Accident Summary
On April 20, 2010, at approximately 1900 mountain daylight time, a Piper PA-44-180 (registration N331GP) sustained a landing gear collapse during a forced landing about two miles southeast of Tooele Valley Airport, Tooele, Utah. The aircraft was operated by Leading Edge Aviation under 14 CFR Part 91 as an instructional flight. The certified flight instructor was not injured; the private pilot-rated student received minor injuries. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and both wings.
Sequence of Events
The flight departed Salt Lake City International Airport about 60 minutes prior to the accident. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed; no flight plan was filed.
According to the flight instructor, after departing the Salt Lake City area, the student executed a simulated engine-out instrument landing system (ILS) approach to Tooele Valley Airport with the right engine set at idle. Following a touch-and-go landing with both engines at full power, the student performed a short-field landing using both engines, followed by a normal takeoff. During initial climb, at about 200–300 feet above ground level, the left engine suddenly lost all power. The instructor took control, confirmed the power loss, checked the fuel selector positions, and attempted to feather the left engine. The left engine did not fully feather due to insufficient oil pressure from low RPM. The instructor turned left toward the airport but realized the airplane was descending too quickly and selected an area for a forced landing. He lowered the landing gear at about 50 feet but kept the flaps fully up. The touchdown was successful, but during the landing roll the airplane encountered rough terrain, causing the left main landing gear to collapse.
Post-Accident Findings
Two days after the accident, the private pilot revealed that after performing the engine cross-feed check prior to departure, she had inadvertently neglected to reposition the right fuel selector to the "ON" position, leaving both engines feeding from the left fuel tank (right engine in cross-feed). When the left engine lost power, she noticed the incorrect selector position and reset it so the right engine fed from the right tank. She did not inform the instructor of this action during the sequence. The instructor stated he had not noticed the incorrectly positioned selector nor the unequal fuel tank quantity that developed during the flight.
Investigation revealed that the private pilot was using an expanded checklist from CheckMate Aviation Inc. instead of the operator's checklist from Leading Edge Aviation. Both checklists included items beyond the Pilot's Operating Handbook, and both required the cross-feed check before the Before-Takeoff section. However, only the Leading Edge Aviation checklist included an extra step in the Before-Takeoff section to recheck that the fuel selectors were reset to the "ON" position. Leading Edge Aviation personnel stated that although instructors, students, and renters were expected to use the Leading Edge Aviation checklist, there was no written policy requiring its use.