2 fatalities

24 Sep 2010: PIPER PA-44-180 (N570ER) — JA Aero, Inc. — Woodruff, WI

Woodruff, WI, United States

On 24 Sep 2010, a PIPER PA-44-180 (registration N570ER) operated by JA Aero, Inc. was involved in an aviation accident near Woodruff, WI. 2 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilot's decision to attempt an instrument approach in turbulent night instrument meteorological conditions with a recently-identified deficiency with his instrument flight proficiency, which resulted in a loss of airplane control as a result of spatial… This summary draws on records from NTSB; 12 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On September 23, 2010, a Piper PA-44-180, N570ER, was destroyed after impacting the Trout River near Woodruff, Wisconsin, during an IFR flight. The commercial pilot and passenger were fatally injured.

Accident Overview

On September 23, 2010, about 2013 central daylight time, a Piper PA-44-180 airplane, registration N570ER, was destroyed when it struck the Trout River near Woodruff, Wisconsin. The commercial pilot and a passenger were fatally injured. The aircraft was operated by JA Aero Inc. under 14 CFR Part 91 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the cross-country flight, which departed Aurora Municipal Airport (ARR) in Sugar Grove, Illinois, at 1819 and was destined for Lakeland Airport (ARV) near Woodruff.

Preflight and Weather Briefing

At 1746, a representative for N570ER contacted the Princeton Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) for a weather briefing and to file an IFR flight plan. The pilot planned an 1800 departure from ARR with direct routing to ARV at a cruise altitude of 6,000 feet msl. The estimated en route time was 2 hours, with 4 hours of fuel onboard. Wausau Downtown Airport (AUW) was listed as the alternate.

The weather briefer provided a full briefing, indicating a warm front over Wisconsin with widespread light to heavy rain showers. IMC was forecast for the evening with occasional moderate turbulence below 10,000 feet and icing above 16,000 feet. Strong winds were expected along the route due to an approaching cold front. The briefing concluded at 1758.

Flight and Communications

At 1808, the pilot contacted ARR ground control and requested an IFR clearance to ARV. The flight was cleared via radar vectors to SIMMN intersection and then direct to ARV. Takeoff from runway 18 occurred at 1819. Multiple air traffic control facilities handled the flight as it progressed north.

At 1912:58, the pilot contacted Minneapolis ARTCC and reported level at 6,000 feet msl. At 1938:13, the controller provided ARV weather: wind from southeast at 8 knots, 5 miles visibility with light rain, scattered clouds at 500 feet, broken ceiling at 1,000 feet, overcast at 2,000 feet. At 1939:42, the pilot requested the RNAV/GPS Runway 18 approach. At 1940:11, the flight was cleared to the initial approach fix FEGOG.

At 1943:11, the controller asked if the pilot was in IMC; the pilot affirmed. At 1953:20, the flight was cleared for the approach and to descend to 3,500 feet msl. Radar data showed the airplane 29 miles south of FEGOG at 6,000 feet when cleared.

At 2003:03, the flight reached FEGOG and proceeded west toward the intermediate fix MIGPY. At 2005:03, about 2 miles east of MIGPY, it turned northbound (opposite the final approach course). A left 270-degree turn back east began at 2006:04. At 2006:16, the pilot reported being "bumped around a lot" and requested radar vectors to an unspecified location. The controller cleared the approach and noted the flight appeared established on final inbound; the pilot acknowledged. At 2006:59, the pilot requested vectors back to the final approach course after crossing through it heading west-southwest. The controller stated the final approach course was not depicted on his display; the pilot thanked him.

At 2007:14, the controller re-cleared the approach and asked if the pilot wanted to proceed to MIGPY for a procedure turn. The pilot agreed. At 2007:49, the pilot acknowledged instructions to report when reestablished on final. Radar showed crossing MIGPY heading east, then a northeast turn for 24 seconds, then a right turn to south-southwest.

At 2009:13, the controller asked if established on final; the pilot replied negative and a bit off. The controller offered rerouting to the initial approach fix. The pilot acknowledged. At 2009:43, the pilot reported over MIGPY; radar then showed southbound toward the final approach fix PEHEK.

At 2011:18, the controller asked if established on final inbound. No response. At 2011:28 and 2011:43, the controller repeated; the pilot replied "loud and clear" and then affirmed established at 2011:51. Radar showed the airplane about 2 miles north of PEHEK on a southerly course. The controller instructed a frequency change and to report upon landing. The pilot acknowledged with thanks at 2012:10; no further transmissions were made.

Descent and Collision

The minimum altitude between MIGPY and PEHEK was 3,200 feet msl. Radar data indicated the airplane descended from 3,000 to 2,100 feet between these fixes. The final radar return was at 2012:28, about 1.2 miles northwest of PEHEK and 6.5 miles north of the runway 18 threshold.

A witness, a certificated commercial pilot, heard an airplane overfly his residence about 1 mile southeast of MIGPY on three occasions between 2000 and 2100. No abnormal engine sounds or power changes were noted. The sound receded southeast. The witness reported strong gusting south winds, moderate to heavy rain, and a 400-foot overcast ceiling.

Wreckage and Location

On September 24, 2010, at 1114, a Civil Air Patrol ground team located the airplane with assistance from an airborne search. The wreckage was in the Trout River, about 6 miles north of the runway 18 threshold.

Personnel Information

The 26-year-old pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with single- and multi-engine land and instrument ratings, plus a flight instructor certificate (single-engine land). His last aviation medical exam was September 2, 2010, with a corrective lenses restriction. No previous accidents or enforcement were found.

As of the last logbook entry on September 18, 2010, the pilot had 936.0 total flight hours, 869.1 as pilot-in-command, 920.4 in single-engine, and 15.6 in multi-engine. He had 1.6 hours in the accident model. Instrument experience: 5.8 actual, 47.4 simulated; night: 52.2 hours. Recent: 523.7 hours in past year, 313.2 in 6 months, 152.3 in 90 days, 41.4 in 30 days. Employer records showed 8.4 additional hours since the last logbook entry and 2.6 hours in the 24 hours before the accident.

In the 12 months before the accident, the pilot logged 27 instrument approaches, 4.0 actual instrument hours, 3.9 simulated, and 35.0 night hours. In the 3 months: 10 approaches, 1.5 actual, 1.7 simulated, 9.7 night. In the last month: 1.7 night hours, no instrument approaches or time.

His last checkride was August 8, 2010, in a Piper PA-23-150 for a commercial multi-engine rating. His previous flight review was May 31, 2010, in a Cessna 172M.

On September 9, 2010, the pilot received a checkout in the accident airplane. The instructor reported the pilot performed all commercial multi-engine maneuvers to standards, but had difficulty maintaining altitude and heading during simulated instrument conditions and showed a lack of situational awareness on an instrument approach, including descending below minimums, deviating off course, and failing to stabilize. Following this, the pilot was authorized to rent the airplane for VFR flights only.

Aircraft Information

The 2002 Piper PA-44-180 Seminole (serial number 4496146) was a four-place, low-wing, T-tail, retractable tricycle gear airplane with a maximum takeoff weight of 3,800 pounds, equipped for IFR. It had two Lycoming O-360-A1H6 (left) and LO-360-A1H6 (right) engines, each 180 horsepower, with Hartzell constant-speed propellers.

Standard airworthiness certificate issued June 27, 2002. JA Aero Inc. purchased the airplane in June 2010. At the accident, airframe time was 5,312.9 hours. Left engine: 6,759.9 total, 217.9 since overhaul; right engine: 4,188.9 total, 1,798.9 since overhaul. Propellers similar. Last annual inspection August 17, 2010, at 5,244 hours; 50-hour inspection September 16, 2010, at 5,306 hours. Static system, altimeter, and transponder tested July 22, 2010. No unresolved airworthiness issues.

Fueling records showed 10.4 gallons of 100LL added before departure.

Meteorological Information

At the preflight briefing, ARR had unrestricted visibility, gusting winds, and a broken ceiling at 6,000 feet. ARV reported gusting winds, moderate rain, 5 miles visibility, scattered clouds at 700 feet, broken at 2,500 feet, overcast at 3,400 feet. The briefer noted deteriorating conditions north of Oshkosh with moderate to heavy rain, 2-5 miles visibility, ceilings as low as 800 feet, and an urgent pilot report of severe turbulence at 12,000 feet over Mosinee.

Forecast for southern Wisconsin (1900-2200): broken 3,000-4,000 feet, overcast 12,000 feet, 3-5 miles in rain showers with widely scattered thunderstorms. Northern Wisconsin: ceilings 2,000-3,000 feet, 3-5 miles in rain and mist, isolated embedded thunderstorms. Terminal forecast for Rhinelander: occasional 2 miles visibility in moderate rain showers, scattered at 1,500 feet, overcast at 2,500 feet.

NWS Surface Analysis at 1900 showed a deep low over Minnesota with a warm front extending over northern Wisconsin. The accident site was north of the warm front, which had passed by the time of the accident. The Weather Depiction Chart at 2000 showed extensive IFR conditions along and north of the warm front, with marginal VFR over central and northern Wisconsin.

Infrared satellite at 2010 showed an overcast layer with cloud tops around 16,500 feet.

ARV ASOS reported at 1955: wind 210° true at 12 knots gusting 19, 5 miles visibility with heavy drizzle, overcast 900 feet agl, temperature 21°C, dew point 20°C, altimeter 29.51 inHg. At 2015: wind 210° at 14 knots gusting 20, 5 miles with light rain, broken 900 feet, overcast 1,400 feet, same temperature and altimeter.

The closest upper air sounding (Green Bay, 116 miles southeast) at 1900 indicated high potential for turbulence and low-level wind shear near the surface. Winds aloft at 6,000 feet were 235° at 48 knots; at 3,000 feet, 205° at 40 knots.

Sunset was at 1853, end of civil twilight at 1923. Moonrise at 1836; a full moon would have been visible above the overcast.

Aids to Navigation

The RNAV/GPS Runway 18 approach began at FEGOG, proceeding westbound (271°) to MIGPY, with minimum altitude 3,300 feet msl between FEGOG and MIGPY. At MIGPY, no procedure turn was required; the approach continued southbound (181°) to PEHEK, with minimum altitude 3,200 feet msl. PEHEK was 4.8 miles north of the runway 18 threshold. After PEHEK, aircraft without vertical navigation must remain at or above 2,200 feet until RAMIW (1.8 miles north of threshold), then descend to MDA of 2,040 feet msl (2,100 feet for circling). The missed approach point was the end of runway 18.

Airport Information

Lakeland Airport (ARV) had two runways: 18/36 (5,150 x 100 feet, asphalt) and 10/28 (3,602 x 75 feet, asphalt). Elevation 1,630 feet. Runway 18 had runway lighting and a four-box VASI. Two NOTAMs: PAPI for runway 28 out of service, and DME for ILS runway 36 approach out of service.

Wreckage and Impact Information

The wreckage was in the Trout River, about 6 miles north of ARV. All structural components and flight control surfaces were accounted for. Failures were consistent with overstress. Flight control continuity could not be established due to damage; cable separations were overstress or cut during recovery. Forward fuselage and cockpit fragmented. Right wing remained attached, with leading edge crushing and main spar deflection; right aileron separated. Right landing gear extended. Left wing separated at root and fragmented. Empennage control surfaces remained attached. Throttle, propeller, mixture, and carburetor heat positions could not be determined.

Both engines separated from nacelles; propellers separated from crankshaft flanges with overstress fractures. Propeller blades had spanwise bending and twisting. Engine continuity confirmed; compression and suction noted on all cylinders. Magnetos sparked after drying. Vacuum pumps provided suction; attitude gyro showed minor scuffing. No evidence of pre-impact mechanical failure.

Medical and Pathological Information

An autopsy on September 25, 2010, attributed the pilot's cause of death to multiple blunt-force injuries. FAA CAMI toxicology tests detected no carbon monoxide, cyanide, ethanol, or drugs.

Contributing factors

PilotEffect on operation