Flight History
On May 27, 2010, at approximately 1843 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 337G (registration N72268) was substantially damaged during a forced landing near High Springs, Florida. The certificated private pilot, who was the sole occupant, reported no injuries. The flight departed Valdosta Regional Airport (VLD), Georgia, bound for Shady International Airport (FA49) in Ocala, Florida, under an IFR flight plan and visual meteorological conditions.
According to the pilot, after topping off the fuel tanks before departure, he climbed to 5,000 feet mean sea level (msl). While in cruise, air traffic control (ATC) cleared him to descend to 2,000 feet. As the airplane descended through 3,500 feet msl, the pilot noted a loss of manifold pressure in both engines and detected an oil smell. He requested an alternate airport and was vectored to Camp Kulaqua Field (91FA) in High Springs. Unable to reach that field, he executed a forced landing in a clear area.
The ATC controller reported that after the pilot checked on, they discussed the destination. During this exchange, the controller noticed the airplane had descended to 4,000 feet msl. As he prepared to confirm the altitude, the pilot declared a problem and requested the nearest airport.
Aircraft and Pilot Information
The pilot held a private pilot certificate with single-engine, multi-engine, and instrument ratings. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate application was on May 31, 2008, at which time he reported 6,500 total flight hours.
The accident aircraft was a 1973 Cessna 337G, a high-wing twin-engine airplane with a push-pull configuration (one engine in the nose, one in the rear). It was powered by two Lycoming IO-360 engines, each rated at 210 horsepower. The airplane's most recent annual inspection was completed on February 26, 2010, at a total time of 5,130.5 hours.
Wreckage Examination
Examination of the accident site by an FAA inspector revealed that the left wing separated from the fuselage after striking trees. The front engine's propeller blades were bent aft approximately 6 inches from the tips, with polishing and spanwise scratching. The rear engine's propeller was feathered. Fuel was present throughout the site.
In the cockpit, all throttle, propeller pitch, and mixture control levers were full forward; both fuel selectors were positioned to the right tank. No preimpact malfunctions were found in the fuel system. Fuel samples appeared clear and uncontaminated, with no water detected.
The front engine showed no preimpact anomalies; its crankshaft rotated freely, continuity was established, and thumb compression was obtained on all cylinders except the impact-damaged No. 1 cylinder. Both magnetos produced spark, and fuel was present in the flow divider.
In contrast, the rear engine's crankshaft could not be rotated. A hole was found in the engine case with a connecting rod protruding. One connecting rod bolt was discovered inside the cowling. The No. 3 exhaust manifold was missing a fastener. SCAT hoses were worn, partially collapsed, and disintegrating; ignition harness shielding was worn through. The mixture control cable was secured with safety wire instead of the required bolt; that bolt was loose, with excessively worn threads and an elongated cotter pin hole. Numerous other fasteners and bolts were loose, and oil was observed weeping from various engine parts. Oil stains were also visible on the ramp at VLD.
The rear engine's dipstick indicated 8 quarts of oil, but draining the sump yielded oil and a translucent light brown liquid that tested positive for water. The oil appeared cloudy. Internal examination revealed corrosion and rotational scoring in the oil pump, corrosion in multiple areas, and thermal damage near the No. 1 and No. 2 cylinder crankshaft journals. Metal fragments, debris, and pieces of connecting rod bolts, caps, and bearings were found in the oil sump.
Maintenance Findings
An oil sample from the rear engine contained high levels of iron, copper, aluminum, silicon, and tin, indicating excessive wear. Maintenance records were incomplete, containing only annual inspection entries with no documentation of repairs, part replacements, oil changes, or preventive maintenance. The rear engine had accumulated 2,404.3 hours since overhaul, exceeding the manufacturer's recommended time between overhaul (TBO) of 1,500 hours.
Engine-Out Procedures and Airport Status
During a telephone interview, the pilot could not articulate the airplane manufacturer's engine-out procedures and stated he had not feathered the propellers. The airplane manufacturer's Owner's Manual includes an "ENGINE-OUT DURING FLIGHT" checklist that instructs pilots to identify and secure the inoperative engine by setting the mixture to idle cutoff, feathering the propeller, and closing fuel and ignition sources. The manual states that with such configuration, the airplane retains sufficient performance to continue flight.
Post-accident investigation revealed that Camp Kulaqua Field (91FA), to which ATC had vectored the pilot, was no longer an operational airport; it had been converted into a privately owned camp and retreat, with a water park on the former runway area. In response, the FAA took two actions: (1) re-emphasized to listed airport owners the importance of notifying the FAA of status changes, and (2) verified nationwide that airports on emergency radar vector maps were operational. These actions were completed by May 25, 2011.