History of Flight
On February 25, 2010, about 0927 eastern standard time, a Hawker Beechcraft Corporation C23, registration N180ED, experienced a loss of engine power during the takeoff climb from Winter Haven's Gilbert Airport (GIF), Winter Haven, Florida. The airplane impacted terrain approximately 0.6 statute mile west-northwest of the airport center. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the personal flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. The flight originated from GIF about 0925, destined for Lakeland Linder Regional Airport (LAL), Lakeland, Florida. The airplane sustained substantial damage, and the private pilot and one passenger were killed.
Witnesses at the operator's facility observed the occupants before takeoff. One witness reported the passenger borrowed a fuel sample device. Another witness saw the passenger check the right wing fuel tank. A student pilot heard an engine run-up but did not pay close attention. The airplane taxied to runway 29 and became airborne before the first intersection.
A pilot-rated witness near the departure end of runway 29 observed the airplane at about 150 feet above ground level (agl) in a wings-level climb attitude. Approximately 5 seconds later, at an estimated altitude of 200 to 300 feet agl, the engine abruptly stopped, as if the mixture had been pulled back. The nose pitched down about 5 degrees, and the airplane banked right about 30 degrees. The witness lost sight of the airplane behind trees and then heard the impact. He reported no sputtering or smoke, and the engine went from running to quitting suddenly. He saw no parts separate from the airplane.
Another pilot-rated witness at the operator's facility saw the airplane in a nose-high pitch attitude with a right bank of 60 to 70 degrees, then the airplane began descending rapidly to the right and disappeared behind trees.
Pilot Information
The pilot, age 45, held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating issued January 1, 2000, and a second-class medical certificate issued October 7, 2009. His logbook showed a total flight time of 468.9 hours, with the last flight logged on January 11, 2010. He had logged 5.7 hours in the accident airplane over five flights between December 6 and December 16, 2009, all as pilot-in-command. No record of a flight instructor sign-off for the accident airplane was found, though the operator's standard procedure required a checkout. His last flight review occurred on October 16, 2009.
Aircraft Information
The airplane was a 1974 Beech Aircraft Corporation model C23, serial number M-1622, powered by a 180-horsepower Lycoming O-360-A4J engine with a Sensenich fixed-pitch propeller. It was registered to Skyway Leasing, Inc., and operated by Tailwheels ETC, Inc. The last annual inspection was on April 10, 2009, and the last 100-hour inspection on August 12, 2009. At the time of the accident, total time was approximately 6,003 hours. Maintenance records showed no direct entry indicating the fuel selector valve was removed or replaced. The manufacturer stated no required overhaul interval for the valve.
Meteorological Information
A surface observation at GIF at 0853, about 34 minutes before the accident, reported wind from 330 degrees at 13 knots, clear skies, temperature 7°C, dew point -2°C, and altimeter 30.09 inHg.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The accident site was on a grass median between eastbound and westbound lanes of State Road 92. First ground contact was on the grass median, followed by contact with concrete curbing on the south edge of the westbound lanes. Ground scars on the westbound lanes were oriented on a magnetic heading of 045 degrees. Two parallel propeller blade contact scars were spaced 57.5 inches apart. The airplane came to rest in a ditch on the north side of the westbound lanes, about 103 feet from the curb contact point.
The right wing separated at the wing root and at the outboard edge of the fuel tank; the left wing remained partially attached. The fuselage rested on its left side, with the aft fuselage separated about 4 feet 6 inches aft of the main spar. The engine, mount, and propeller separated but were near the main wreckage. Flight controls showed no preimpact failure. Fuel supply system had no obstructions from tanks to engine, and fuel vents were clear. Flaps were retracted.
Cockpit examination revealed the ignition switch in the both position and the fuel selector handle in the off range. No air could be blown through the valve in the as-found position. The throttle cable was separated at the throttle quadrant end. Carburetor heat was cold, mixture control was 2 inches back from full rich.
Engine examination found the carburetor bowl contained about 1 ounce of blue fuel consistent with 100LL. All controls remained attached. Spark plugs showed gray deposits; top plugs had advanced wear, bottom plugs slight wear. Borescope revealed no cylinder anomalies. Crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity were confirmed. An engine run test with a test club propeller showed a magneto drop of 200 rpm on one magneto; after replacing two top spark plugs, left and right mag drops were 150 and 200 rpm respectively. Oil pressure was normal, idle smooth at 650 rpm.
Propeller examination: one blade bent aft about 180 degrees with chordwise scratches on the tip; the other blade bent aft about 30 degrees with leading edge twist toward low pitch and chordwise scratches. Spanwise scratches were present inboard of the tip.
Medical and Pathological Information
Postmortem examinations of the pilot and passenger by the Office of the District Medical Examiner, Winter Haven, Florida, listed the cause of death for both as "Blunt Impact to Head and Torso." Forensic toxicology for the pilot was negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, and volatiles; atropine was detected in liver and blood. For the passenger, toxicology was negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, and volatiles; atropine, etomidate, and midazolam were detected in liver; atropine in blood; etomidate (0.03 µg/mL), midazolam (0.015 µg/mL), and fentanyl in blood; laudanosine and lidocaine in drug screen.
Tests and Research
Examination of the throttle cable showed the end fitting was bent about 10 degrees. The separated cable ends were consistent with an anvil cutter. The failure mode was consistent with the cable pulling from the end fitting during separation.
The airplane was last fueled on January 28, 2010, with 17.8 gallons of 100LL at GIF. No fuel quality issues were reported. A pilot who flew the accident airplane the day before reported the fuel tanks were within 1 inch of full; the flight was .3 to .5 hours, with fuel selector on left tank. A CFI looked into both tanks before the accident flight and noted fuel levels within 2 inches from the top. Testing of an exemplar airplane determined each tank contained about 22.1 gallons usable fuel before engine start.
Weight and balance calculations: empty weight 1,602.5 lbs, pilot 228 lbs, passenger 338 lbs, fuel 22.1 gallons per tank. Gross weight calculated as 2,434 lbs, with CG at 112.66 inches aft of datum; CG limits at that weight are 114.2 to 118.3 inches aft of datum for normal category. Gross weight limit is 2,450 lbs.
Examination of both magnetos revealed internal timing correct on both. The left magneto had a missing distributor gear tooth but timing unaffected. Both magnetos operated intermittently at low rpm on test bench. Capacitors measured 0.3 microfarads (spec: 0.34–0.41). Coil resistances were within limits. The right magneto had a missing nylon washer but an extra washer installed.
Ignition switch P-leads were securely connected, but shielded wires separated from terminals. Testing showed no continuity when leads were moved. Switch operation tested satisfactory.
Airworthiness Directive 85-05-02 required modification of the fuel selector guard with a "Selector Stop" and decal. Compliance was recorded in 1985. The fuel selector valve had four detents: left, right, and two off positions. The handle has a raised arrow pointing to the selected tank. A fuel selector stop spring was installed per AD. The guard had placards for left and right tanks and off, but green line radials on the shroud did not continue onto the stop, and red line arcs were missing.
Postaccident testing of the fuel selector valve at the manufacturer's facility revealed excessive leakage from the "out" port in both off positions (500 mL/min vs 2 cc/min max). After disassembly, the sealing side of the selector plate had a surface finish of 24 microfinish (spec: 4 microfinish) and multiple scratch marks. Replacing o-rings eliminated leakage.
The shop manual specified checking the fuel selector valve at 100-hour and annual inspections. The mechanic for the last 100-hour inspection used a checklist that included checking the fuel shutoff and selector valve proper operation. He stated he would move the selector to off and access the fuel strainer, and also run the engine and move the selector to off to check for engine stumble. The mechanic for the annual inspection used the same checklist but did not perform an engine-running test; she moved the selector to off and opened the fuel system at the strainer.
Calculations of propeller rpm at ground contact based on propeller blade strike spacing (57.5 inches) and estimated ground speed (67 knots) gave approximately 706 rpm.
A previous NTSB investigation involving a similar Beech C23 (N6645P) in 2000 found the fuel selector leaking beyond limits in both off positions. In that investigation, placing the accident fuel selector in an exemplar airplane with engine at full static rpm (2,250) and selector in off positions resulted in engine fuel starvation.