Overview
On July 20, 2010, at approximately 1630 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-28R-200, registration N8900E, operated by Tradewind Aviation International, was substantially damaged during an impact with a fence after a loss of engine power while departing from Coastal Carolina Regional Airport (EWN) in New Bern, North Carolina. The commercial pilot and a passenger were not injured. The flight was a maintenance test flight conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 in visual meteorological conditions. No flight plan was filed.
Accident Sequence
The accident flight was the first after an overhauled fuel servo had been installed. During takeoff from runway 22, at about 600 feet above ground level, the engine experienced a partial loss of power. The pilot performed a 180-degree turn to land on the opposite runway (runway 4). However, during final approach, the engine lost all power, and the airplane impacted a fence approximately 150 feet short of the runway.
Aircraft and Engine History
According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the engine had recently been overhauled and had accumulated about 6 hours of uneventful flight time over several subsequent flights. Pilots reported difficulty starting the engine, but once running, no other problems occurred. A certificated airframe and powerplant mechanic diagnosed a faulty fuel servo as the cause of the starting issue and replaced it with an overhauled unit.
Examination Findings
The impact resulted in substantial damage to the nosegear, fuselage, and both wings. An FAA inspector examined the wreckage and found fuel system continuity with fuel present at the fuel servo. Fuel recovered from the lines showed no contamination, and the fuel strainer at the firewall was also clear. The right fuel tank was compromised, causing a fuel spill; the left tank remained intact with fuel. When the fuel selector was moved from "RIGHT" to "LEFT," fuel flowed freely. No evidence of catastrophic engine failure was observed.
The fuel servo and fuel flow divider were retained for further examination. A teardown at the manufacturer's facility, supervised by the FAA, revealed small, clear spherical particles (consistent with glass beads) on the threads of the inlet fitting and plug of the fuel inlet screen, in the manual mixture control valve chamber, on the unmetered side of the fuel diaphragm, and one particle under the flow divider diaphragm. Despite the contamination, the fuel servo and flow divider operated within limits when tested post-accident.
Maintenance Context
The FAA principal maintenance inspector (PMI) for the company that overhauled the fuel servo noted that the glass beads found were similar to those used in the factory. Although the company did not bead-blast fuel servos specifically, bead-blasting occurred in other factory areas about 20 feet from where fuel servos were overhauled. The PMI did not know how the beads entered the servo and had not discovered contamination in other servos, but planned additional inspections.
Weather Conditions
The recorded weather at EWN at 1654 included clear skies and wind from 230 degrees at 8 knots.