No fatalities

28 Jan 2011: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22 (N8135B) — Deep South Express LLC — Cross City, FL

Cross City, FL, United States

On 28 Jan 2011, a CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22 (registration N8135B) operated by Deep South Express LLC was involved in an aviation accident near Cross City, FL. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: A total loss of engine power resulting from the failure of the camshaft due to fatigue cracks. Contributing to the accident was the inadequate quality inspection of the camshaft after initial manufacture. This summary draws on records from NTSB; 12 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On January 27, 2011, a Cirrus SR22 lost engine power near Cross City, Florida; the pilot deployed the ballistic parachute and landed in a field; the pilot was uninjured.

History of Flight

On January 27, 2011, at approximately 1919 eastern standard time, a Cirrus Design Corp. SR22, registration N8135B, experienced a loss of engine power during cruise flight near Cross City, Florida. The pilot, who was the sole occupant, deployed the airframe ballistic recovery system parachute, and the airplane descended into a field. The airplane sustained substantial damage, but the pilot was not injured. The flight was operating under instrument flight rules on a 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight from Weedon Field Airport (EUF), Eufaula, Alabama, to Leesburg International Airport (LEE), Leesburg, Florida. The flight originated from EUF at about 1819.

Earlier that day, the pilot and the student/airplane owner flew the airplane from LEE to EUF, where the student was dropped off. After landing, the fuel tanks were filled, and the pilot checked the wing tanks and fuel strainer for contamination; none were found. A preflight inspection revealed no discrepancies. The pilot received an IFR clearance while on the ground at Eufaula for a direct flight to Leesburg.

The flight departed and climbed to 7,000 feet, then later to 9,000 feet. Approximately one hour into the flight, while north-northwest of Cross City, with the engine operating between 2,500 and 2,600 rpm and 23 inches of manifold pressure, the engine surged then lost power. The pilot performed emergency procedures including activating the alternate air control, switching the fuel selector, moving the magneto switch, and turning on the auxiliary fuel pump, but was unable to restore power.

Communications with Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) began at 1913:02 when the pilot reported engine problems. The controller provided the distance and direction to Cross City Airport (CTY), and the pilot declared an emergency. The pilot descended at best glide airspeed toward CTY using the GPS. At 1916:23, the pilot reported the engine was only operating at 1,500 rpm. At 1918:24, he informed the controller he could not land at CTY and intended to land in a field, noting it was dark. The controller vectored the flight toward the VOR near CTY, and at 1919:21, the pilot stated he was deploying the parachute. The pilot reported deceleration from deployment and a hard ground contact. He was wearing a four-point harness and was not injured. After landing, he used the VHF transceiver to broadcast his coordinates to another pilot, who relayed them to ATC. Law enforcement responded to the scene. The pilot did not recall hearing the ELT activate.

Pilot Information

The pilot, age 28, held private, commercial, and flight instructor certificates with airplane single-engine land and instrument ratings. He held a second-class medical certificate issued on October 5, 2009, with no restrictions. His total flight time was 470 hours, with 442 hours as pilot-in-command, including 30 hours in the accident make and model.

Aircraft Information

The SR22, serial number 0669, was manufactured in 2003 and powered by a 310-horsepower Teledyne Continental Motors IO-550-N engine with a Hartzell constant-speed propeller. The most recent oil change was during a 100-hour inspection on August 11, 2010, when 8 quarts of oil were added. The chief inspector later stated the oil was Aeroshell 100 Straight Mineral Oil, not the initially recorded Aeroshell 100R. At the time of the accident, the airplane had accumulated about 1,414 total hours, with 43 hours since the last oil change.

Meteorological Information

A surface observation at Cross City Airport at 1853 reported wind from 220 degrees at 4 knots, temperature 8°C, dew point 3°C, and altimeter 30.09 inches of mercury. The accident site was about 11 nautical miles northeast of CTY.

Flight Recorders

The airplane was equipped with Avidyne primary flight display (PFD) and multi-function display (MFD) that recorded flight data. The data were extracted and examined by the NTSB.

Wreckage and Engine Examination

Examination of the airframe revealed substantial damage to the lower aft lip of the spar cover. The engine was examined by a representative of the manufacturer. Crankshaft continuity was confirmed, but hand rotation did not produce valve train action. About 16.9 pounds of oil were drained. Disassembly revealed a completely fractured camshaft (part number 654084 D) approximately one inch forward of the flange. Oil analysis showed the oil was Shell AeroShell 100, SAE grade 50, with all values normal.

The NTSB Materials Laboratory examined the fractured camshaft. A vibro-peen marking "B15-00-19" was found on the flange aft face. The camshaft fractured through oiling holes for the aft bearing, with fatigue regions at four locations. Crack initiation points were at or near the corners of the holes, where lapped and folded material was present. The holes lacked proper chamfering as specified in the engineering drawing, and chamfering should have been done before shot peening. Hardness testing showed surface hardness of 60 HRC (specification 58-62 HRC) and core hardness of 27.7 HRC (specification 25-45 HRC). Decarburization layers of 0.002 to 0.004 inches were present; no limits were set for decarburization in the heat treatment process.

Camshaft History

The camshaft part number 654084 Revision D became effective August 17, 1998, and was superseded by Revision E on October 21, 1999, which added serialized markings. The vibro-peen marking indicated the camshaft was the 19th manufactured on February 15, 2000. Manufacturing records could not be located because the camshaft was not serialized. Quality control procedures required verification of deburring of oil holes.

The engine (serial number 913919) was last overhauled in March 2008 by an FAA-certified repair station. During overhaul, the camshaft was rejected and a reconditioned camshaft (P/N 654084 D) was obtained from Rock Aviation, Inc., and installed. The engine was returned to service on March 6, 2008, but the airplane owner later had new lifters installed. The engine was installed in the accident airplane on April 1, 2008, with about 1,021 total hours on the airframe. At the time of the accident, the engine had accumulated about 393 hours since overhaul.

The president of the overhaul facility stated they only performed a visual inspection of the reconditioned camshaft; no other quality control checks were done. The paperwork from Rock Aviation, Inc., dated April 26, 2006, indicated the camshaft was repaired per their procedures but listed no serial number. Rock Aviation's repair station certificate was revoked on October 3, 2008, for a Federal Aviation Regulation violation. Attempts to obtain records from former Rock Aviation personnel were unsuccessful.

Flight Data Analysis

The NTSB's Vehicle Recorder Division downloaded data from the PFD and MFD. Plot 1 showed that oil pressure remained nearly constant from takeoff power application until the engine rpm began decreasing from steady state.

Database Search

A search of the FAA database from 1995 to February 2, 2012, for camshaft P/N 654084 revealed four entries, including the accident event. None of the other three entries involved camshaft fracture failure.

Contributing factors

Causes

Fatigue/wear/corrosion

Other contributing factors

Inspection