History of Flight
On March 21, 2012, at 1112 central daylight time, a Beech 35, registration N3871N, was substantially damaged when it struck an open field under unknown circumstances approximately five miles north of Glencoe, Minnesota. A post-impact fire followed. The non-instrument rated private pilot and two passengers sustained fatal injuries. The aircraft was registered to and operated by the pilot under 14 CFR Part 91 as a personal flight. Instrument meteorological conditions existed for the flight, which operated without a flight plan. The flight originated from Crystal Airport (KMIC), Minneapolis, Minnesota, and was en route to Craig, Colorado.
Several witnesses in the area reported hearing an airplane flying low and a loud snap or pop. One witness heard a second explosion when the airplane hit the ground. Witnesses described the weather as low overcast with limited visibility due to light fog and mist. No radar data was available from the FAA for the accident flight.
Personnel Information
The pilot, aged 52, held a private pilot certificate with a single-engine land rating. He received a third-class airman medical certificate on October 28, 2011, with the limitation "must wear corrective lenses." At the medical application, the pilot reported 250 total flight hours and no flight time in the preceding six months.
The family provided the NTSB with two logbooks. A third, a training logbook, was retained by the family and showed 57.5 hours of instruction and 41.1 solo hours. The first logbook (June 2005 to June 2009) recorded 117 hours in an Alon A-2A with no endorsements or instrument time. The second logbook (November 2011 to March 2012) logged 32.6 hours, 24.2 in the accident airplane. On November 12, 2011, the pilot completed a flight review and received a complex aircraft endorsement. Neither logbook showed instrument training or experience. The pilot lacked a high-performance aircraft endorsement.
Aircraft Information
The accident airplane, a Beech 35 (serial number D1113), was manufactured in 1947. It held a standard airworthiness certificate for normal operations. It was powered by a Continental Motors E-185-11 engine rated at 205 horsepower, equipped with a two-blade propeller. According to the previous owner, the airplane was not certified or maintained for instrument meteorological conditions. The aircraft was maintained under an annual inspection program; the last annual was completed on March 22, 2011, at an airframe total time of 4,744.0 hours and a tachometer time of 595.7 hours.
Meteorological Information
Surface observations from Glencoe Municipal Airport (KGYL), about five miles south-southeast of the accident site, indicated instrument flight rule (IFR) conditions. At 1116, KGYL reported wind from 200 degrees at 7 knots, visibility 5 miles with mist, overcast ceiling at 900 feet above ground level, temperature 14°C, dew point 13°C, and altimeter 29.98 inHg. Multiple automated observations around the accident time showed similar conditions. Weather radar from Minneapolis indicated no convective weather near the accident site. Wind data below 3,000 feet from commercial aircraft showed light winds (<10 knots), with the freezing level between 9,500 and 10,000 feet. No pilot reports were available near the accident time. An AIRMET advisory for IFR conditions and moderate icing was active for the accident location. No AIRMETs for turbulence or SIGMETs were active. The area forecast predicted ceilings overcast at 2,500 feet with occasional 3-5 mile visibility, light rain and mist for southwest Minnesota; for southeast Minnesota, scattered clouds at 3,000 feet, broken at 5,000 feet with widely scattered light rain showers. The pilot contacted DUATS at 0536 UTC on March 21 for temporary flight restriction information but did not request weather for his route or file a flight plan. No evidence of a briefing through recorded services was found.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The wreckage was strewn over 900 feet across two plowed fields divided by a service road. Small red paint chips marked the debris field oriented west to east with an energy vector of 108 degrees. The initial debris included left wing leading edge skin, torn sheet metal, and the pitot tube. Further east, the left aileron with wing skin, then the left flap (87 inches long) with actuator extension corresponding to 2 degrees flap. An inboard left wing leading edge section with fuel tank bladder (torn, no residual fuel) was found. The empennage lay on the service road, including the ruddervator and stabilator; the left stabilator leading edge was crushed and dented, with black marks on adjacent fuselage skin. The elevator trim actuator extension indicated 10 degrees trim tab trailing edge down. Two ground scars were in the southern field: the first 8 feet long, 8 inches wide; the second 18 feet long, 10.5 feet wide, 12 inches deep, with strong fuel odor. The differential mechanism for elevator and rudder control was found tangled with fuselage skin. Control cables showed tension overload separations. The main wreckage, including the right wing and forward fuselage, lay 80 feet southeast of the last scar. The right wing was inverted with thermal damage, fuel tank compromised, landing gear retracted. Continuity was confirmed from aileron quadrant to the right aileron. The right flap actuator showed 0 degrees (flaps up). The engine separated, coming to rest 20 feet south. Both magnetos produced sparks. Cylinder examination revealed normal signatures except number four cylinder's intake valve damaged by impact. The vacuum pump rotated freely. The instrument panel was charred and melted. Cabin seats were consumed by fire. The battery and antenna assembly were at the far east of the debris field.
Medical and Pathological Information
The Midwest Medical Examiner's Office performed an autopsy on the pilot on March 22, 2012, concluding the cause of death as multiple blunt force injuries. Toxicological tests by the FAA's CAMI were negative for volatiles and drugs; carbon monoxide and cyanide tests were not performed.
Tests and Research
The wreckage was moved to a hangar in Minneapolis for examination. The left wing, laid out anatomically, showed upward bending and fragmentation. The leading edge separated into two sections; the inboard section had upward compression bending near the wing root. The flap exhibited aft diagonal buckling upward at midspan. The aileron had red paint transfer scratches. The forward carry-through spar, modified by supplemental type certificate SA 222-CE, separated partially at midspan; fracture surfaces showed slant fractures consistent with overstress failure. The forward upper and lower carry-through spar components were sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory, where visual examination confirmed overstress failures.