History of Flight
On March 9, 2012, at approximately 1034 eastern standard time, a Cirrus SR22, registration N444VR, was substantially damaged during a forced landing near Homestead, Florida. The certificated flight instructor, private pilot, and a passenger were not injured. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the instructional flight conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The flight departed Opa-Locka Executive Airport (OPF), Miami, Florida, destined for Key West International Airport (EYW), Key West, Florida.
According to the flight instructor, prior to departure from OPF, he had the fuel tanks filled to capacity and added oil to the engine to bring it up to 5 quarts. They departed to the east from OPF at approximately 1000 and were given the MIAMI ONE DEPARTURE, MNATE TRANSITION, then direct to EYW. During the departure, they were eventually cleared to 6,000 feet above mean sea level (msl). Once they leveled off in the approximate vicinity of Ocean Reef Club Airport (07FA), Key Largo, Florida, the engine incurred a total loss of power. The flight instructor believed that at the time, the engine was still producing partial power. He established best glide speed and turned toward 07FA, while the private pilot declared an emergency with Miami Air Traffic Control Center. They "quickly went through the troubleshoot checklist" but could not regain engine power. The airplane was descending through 4,000 feet msl. The flight instructor realized there was a 20-knot headwind, they were approximately 10 nautical miles from 07FA, and descending at 1,000 feet per minute. He determined they would not make the airport, so he turned left to take advantage of the tailwind and headed for US Highway 1. Noticing heavy traffic on the highway, he deemed the risk too great to land there. At approximately 2,000 feet msl, they considered deploying the Cirrus Aircraft Parachute System (CAPS) but spotted a light-colored patch of ground that appeared to be a hard dirt surface, which seemed a better option than deploying the CAPS. During the final approach while in ground effect, the flight instructor observed a mound of dirt directly ahead and deployed 50 percent wing flaps to "balloon" over the obstacle. The stall warning horn sounded, and the wheels touched down on water "like a soft seaplane landing" and slid over a long mound of dirt. The instructor kept the control wheel fully back until the airplane came to rest in a water-filled marshy area.
Personnel Information
According to FAA and pilot records, the flight instructor held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, sea, multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued on August 7, 2009. He reported 2,100 hours of total flight experience. The private pilot held a certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on July 27, 2009. He reported 480 hours of total flight experience.
Aircraft Information
The airplane was manufactured in 2003. Its most recent annual inspection was completed on December 20, 2011, at which time the airplane had accrued 2,888 total hours of operation.
Meteorological Information
The recorded weather at Homestead Air Reserve Base (KHST), approximately 10 nautical miles northwest of the accident site, at 1455 included wind 110 degrees at 12 knots gusting to 15 knots, visibility 10 miles, sky clear, temperature 26 degrees C, dew point 20 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 30.20 inches of mercury.
Wreckage and Impact Information
Examination of the accident site revealed the airplane came to rest in mud and water, with the bottom immersed to an approximate depth of 9 inches. No fuel residue was present on the surrounding water. The left and right main landing gear had separated from their mounting locations. The nose landing gear fairings were torn off, but the strut and wheel assembly remained intact. The left wing outboard leading edge was impact damaged; the TKS panel was dented; and the leading edge of upper and lower wing skins were buckled aft. The wing flap was impact damaged. The fuel cap was closed and secured, and fuel was present within 1 to 2 inches of the top of the fuel tank. The right wingtip, navigation light, and strobe were impact damaged; the wing flap was impact damaged; and the fuel cap was closed and secured with fuel similarly present. The fuselage had a hairline crack along the aft seam cover over the left front CAPS harness attach point on the left side immediately aft of the firewall. Both cabin entry steps were bent aft, and the cowling was impact damaged. The horizontal stabilizer showed no impact damage, but both elevators were impact damaged with left and right tips bent and torn off. The rudder and vertical stabilizer were undamaged. The propeller was undamaged. The engine had a visible hole in the top of the engine case near the No. 1 and No. 2 cylinders. Both magnetos were separated from their mounting locations; the left magneto was impact damaged and would not rotate but showed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The right magneto turned freely and produced spark throughout its rpm range during bench testing. The ignition harness was impact damaged but exhibited normal operating signatures; spark plugs showed normal wear. The fuel pump turned freely with no abnormalities and functioned normally when tested. The throttle and fuel control assembly functioned normally throughout its range. Fuel nozzles were unrestricted, and fuel lines were intact and undamaged. The oil sump had minor impact damage, and the sump drain plug was not safetied. The sump contained 2.5 quarts of oil that was dark and contained fragments of engine components. The oil suction screen had a small amount of debris; the oil filter contained metallic flakes and slivers. The oil pump cavity exhibited scratches, but the pump drive was intact and gear teeth showed normal operating signatures. The oil pressure relief valve and seat were unobstructed with proper seating signatures. The oil cooler was undamaged. Cylinders No. 1, 4, 5, and 6 exhibited normal operating signatures, while cylinders No. 2 and 3 had mechanical damage to their skirts. Pistons, rings, and pins from cylinders No. 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 showed normal signatures; the No. 2 piston skirt, rings, and pin exhibited mechanical damage. The crankshaft and counterweight assembly showed lubrication distress, thermal damage, and mechanical damage concentrated at the No. 2 connecting rod journal, which also showed lubrication distress, thermal discoloration, mechanical damage, and displacement of journal material. The No. 2 main bearings had contamination embedded in the surface layer, wear consistent with high-time engines, and the Babbitt layer was worn through. The bearings were fragmented and extruded from the bearing support, had shifted in the main bearing support, and the lock slot in the crankcase was damaged, indicating inadequate torque of the crankcase through bolts. The No. 2 connecting rod showed extreme thermal and mechanical damage and was fractured through at the base of the I-beam, separating both sections of the bearing supports. Fragments of the connecting rod cap and bolts exhibited thermal and mechanical damage. The piston pin bushing had fractured sections, and the No. 3 connecting rod was missing portions of its piston pin bushing.
Additional Information
During an interview, the flight instructor stated that during preflight he discovered the oil level was at 3-3/4 quarts, so he added oil to bring it to 5 quarts, which he said was the level they always serviced it to based on his experience and recommendations from the Cirrus Owners and Pilot Association (COPA) that anything over 5 quarts would blow out the breather. However, the Cirrus Design SR22 Pilot's Operating Handbook and FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual Section 4 stated, "Engine Oil ……… Check 6-8 quarts." Section 7 contained a caution: "The engine should not be operated with less than six quarts of oil. Seven quarts (dipstick indication) is recommended for extended flights." Section 7 also stated that engine cooling is accomplished by discharging heat to the oil and then to the air passing through the oil cooler. The CMI IO-550 Permold Series Engine Maintenance and Overhaul Manual indicated that with an 8-quart fill, usable oil at a 16-degree nose-up attitude was 5 quarts and at a 10-degree nose-down attitude was 4.5 quarts. Supplemental instructions advised checking oil level and verifying quantity within specified limits.
Flight Recorders
The airplane did not have a flight recorder installed. However, it had data recording capability in the Primary Flight Display (PFD) and Multi Function Display (MFD). The PFD contained flash memory storing maintenance and diagnostic data, including 20 power cycles and approximately 16 hours of data. The accident flight was the 16th power cycle, lasting about 45 minutes. The MFD contained a CF memory card with 103 data files; one file of about 39 minutes was recorded during the accident flight. Review of PFD and MFD data indicated the airplane powered up at 09:41:30, departed OPF at 09:54:36, climbed east, turned south, reached 6,000 feet at 10:13:36, then at 10:18:29 a drop in engine RPM and an oscillation in lateral acceleration were recorded. The airplane descended, turned 180 degrees right to a northeasterly heading, then left to a northwesterly heading, then right until it touched down above an old drainage canal, with the last recorded position at 10:25:18. Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) data showed fluctuations of the No. 2 cylinder's EGT reaching a peak of approximately 1600 degrees Fahrenheit from power-up until the last position.
Tests and Research
According to an engine overhaul facility owner, about six weeks before the accident, the mechanic who maintained the airplane found a piece of connecting rod bushing (piston pin bushing) in the oil sump. The facility personnel advised the owner and mechanic that a service bulletin concerning connecting rod bearings existed and that the engine case should be split for repair. When the total time of the engine was noted, the facility recommended a major overhaul or a new engine. The mechanic indicated the airplane was expected to be sold as is. Neither returned to the overhaul shop before the accident. Continental Motors Incorporated (CMI) Service Bulletin (SB) 96-7C stated that failure to torque through-bolt nuts on both sides of the engine can result in a loss of main bearing "crush" with main bearing shift and subsequent engine failure. CMI SB 07-1 provided instructions for inspection of the connecting rod piston pin bushing installation; if bushing material was recovered from an engine, all cylinders, pistons, and pins must be removed for inspection. Review of maintenance records revealed that on December 1, 2006, the engine received a propeller strike inspection at 927.8 hours; on September 25, 2008, it received a "top overhaul" using CMI cylinder kits; the last annual inspection was on December 20, 2011, at 2,888 hours; and the last logbook entry was February 2, 2012, for installation of an overhauled starter at 2,930.8 hours. No record of compliance with SB 07-1 was found. Total time on the failed engine was 2,978.1 hours. According to CMI SIL98-9A, time between overhauls was 2,000 hours.