Accident Overview
On June 18, 2011, at approximately 1430 central daylight time, a Cessna P210R, registration N900SR, was substantially damaged during a forced landing following a loss of engine power at Albia Municipal Airport (4C8), Albia, Iowa. The pilot sustained serious injuries. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the right wing and the fuselage.
Flight Details
The aircraft was registered to and operated by the pilot under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a business flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The flight originated from Grand Junction Regional Airport (GJT), Grand Junction, Colorado, at 1008 mountain daylight time, with an intended destination of Iowa City Municipal Airport (IOW), Iowa City, Iowa.
Pilot Narrative
The pilot reported that the airplane was fully fueled before departure from GJT. After takeoff, the airplane climbed to Flight Level 250 (25,000 feet pressure altitude) to remain above cloud layers. He initially filed an IFR flight plan to St. Joseph, Missouri (STJ), but requested a destination change to IOW due to deteriorating weather. During the initial descent into IOW, at about 15,000 feet mean sea level, the engine began to sputter and lose power. The pilot notified air traffic control and altered course for the nearest airport, 4C8.
Efforts to restore engine power were unsuccessful. The pilot circled about 1 mile south of the airport and descended below the clouds at about 1,000 feet above ground level. The airplane's flight path was approximately 45 degrees to the runway heading. He lowered wing flaps and landing gear, and banked hard right to reduce airspeed and align with the runway. However, too much airspeed and altitude were lost, preventing a runway landing. The forced landing occurred about 100 feet southwest of runway 31, on a bearing of approximately 220 degrees, with the impact path roughly perpendicular to the runway. The airplane came to rest in an adjacent cornfield about 200 feet from the runway edge and about 700 feet from the departure end.
Witness Statement
A witness who was mowing the lawn and wearing hearing protection reported seeing the airplane approach from the southeast and overfly the hangar area. He observed the propeller rotating but could not hear the engine due to his hearing protection. He responded to the accident site and found the pilot had already exited the airplane.
Postaccident Examination
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspectors conducted a postaccident examination. The airplane rested upright on a northwest bearing, with the right wing tip contacting the ground. The right main landing gear had collapsed, and the nose landing gear separated from the airframe. The right wing showed damage near the wingtip and at the root adjacent to the fuselage. The fuel tanks appeared intact; no fuel was observed in the right tank via the filler port, and a trace amount was obtained from the left tank through the inboard quick drain valve. Visual inspection of the engine revealed no anomalies. Fuel caps were securely installed, and no staining consistent with fuel leakage was observed on the wings or fuselage.
Fuel and Maintenance Records
According to fixed base operator (FBO) records, the airplane was fueled with 42.2 gallons of 100 low lead aviation fuel prior to departure from GJT. Line service personnel reported the airplane was topped off at that time.
The pilot noted that the right fuel gauge indicated near empty and the left gauge about 10 gallons, adding that the gauges never worked properly. The fuel flow unit indicated at least 40 gallons remained. Normal airplane endurance was about 5.5 hours; the flight duration at the time of power loss was about 3.5 hours. Approximately 30 minutes before the accident, the pilot heard a loud bang from the engine compartment, but no instrument indications changed.
The pilot did not visually check the fuel quantity during preflight. He reported a fuel burn of about 20 gallons per hour and noted the fuel indicators read near half tanks about 30 minutes before power loss.
The airplane was equipped with long-range fuel tanks totaling 120 gallons (115 usable), configured with two integral, interconnected tanks in each wing. An FAA airworthiness directive (AD) effective July 1994, applicable to the accident airplane, required a flight manual revision, one-time fuel gauge calibration, and installation of raised filler caps or a placard for rechecking fuel level two minutes after fueling. The airplane's maintenance records showed compliance, but raised filler caps or the specified placards were not installed. The flight manual did include the required revision, which stated that the fuel level must be visually verified and the wing surface inspected for fuel staining during preflight whenever more than 75 gallons are needed.