No fatalities

Cessna 402C Veers Off Runway During Takeoff at Canyonlands Field Airport (N520NE)

Moab, UT, United States

On December 23, 2009, a CESSNA 402C (registration N520NE) operated by AeroLynx was involved in an aviation accident near Moab, UT. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilot's decision to depart on a snow covered runway, which resulted in a loss of control and encounter with terrain. This summary draws on records from NTSB; 12 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 2026-08-03Data APIEditorial standards

On December 22, 2009, a Cessna 402C cargo flight veered off runway 21 during takeoff at Canyonlands Field Airport, Moab, Utah, collapsing the nose gear. The pilot was uninjured; the aircraft sustained substantial damage.

History of Flight

On December 22, 2009, about 1700 mountain standard time, a Cessna 402C, N520NE, veered off the runway surface and collapsed the nose landing gear at Canyonlands Field Airport in Moab, Utah. AeroLynx operated the airplane under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135. The commercial pilot, the sole occupant, was not injured; the airplane sustained substantial damage. The cargo flight was originating in Moab with a planned destination of Price, Utah. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and a company flight plan had been filed.

The pilot reported receiving the latest weather report and checking for NOTAMs via Aviation Digital Data Service and FltPlan.com before departure. He taxied to runway 21 and performed pre-takeoff procedures, noting a thin snow covering on the runway with light snow falling. During the takeoff roll, the airplane encountered a "snow bank," which resulted in a loss of forward momentum and a veer to the left of the runway centerline. The pilot attempted corrective action but opted to abort the takeoff. The left main landing gear veered off the runway surface, and the nose gear collapsed. The airplane came to rest on snow-covered ground left of the runway, with its nose oriented about 90 degrees from the runway heading.

After exiting the airplane, the pilot observed a snow bank across the runway about one-quarter of the way down, where the snow was deeper than at the departure end. The bank appeared to mark where airport personnel had discontinued snow removal. The pilot noted that snow removal had been continuous throughout the day and that no NOTAMs indicated an airport closure.

A sheriff's deputy who responded spoke with the pilot shortly after the accident. According to the deputy's report, when the airport manager told the pilot that the deputy needed to ask what had happened, the pilot responded, "what I lost direction control." While the pilot was on the phone with his company, someone apparently indicated he should not speak to the deputy. The deputy asked the pilot why his company did not want him to speak, and the pilot replied that he guessed they were afraid he might "say something dumb."

The airport manager responded immediately after the accident. He stated that the airplane began the takeoff roll left of the centerline for runway 21 and continued to veer left. The left main gear eventually departed the runway surface into deep snow, and the airplane rotated sideways, sliding about 300 feet into the safety area.

The airport manager further stated that at the time of the accident, heavy snow was falling with winds from the northwest at 5 to 15 miles per hour, and he estimated runway snow cover at 4 to 5 inches. He commented that the airport has limited snow removal resources and that he was waiting for the snow to let up before starting removal. He was in the process of closing the airport because the snow cover exceeded the 2 inches allowed by the Airport Certification Manual. Although not on airport property at the time, he had contacted the Cedar City Flight Service Station to issue a NOTAM for airport closure, effective from approximately 1700 on the accident day to 0130 the following day.

A pilot employed at a fixed-based operator on the airport, who regularly flies a Cessna 207 on the same route, stated that he chose not to fly on the day of the accident because the weather did not permit safe operations due to low visibility and heavy snow. The cargo was transported by automobile instead.

A mechanic with the same FBO stated that the pilot indicated he wanted to depart around 1700 to 1730. After pulling the airplane out of the hangar, the pilot asked if the airport manager was plowing. The mechanic recommended the pilot call the manager on the local frequency. The mechanic watched the departure roll; the airplane gradually increased power until about 500 feet down the runway, where it appeared to be at full power. Snow kicked up from the landing gear, and the mechanic lost sight of the airplane due to reduced visibility.

Meteorological Information

A routine aviation weather report (METAR) for Canyonlands Field Airport issued at 1653, seven minutes before the accident, stated: visibility 3/4 mile; 1,500-foot overcast cloud layer, with few clouds at 800 feet; light snow and mist; temperature 23 degrees Fahrenheit; dew point 20 degrees Fahrenheit; altimeter 29.62 inHg. An updated report at 1723 showed visibility had increased to 1.5 miles, with the overcast layer at 2,200 feet and broken clouds at 1,500 feet.

Aerodrome Information

Canyonlands Field is a public airport operating under FAR Part 139. It has an asphalt runway 03/21, 7,100 feet long and 75 feet wide. The airport is equipped with an on-site Automated Weather Observation System (AWOS) providing 24-hour service on frequency 118.525 MHz.

Snow removal operations at the time were governed by the Airport Certification Manual (ACM). Section 313, Snow and Ice Control 139.313, stated that snow removal would be initiated when accumulations reached 0.5 inches or more of slush or 2 inches of dry snow. The runway would be closed if it had more than 0.5 inch of slush or 2 inches of dry snow. The airport manager or technicians were responsible for notifying the Grand County Road Department to begin snow removal; the Road Department operated from 7:00 AM to 5:30 PM, Monday through Thursday. The accident occurred about 1700 on a Tuesday. The manual also required that during after-hours snow events, airport technicians would report early to verify conditions and notify the county.

The airport manager stated that snow removal equipment at the airport is limited in size and capacity. Auxiliary equipment from the Grand County Road Department is not always immediately available due to higher priority areas and limited equipment. He noted that the airport does not frequently receive snow cover, with the current winter being an exception. There was no record of the manager contacting the Road Department.

The airport manager reported that records of snow removal operations or airfield conditions were kept via a Self Inspection form and/or a NOTAM log. The airport does not have friction measuring equipment.

Additional Information

According to FltPlan.com, the pilot last received a weather briefing at 1516 on the day of the accident.

A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector reviewed the damage and determined that damage incurred to the forward bulkhead, just aft of the radar, would require a major repair.

Contributing factors

Causes

Decision related to conditionPilotEffect on equipment

Other contributing factors

Airport personnel