History of Flight
On September 1, 2009, at about 1425 central daylight time, a Robinson R44 Raven I helicopter, registration N33PX, was substantially damaged when it struck trees, terrain, and a house near Jackson/Hawkins Field (HKS), Jackson, Mississippi. The pilot in command (PIC) was seriously injured, and the second pilot was fatally injured. The flight was a combination currency flight for the PIC and familiarization flight for the second pilot, operated under 14 CFR Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed.
According to recorded air traffic control (ATC) voice and radar information, the helicopter first contacted Jackson Approach at about 1404 while still on the ground at Flowood Industrial STOLport (MS90), Flowood, Mississippi. The approach controller assigned a discrete transponder code and instructed the helicopter to contact approach once airborne. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter reported airborne and northbound. The radar target was acquired by the ATC radar facility at Jackson-Evers Airport (JAN). The first radar return appeared at 1405:55 at a radar-indicated altitude of 300 feet mean sea level (msl), 2,400 feet north of MS90. Soon after, the helicopter advised a change of plans and requested to proceed to HKS for practice at "Area 1"—a designated helicopter practice area east of runway 16/34 and north of runway 11/29. Radar data showed the helicopter turning from northerly to south-southwesterly heading at 700 feet msl.
When approximately 4 miles southeast of HKS, Jackson Approach terminated radar services and instructed the helicopter to contact HKS air traffic control tower (ATCT). The helicopter contacted HKS ATCT, requested approval for hover practice, which was granted. Radar showed the helicopter turning northwest toward the southeast corner of Area 1. As it descended, it temporarily disappeared from radar; the last return during this approach was at 1411:20 at 400 feet. The ATCT local controller reported the helicopter practiced hovering briefly, then landed in Area 1.
The helicopter then requested "right closed traffic" for Area 1 and was cleared for the option. Radar re-acquired the target at 1420:22 at 500 feet. The helicopter flew a downwind leg at 900 feet msl, offset about 3,800 feet east of Area 1, then made another approach. The last radar return for this approach was at 1422:53 at 400 feet. The local controller observed a touch and go, followed by another circuit. Radar reappeared at 1424:08 at 600 feet, with an immediate right turn for a second downwind leg offset 1,700 feet east of Area 1. The controller again cleared the helicopter for the option.
The controller then communicated with another aircraft and attempted to visually locate the helicopter but did not see it. Several calls to the helicopter went unanswered. The last three radar returns were at 1424:37.220 (1,000 feet), 1424:41.840 (800 feet), and 1424:46.550 (600 feet). The final return was located 700 feet northwest of the accident site.
Two pilots from the Mississippi Department of Public Safety (DPS) observed the helicopter from a hangar on the west side of HKS. One saw it approach Area 1, taxi north and south, then climb out north for a traffic pattern. When the helicopter was on downwind due east, he saw it begin "falling rapidly." The other DPS pilot, familiar with Robinson helicopters, initially thought the descent rate was not unusual but later agreed it seemed high. After descending a few hundred feet, the helicopter entered a right bank of about 15 degrees. Both stated the pitch attitude was approximately level before the bank. The helicopter disappeared behind the treeline to the east, and the DPS pilots prepared their helicopter for flight.
Another witness walking down his driveway heard repeated "clup" sounds from the helicopter. He saw it descend rapidly from the north, strike a tree, and enter a spin. It then struck a second tree and fell into a house, disappearing from view behind a house across the street. The witness crossed the street and approached the helicopter, seeing a person in the left front seat. The postman also went to the helicopter and noticed another person inside. Both used mobile phones to summon assistance.
Personnel Information
Both occupants were inspectors from the Jackson, Mississippi, FAA Flight Standards District Office (FSDO). The PIC was seated in the right seat, the second pilot in the left seat.
Pilot in Command (PIC)
The PIC had been employed by the FAA for about 3 years. He held commercial pilot and flight instructor certificates with rotorcraft-helicopter ratings. According to his logbook and FAA records, he had approximately 22,000 total flight hours, including about 221 helicopter hours (6 hours in R22, 81 in R44). Of those, 27.9 hours were without a safety pilot. His other helicopter experience was primarily in Bell 206 and Schweizer 300 series. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued in April 2009.
His initial helicopter flight was in April 2006 in an R44. First solo helicopter flight was November 7, 2007, in a Schweizer 300. He passed his commercial helicopter flight test on November 15, 2007, with 99 total helicopter hours (39 dual, no solo in Robinson). He passed his helicopter instructor flight test on January 22, 2008, with 138 total helicopter hours (60 dual, no solo in Robinson). Both tests were in a Schweizer 300.
The most recent R44 logbook entries were February 5 and February 12, 2009, both in the accident helicopter. The February 5 flight was his most recent flight review. According to FSDO records, his most recent R44 flight before the accident was July 23, 2009, and his most recent helicopter flight (Bell 206) was July 30, 2009.
A February 2007 logbook endorsement stated he completed awareness training per SFAR No. 73. An April 23, 2008 entry indicated he completed the Robinson Helicopter Company (RHC) Pilot Safety Course. Two February 5, 2009 endorsements stated he met requirements to provide instruction in an R44 and satisfactorily completed a flight review per FAR 61.56 and SFAR73. Both were signed by the FAAST team manager, a colleague at the Jackson FSDO. However, no evidence was found that the PIC ever provided flight instruction in a Robinson helicopter. After the accident, the PIC could not recall any specifics of the flight.
Second Pilot
The second pilot had been employed by the FAA for about 1 month. He held airline transport pilot and flight instructor certificates with rotorcraft-helicopter ratings. His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued in October 2008. According to his FAA employment application, he had approximately 16,800 total flight hours, including about 4,250 helicopter hours. He reported over 3,000 hours as PIC, 1,000+ as flight instructor, and 500 to 1,000 as second in command in US Army helicopters (Bell UH-1H). He also cited 1-99 hours in Bell single-piston and 100-499 hours in Hughes single-piston helicopters. His flight logbooks were not located for review. His most recent helicopter piloting experience was in 2000, and the accident flight was his first in a Robinson helicopter. No records of Robinson-specific training or SFAR73 endorsements were found. No definitive evidence was discovered regarding whether he manipulated the controls.
Aircraft Information
The helicopter was a 2007 Robinson R44 Raven I, equipped with a Lycoming O-540 piston engine. Power was transferred via four vee-belts connecting the engine and rotor system sheaves. The upper sheave had an overrunning clutch. An electric actuator maintained belt tension, enabled by a cockpit clutch switch. Fuel system was gravity-flow; main tank capacity 30.6 gallons, auxiliary 18.3 gallons. Maximum certificated gross weight 2,400 pounds.
The collective had a twist-grip throttle and an electronic governor that adjusted throttle when collective moved. The POH stated the governor was easily overridden, active above 80% engine rpm, and could be switched on/off via toggle on the right-seat collective. The governor was designed to assist in controlling rpm but may not prevent overspeed/underspeed during aggressive maneuvers.
A single aural warning horn sounded when main rotor rpm dropped to 97% or less, accompanied by a low rotor rpm warning light. Both received signals from the Low RPM Warning Unit, which received input from one of two Hall Effect transducers on the main rotor gearbox input yoke. The other transducer drove the rotor tachometer.
The helicopter was owned by a property-management company and primarily used for personal/business purposes, but also rented to FAA inspectors for currency and proficiency flights. It was based at MS90. The most recent annual inspection was January 2009, with 198 hours total time. A recovered notebook indicated the hour meter read 236.8 hours at start of the accident flight; at the accident site, it read 237.1 hours.
Meteorological Information
The 1353 HKS observation reported winds 330 degrees at 8 knots, 10 miles visibility, few clouds at 4,700 feet, temperature 27°C, dew point 14°C, altimeter 30.13 inHg. The 1453 HKS observation reported winds 320 degrees at 6 knots, 10 miles visibility, few clouds at 4,900 feet, temperature 28°C, dew point 15°C, altimeter 30.11 inHg.
Communications
Recorded ATC communications showed the helicopter was in contact with Jackson Approach for 3 minutes 35 seconds, then with HKS ATCT for 13 minutes 55 seconds. Radar tracking was discontinuous over 18 minutes 51 seconds.
Airport Information
HKS elevation was 270 feet msl. The ATCT was operated by Robinson Aviation, Inc (RVA), not affiliated with RHC. A letter of agreement (LOA) among several entities (excluding FAA) described procedures for helicopter operations at HKS, including Area 1, and specified a pattern altitude of 1,050 feet msl.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The accident site was located about 1/2 mile east of HKS in a residential neighborhood. The helicopter first struck a tree left of the flight path about 60 feet above ground level (agl), 135 feet before final rest. It then struck a second tree to the right about 25 feet agl, 55 feet before final rest. First ground scars were about 30 feet before the helicopter's final position. The helicopter came to rest on the ground, lodged into a wooden porch at the back of a house. Except for outboard segments of main rotor blades, all components were within 15 feet. Wreckage path aligned on a magnetic course of about 150 degrees. No pre- or post-impact fire.
The cabin, engine compartment, and main rotor mast were approximately level in roll. Forward cabin was bent up relative to aft cabin, pitched up about 60 degrees. Significant longitudinal crush damage. Both landing skids fracture-separated from forward struts.
The engine remained partially attached, with crush damage to baffles and aft accessories. Grass and dirt embedded in aft-facing components. The lawn and ground aft of the engine compartment had scars and divots.
Main rotor mast upright. Both blades remained attached; outboard ends fracture-separated. Blade A nearly inverted, bent up 90° at 32 inches from root; outboard 47 inches missing. Blade B bent up 90° at 22 inches from root, embedded in porch roof; leading edge fractured at 49 inches from tip. Liberated tip segment of Blade B found 80 feet prior to main wreckage. Upper skin surfaces of both blades had compression creases.
Tail boom partially separated just aft of fuselage; forward 5-foot section vertical, aft 12-foot section folded down with tail rotor on ground. Both tail rotor blades attached; one intact, one crumpled. Horizontal and upper vertical stabilizers intact; lower vertical crushed upward.
Severe structural disruption in vee-belt sheave region; sheaves displaced. All four vee-belts found; only one on upper sheave, all four on lower sheave, none in grooves. No damage associated with vee-belt failure at high speed.
Carburetor heat control knob extended about one-quarter travel; cable intact; slider valve crushed in position consistent with full heat. Mixture control cable separated from carburetor arm; spring in place. Fuel from carburetor bowl and strainer was clear blue aviation gasoline; no water detected. Main fuel tank split open; auxiliary tank separated and breached; no fuel observed but both bulged hydraulically. Finger screens clean; strainer screen and bowl free of contaminants.
Full set of flight controls installed at both seats; continuity established; separations consistent with overload. Tail rotor driveshaft separations from bending overload. Main and tail rotor gearbox continuity confirmed; magnetic chip detectors debris-free. No over-temperature indications on Telatemp decals. Upper sheave overrunning clutch functioned manually.
All circuit breakers except the 5-ampere "Clutch Start" were in normal positions.
Several components removed for examination. Hand rotation of engine confirmed magneto impulse coupling, valve-train and crankshaft continuity. Engine shipped to Lycoming for further examination.