History of Flight
On May 27, 2011, about 1415 Pacific daylight time, a Brantly B-2B (N222DW) collided with wooded terrain near Weaverville, California. The solo instructional flight under Part 91 resulted in fatal injury to the student pilot and substantial damage to the helicopter. Departing Hayfork Airport (F62) at about 1330, the intended destination was Lonnie Pool Field/Weaverville Airport (O54). Visual meteorological conditions prevailed; no flight plan was filed.
A friend arriving at Hayfork about 1320 observed the pilot starting the helicopter. After a radio conversation, the pilot reported 22 gallons of fuel and departed east. Concerned when the helicopter did not return, the friend reported it missing, leading to an ALNOT at about 1600. The helicopter lacked an emergency locator transmitter. Search teams used the pilot's cell phone signal to locate it the following day around 1600.
A witness about 4 miles southwest of Weaverville reported strong gusty winds starting midday. She heard a loud metallic crunching sound between 1400 and 1430 but no engine or helicopter noise. Her residence was about 900 feet northeast of the accident site.
The helicopter came to rest on a 45-degree sloping southwest face of a gulch, about 3.5 miles southwest of Weaverville Airport, at 2,450 feet msl. The area was heavily wooded with 100-120-foot pine trees and waist-high poison oak.
Personnel Information
The 50-year-old pilot held a combined student pilot and third-class medical certificate issued August 25, 2009, with no limitations or waivers. He reported 49.1 total flight hours at that application. His first certificate was issued September 27, 2007. He did not hold an Airframe and Powerplant mechanic certificate and also owned a Piper PA28-140.
His logbook had missing pages; first helicopter training was August 6, 2007. The last entry with total times (February 15, 2010) showed 77.1 hours of dual instruction in helicopters. Fourteen subsequent flights had the time page missing. The CFI estimated about 30 hours missing. In March 2011, the pilot reported to the FAA that an altercation with a prior instructor led to removal of logbook entries representing 30-40 hours of solo experience.
Most of his experience was in Robinson R22, R44, and Schweizer 269/300 helicopters. The accident helicopter's CFI provided about 5 hours of training in it and issued a solo cross-country endorsement on May 14, 2011, with limitations (winds <12 knots, no gusts, visibility ≥3 miles, ceilings ≥3,000 feet agl). The CFI was unaware of the planned flight.
The CFI had no prior Brantly B-2B experience and flew about 10 hours to familiarize himself. He noted the helicopter's performance was marginal and could not maintain a hover out of ground effect above 6,000 feet. He described the pilot as headstrong, stubborn, easily distracted, and with poor planning. Other instructors noted stubbornness, lack of progression, and overconfidence.
Aircraft Information
The helicopter received its original airworthiness certificate in 1962, equipped with a Lycoming IO-360-A1A engine. An annual inspection on December 14, 2010, showed total airframe time (Hobbs) of 698.9 hours. At the accident, the Hobbs read 711.2 hours. The engine had 1,597.8 total hours, with 420.2 since last overhaul in 1984.
Meteorological Information
The closest weather station at Weaverville Airport (elevation 2,350 ft msl) reported at 1415: wind 250° at 7 knots gusting 22 knots; visibility 10 miles; few clouds at 5,500 ft, broken at 6,500 ft; temperature 14°C; dew point 2°C. A 1335 report showed similar conditions with wind 260° at 6 knots gusting 16 knots.
Unofficial stations near the accident site (elevations 2,550-3,300 ft) reported variable winds generally from west-southwest at 5-10 knots, gusts up to 17 knots. The FAA Aeronautical Information Manual notes abrupt wind changes and severe turbulence can occur in mountainous terrain.
The pilot did not request any weather briefing from Lockheed Martin Flight Service or any DUAT provider.
Wreckage and Impact
The main wreckage came to rest nose-down at the base of a 120-foot tree. A tree 20 feet southwest was topped at 60 feet. Another 120-foot tree 20 feet west sustained fresh damage with bark stripped on its southern surface. The debris path of plastic fragments and main rotor blade material continued about 30 feet north. All major sections except yellow and red main rotor blade tips were found nearby; the outboard 3-foot sections of those blades were 150 and 300 feet north.
Medical and Pathological Information
A postmortem examination determined the cause of death as blunt force head, neck, and thoracic injuries. Toxicological tests were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, screened drugs, and alcohol.
Tests and Research
The forward fuselage was crushed and fragmented from nose to foot pedals, buried in soft soil. The cabin had accordion crush damage to the firewall. The engine compartment had minimal damage. The tailcone remained partially attached and largely intact. The fuel quantity needle indicated 14 gallons; engine temperature 82°C. Rotor speed indicated 190 rpm; engine speed 0 rpm. No rotor blade scrape marks or paint transfers were found; no evidence of in-flight fire or bird strike.
Control and drive train continuity was confirmed with multiple impact-related disconnects. Both tail rotor blades remained attached with trailing edge wrinkling. The main rotor hub was attached to the transmission under the fuselage.
Fuel from the gascolator was light blue consistent with aviation gasoline. The fuel selector valve was on. About 2 ounces of fuel was drained from a line, and about 1 gallon from the tank; an undetermined larger quantity remained. The low fuel light filament was intact.
The throttle grip was found full clockwise, but the butterfly valve was closed. The mixture control was 1 inch aft of full rich. The engine had minimal damage; internal surfaces were oil-wet with no heat discoloration. Spark plug wear was consistent with normal operation. No anomalies precluding normal operation were found.
The fuel servo venturi and inlet plenum were coated with brown grease. Testing of the servo, fuel flow divider, and injection nozzles showed no anomalies. The grease appeared to have entered the inner suction slots of the venturi.
The CFI reported the pilot performed unapproved maintenance, including replacing the collective friction lock with a screwdriver and installing an automotive air filter system (later removed). The grease likely originated from modifications to the air induction system.
The helicopter was equipped with an Insight GEM 602 Engine Monitor, which did not store engine parameters.