No fatalities

12 Sep 2010: PIAGGIO P-180 (N590JL) — Get Me There LLC — Clearwater, FL

Clearwater, FL, United States

On 12 Sep 2010, a PIAGGIO P-180 (registration N590JL) operated by Get Me There LLC was involved in an aviation accident near Clearwater, FL. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The flight crew did not ensure that the landing gear was down and that it indicated down through the takeoff sequence. This summary draws on records from NTSB.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On September 12, 2010, a Piaggio P-180 conducted a belly landing after a maintenance test flight at St. Petersburg-Clearwater International Airport. The aircraft sustained substantial damage; both pilots evacuated without injury.

History of Flight

On September 12, 2010, at approximately 1530 eastern daylight time, a Piaggio P-180 (registration N590JL) came to rest with the landing gear retracted at St. Petersburg-Clearwater International Airport (PIE), Clearwater, Florida. The flight was a local maintenance test flight conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 following replacement of the elevator flight control surfaces. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The aircraft sustained substantial damage; the two pilots—an airline transport pilot and a commercial pilot—reported no injuries.

The pilot-in-command (PIC) stated that the preflight inspection included testing the landing gear indicator and warning system using the rotary test switch; no discrepancies were noted. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) captured one crew member advising that the brakes were set and announcing light status. After engine start, the second pilot requested taxi clearance for a visual flight rules pattern flight. The flight was cleared to taxi to runway 35R. During taxi, checklist items were completed. The PIC reported that flaps were set to the “mid” position and that the before-takeoff checklist was run while taxiing into position; however, the CVR did not record a verbal challenge-response.

As the PIC advanced the throttles, the second pilot guarded them and set takeoff power. The CVR recorded the second pilot stating he had power and airspeed was alive. The PIC disengaged the steering; the second pilot called 80 knots and then “rotate.” At the “rotate” call, the CVR recorded a sound similar to a mid-frequency motor operating for two seconds, followed by a continuous low-pitch tone on the intercom lasting 14 seconds. At the start of that tone, the second pilot was heard uttering an expletive.

The PIC stated that he rotated at 100 knots but the main landing gears remained on the ground. He heard a sound consistent with a blown tire, considered the recent left elevator replacement, and elected to abort the takeoff. As he retarded the throttles and set the nose gear onto the runway, he noticed the aircraft descending below his normal wheels-on-ground sight line, and the belly began scraping the runway. The CVR recorded the PIC stating the landing gear had collapsed and informing the second pilot they would secure the airplane. The aircraft slid about 1,000 feet; smoke filled the cockpit. Both pilots evacuated. The PIC later reported seeing the landing gear selector sideways but could not determine its position. Neither crew member reported abnormal aural warnings before the event.

Personnel Information

The PIC, age 44, held an airline transport pilot certificate with multi-engine land rating and a commercial certificate with single-engine land rating. He had approximately 9,410 total hours, including 186 hours in the Piaggio P-180 as PIC. His last flight review was on November 19, 2009.

The second pilot, age 28, held commercial and certified flight instructor certificates with single- and multi-engine land and instrument ratings. He had about 1,046 total hours, with 173 hours in the accident make and model (43 as PIC). His last flight review was on November 8, 2009.

Aircraft Information

The aircraft, a 1992 Piaggio P-180 (serial number 1014), was equipped with two Pratt & Whitney PT6A-66 engines and two five-bladed Hartzell propellers. It featured hydraulically actuated, fully retractable tricycle landing gear. The landing gear controls and indicators were located on a panel in the center instrument subpanel. The two-position (UP and DN) landing gear control lever was located to the right of indicator lights: three red UNSAFE warning lights (NOSE, LH, RH) and three green LOCKED DN advisory lights. When gear was up and locked, no lights illuminated. The system included two weight-on-wheels (WOW) micro switches on the nose gear and right main gear shock absorber to inhibit retraction when on ground. Maintenance records showed the aircraft had last undergone scheduled inspections (1-month through 2-year) on the day of the accident, with total time about 4,642 hours and 3,891 landings. The left elevator had been removed and replaced.

Meteorological Information

A special surface observation at PIE at 1544 (about 14 minutes after the accident) reported wind from 300° at 8 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, few clouds at 3,300 feet, temperature 32°C, dew point 24°C, and altimeter setting 29.92 inHg.

Flight Recorders

The aircraft was equipped with an L-3 Communications CVR model FA 2100-1010 (30-minute solid-state memory). The recording was of excellent quality for crew channels and good for the cockpit area microphone. A summary transcript of the CVR was prepared.

Aircraft Examination

According to a person who helped recover the aircraft, the landing gear selector was in the “up” position when first viewed, and all landing gears were in their respective wheel wells with doors closed. The aircraft was raised, and the landing gear was lowered using the manual system without moving the selector. The battery was disconnected, and the aircraft was towed to a hangar.

The following day, FAA inspectors observed gear extension and retraction tests while the aircraft was on jacks; the gear cycled normally without discrepancies. Inspection of main landing gear tires revealed the right tire had a flat spot on the inboard sidewall and was deflated; the left tire also had a flat spot but retained pressure.

Further testing by the manufacturer with FAA oversight found no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions of the hydraulic system, WOW micro switches, electrical, or annunciation systems. The landing gear control handle locking mechanism was tested with no defects. By design, the handle requires two actions to change position: pull out and then move up or down.

Additional Information

The aircraft was not equipped with an annunciator to indicate a disagreement between landing gear selector handle position and actual gear position, nor was one required by 14 CFR Part 23.729. The inspection checklists signed off on the day of the accident included an operational test of the landing gear as part of the 1-year inspection; no other landing gear maintenance was recorded.

Contributing factors

Incorrect use/operationOther/unknown