated.
The propeller assembly remained attached to the crankshaft flange. The spinner was crushed with no rotation evidence. Three blades remained attached; one blade showed no damage, another was bent aft 22 inches outboard with chordwise rubbing, and the third was bent aft 5 inches outboard.
Airframe and flight control examinations revealed no anomalies. Flight control continuity was confirmed from cabin to all surfaces. Flaps were extended 50%.
Engine examination revealed no anomalies. Upper spark plug electrodes were normal per Champion comparison chart. Thumb compression and suction were obtained on all cylinders; valve and gear train continuity confirmed. Engine-driven fuel pump and drive coupling intact; pump drive shaft rotated freely. Throttle plate half open; mixture control at idle cutoff. Residual fuel in pump un-metered line; no fuel in firewall-mounted lines. Gascolator damaged.
The engine was sent to the manufacturer for a run on March 12, 2009, under NTSB supervision. The operation was normal and revealed no abnormalities that would have prevented normal operation or production of rated horsepower.
Medical and Pathological Information
Postmortem examinations conducted on February 18, 2009, determined the cause of death for both pilots as "multiple blunt force injuries." Postmortem toxicology tests for both pilots were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, ethanol, basic, acidic, and neutral drugs.
Additional Information
The DCA Manager of Safety and Security stated the Academy did not have a written procedure for flight following.
According to the Cirrus SR20 Pilot's Operating Handbook, at a gross weight of 3,000 pounds with the most forward center of gravity, the airplane will stall at 61 knots indicated (63 knots calibrated) with 0° bank and 50% flaps, and at 72 knots indicated (75 knots calibrated) in a 45° bank with 50% flaps.
Section 10 of the handbook, on deployment altitude, states: "No minimum altitude for deployment has been set... the actual altitude loss during a particular deployment depends upon the airplane's airspeed, altitude, and attitude at deployment as well as other environmental factors... the demonstrated altitude loss from entry into a one-turn spin until under a stabilized parachute is 920 feet. Altitude loss from level flight deployments has been demonstrated at less than 400 feet. With these numbers in mind it might be useful to keep 2,000 feet AGL in mind as a cut-off decision altitude."
The Cirrus SR20 Flight Standards Manual (Page 3A-17) states: "Minimum Altitudes, While conducting maneuvers other than those which are ground-based, flight crews will ensure that at no time the aircraft is operated at an altitude less than 3000 feet AGL. In the event of an inadvertent spin, this will allow the flight crew additional time to execute recovery or CAPS deployment procedures."
Review of ten additional MFD data files from other aircraft flown by the flight instructor showed no instances similar to the accident flight.