History of Flight
On October 31, 2011, at 1942 eastern daylight time, a Gulfstream G150, registration N480JJ, operated by Hendrick Motorsports Aviation, experienced a landing overrun at Key West International Airport (EYW), Key West, Florida. The two airline transport pilots and one passenger reported minor injuries, while a second passenger sustained serious injuries. The flight departed Witham Field Airport (SUA), Stuart, Florida, at 1900 under an instrument flight rules flight plan. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed.
According to the pilot-in-command (PIC), air traffic control cleared the flight for a visual approach to runway 27, which was 4,801 feet long. The PIC did not call for the checklist due to radio chatter but observed the copilot complete the before landing checks, with landing gear and flaps extended. The airplane entered the traffic pattern on a right base leg, but the flightcrew lost sight of the runway due to low stratus clouds and discontinued the approach. After overflying the airport, they entered a right downwind leg. On the second approach, they temporarily lost sight of the runway again but reacquired it on final.
The PIC stated that he touched down at about 120 knots, just past the 1,000-foot touchdown marker. He applied brakes and was about to activate thrust reversers when he realized the brakes were not working. The copilot also depressed the brake pedals with no effect. The PIC suggested a go-around, but the copilot responded it was too late. The airplane traveled off the end of the runway and struck a gravel berm. During impact, one passenger's seat dislodged from its seat track, with the passenger still in it. Maintenance had been performed on the brakes within 10 days of the accident.
The copilot's statement was consistent. Both pilots stated there was not enough time to use the emergency brake system. A passenger in the left forward-facing seat reported no braking action and heard someone in the cockpit say "oh no" before the overrun.
Personnel Information
The PIC, aged 47, held an airline transport pilot certificate with multiengine and instrument ratings, issued May 6, 2011. He also held a flight instructor certificate. His most recent first-class medical was issued September 6, 2011, with a limitation for near vision. He estimated 11,000 total flight hours, including 290 hours in the G150 and 9,050 hours in multiengine airplanes. He had flown 66 hours in the 90 days prior.
The copilot, aged 55, also held an airline transport pilot certificate with similar ratings, issued May 28, 2011. He held a flight instructor certificate issued November 13, 1981. His most recent first-class medical was issued July 19, 2011, with a near vision limitation. He estimated 13,500 total flight hours, including 75 hours in the G150. He had flown 75 hours in the previous 90 days.
Both pilots received training from FlightSafety for normal and abnormal hydraulic procedures. They stated they received training on brake failures during landing, but it was always associated with a hydraulic failure in flight. They did not recall training for an unexpected brake failure after landing requiring engagement of emergency brakes.
Aircraft Information
The Gulfstream G150, serial number 241, manufactured in 2007, was a nine-place airplane with retractable tricycle landing gear. It was powered by two Honeywell TFE731-40AR-2006 engines. The airplane was maintained under a manufacturer's approved inspection program, with the most recent inspection completed on December 15, 2010, at 867.7 hours. The Hobbs meter at the accident was 1,189.8 hours. Four days before the accident, the No. 4 brake swivel was resealed due to a hydraulic fluid leak, and the brakes were operationally checked. No anomalies were reported during the previous landing.
Meteorological Information
The 1953 surface observation at EYW reported wind from 360 degrees at 12 knots, gusting to 17 knots, visibility 10 miles, broken ceilings at 1,000, 1,400, and 5,000 feet. Sunset was at 1848, civil twilight at 1911. The moon was a waxing crescent with 29% illumination. The PIC had obtained a preflight weather briefing.
Airport Information
Runway 9/27 at EYW was 4,801 feet long and 100 feet wide, grooved asphalt in good condition. An engineered material arresting system (EMAS) was installed at the departure end of runway 9 in October 2010, but not at the departure end of runway 27. The runway 27 safety area extended 400 feet wide and 600 feet long. About 80% of flights land on runway 9 due to prevailing winds. After this accident, the airport manager submitted a preapplication for an EMAS at runway 27. Four days later, a Cessna 550 overran runway 9 and was stopped by the EMAS without injury.
Flight Recorders
The airplane was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR) that captured the final 13 minutes. The CVR transcript showed the flightcrew's communications and sounds of touchdown, with the copilot remarking on speed, the PIC stating brakes were not working, and the PIC suggesting a go-around. Impact sounds were recorded. No aural warnings were heard. The airplane was not equipped with a flight data recorder. The maintenance diagnostic computer did not record braking system faults. The enhanced ground proximity warning system recorded a data point at about 50 feet above ground level. The digital electronic engine controls data showed that about 8 seconds after weight on wheels, power levers were advanced to takeoff, then returned to idle, then to reverse thrust 8 seconds later, remaining there for 127 seconds.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The airplane came to rest about 816 feet from the end of runway 27, after crossing a grassy area, coral rock, a ditch, and an embankment. The nose landing gear separated, and the left main landing gear was located aft of the left wing. The right main landing gear remained attached. The fuselage sustained damage, including skin buckling. Both engines remained attached but were contaminated with salt water and debris. Examination of the brake system components, including the power brake valve, antiskid control unit, and valves, revealed no anomalies that would have caused a loss of braking performance. The airbrake control switch was in the land position; the system was designed for automatic deployment. The seat that separated was a B/E Aerospace fixed base seat; its shear plungers were found raised. Additionally, seats in rows 1 and 2 were not installed in accordance with the seating drawing, with aft-facing seats installed forward and vice versa.