History of Flight
On May 25, 2009, at about 1146 eastern daylight time, a Beech C90A, registration N8001V, was landed hard during a forced landing in a field near Yeehaw Junction, Florida. The aircraft was operated by Executive Airlink, Inc., under 14 CFR Part 135 as a non-scheduled domestic passenger flight from Ocean Reef Club Airport (07FA), Key Largo, Florida, to Orlando Executive Airport (ORL). Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was activated. The airplane was substantially damaged; the airline transport pilot, co-pilot, and two passengers were not injured. The flight departed 07FA about 1104 with an estimated 1,600 to 1,800 pounds of fuel.
Shortly after departure, the pilot-in-command (PIC) observed an amber crossfeed light on the annunciator panel. The flightcrew reviewed the emergency procedures checklist for boost pump failure but did not comply with the checklist or change the fuel control configuration. The PIC reported no urgency and continued the flight without monitoring fuel quantity gauges.
At 1137, air traffic control instructed the flightcrew to cross BAIRN intersection at 10,000 feet. At 1145:37, the flightcrew requested diversion to the nearest airport. The controller vectored them toward an airport, but radio communications were lost shortly after. The PIC stated that while descending to 10,000 feet with the autopilot engaged, left and right low fuel pressure annunciator lights illuminated, followed by loss of power from both engines. The PIC restarted the left engine, but while attempting to restart the right, the left engine quit again. The PIC executed a forced landing in an open field, lowering the landing gear before touchdown. The airplane landed hard, bounced, and became airborne momentarily before coming to rest. All occupants evacuated safely.
Aircraft Information
The Beech C90A, serial number LJ-1265, was manufactured in 1990 and powered by two Pratt & Whitney PT6A-35 engines installed per a supplemental type certificate. The fuel system included five tanks per wing with transfer pumps and boost pumps. The crossfeed valve operated automatically in the event of a boost pump failure. Examination of the fuel control panel revealed a broken No. 1 terminal on the right no-transfer time delay relay, with wires TBI-21-XK4-1 and XK4-1-S9-6 still attached to the separated portion. The left no-transfer time delay relay appeared properly attached.
Examination and Testing
Post-accident examination showed no pre- or post-crash fire. The left boost pump was tested; it initially operated but later failed electrically. Disassembly revealed worn upper motor brushes with restricted travel due to the shunt wire catching the brush card slot, causing multiple contours and pitted commutator bars. The right boost pump operated satisfactorily. Both transfer pumps pumped fuel into nacelle tanks, but the right no-transfer annunciator did not illuminate when the right center tank was empty, and the transfer pump continued running beyond one minute. Laboratory examination of the right relay found wires from terminals 1, 6, and 8 severed from the terminal; no arcing was observed. The left relay wire from terminal 6 separated during removal.
The left wing fuel filter bowl was full; approximately 12 ounces of fuel were drained from the outboard sump. Over 50 gallons were drained from the nacelle and center tanks. The right wing outboard tank was empty, and 16 ounces were drained from the center tank. The right nacelle tank contained about 42 ounces of fuel. Operational testing of the fuel quantity gauges showed left side indicating 650 pounds total and 400 pounds nacelle; right side showed off-scale low and 0 pounds nacelle, respectively. No fuel transfer warning lights had illuminated during the flight, according to the PIC.
Personnel Information
The PIC, age 46, held an airline transport pilot certificate with multi-engine and single-engine ratings, and a first-class medical certificate. He reported 5,789 total flight hours, with 725 hours in the accident make and model. The co-pilot, age 29, also held an airline transport pilot certificate and reported 2,500 total hours, with 690 hours in the accident make and model. Both were employed by Executive Airlink and had recent proficiency checks.
The PIC noted that on a previous flight (May 20 or 21, 2009), the left boost pump was intermittently inoperative; he did not follow the checklist and continued the flight. The discrepancy was reported to the company, but maintenance could not duplicate the issue, and the airplane was returned to service.