History of Flight
On April 1, 2012, about 1600 central daylight time, a Beech 58, N9448Q, registered to and operated by a private individual, crashed shortly after takeoff from Woosley Field Airport (96KY), Calhoun, Kentucky. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight to Madisonville Municipal Airport (2I0), Madisonville, Kentucky. The airplane sustained substantial damage, and the private pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally injured. The purpose of the flight was to obtain fuel.
Two witnesses reported observing the airplane takeoff. One noted that the airplane became airborne before being abeam a building on the north side of the runway, and after becoming airborne, the wings rocked then returned to level before the airplane turned left and flew over trees on the south side. The witnesses, familiar with the pilot, stated he “always” flew past the departure end before turning, making the early turn unusual. Another witness reported seeing the airplane taxi to the approach end of runway 27 and remain there for a longer-than-normal period. While there, the witness heard run-up of the engines and then saw the airplane positioned for takeoff. The airplane appeared to get airborne faster than normal, and the witness lost sight but heard what she thought was an impact sound. She did not report the crash until later that evening after hearing nothing on her scanner. A search was initiated when the pilot did not return, and the wreckage was located about 2330.
Personnel Information
The pilot, age 46, held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane, and a private pilot certificate with airplane multi-engine land rating limited to visual flight rules. He was issued a third-class medical certificate with no limitations on April 30, 2010. Review of his logbook showed a carry-forward time of approximately 1,609 hours, with an additional 138 hours logged between May 29, 2010, and December 10, 2011, of which approximately 117 hours were in multi-engine airplanes. Of those, about 2 hours were in the accident airplane on the date of purchase (December 10, 2011), flying from Middlesboro-Bell County Airport to Madisonville Municipal Airport. The airplane hour meter indicated about 5 hours of operation since purchase. A certified flight instructor reported that during that flight, the pilot performed all maneuvers required for a flight review, and he endorsed the logbook. The pilot’s wife reported no significant health issues; review of his FAA medical file revealed no previously reported heart issues.
Aircraft Information
The airplane was manufactured in 1972 by Beech Aircraft Corporation as model 58, serial number TH-204. It was powered by two 285-horsepower Continental Motors IO-520-C engines and equipped with Hartzell constant-speed propellers. The fuel system consisted of 172-gallon total capacity bladder-type tanks (166 gallons usable), with three interconnected fuel cells per wing. Fuel system control was off/on/crossfeed via cable-actuated valves in each wheel well. Maintenance records showed only one entry specifically referencing fuel cap replacement: on July 2, 2010, the left fuel cap was replaced with a serviceable unit and a new packing part number MS29513-338 was installed at about 778 hours. No entry indicated repair or replacement of the right fuel cap since manufacture. The last annual inspection was on December 9, 2011, at a total time of about 5,542 hours and hour meter reading of 784. The mechanic used 14 CFR Part 43 Appendix D and the Beech Long Form Inspection Guide but did not retain the marked checklist. The hour meter at the accident was about 789.
Meteorological Information
A surface observation at Owensboro-Daviess County Airport (OWB) at 1556 local, about 4 minutes before the accident, reported wind from 230 degrees at 11 knots gusting to 16 knots, visibility 10 miles, scattered clouds at 8,500 feet, temperature 31°C, dew point 17°C, and altimeter 29.68 inches of mercury. The accident site was about 205 degrees and 13 nautical miles from OWB.
Airport Information
Woosley Field Airport (96KY) is a private airstrip owned by the pilot, with a single grass runway oriented 09/27, 1,800 feet long and 100 feet wide, at an estimated elevation of 465 feet. A steep drop-off in terrain was noted beyond the departure end of runway 27. Trees border the south side of the runway, but inspection revealed no evidence of tree contact. Examination of the airstrip and hangar on April 3, 2012, showed no airplane parts on the runway, no evidence of fuel storage, and tie-down stakes for outside parking; the pilot’s stepson reported the pilot would park outside if he intended to fly soon.
Wreckage and Impact
The airplane impacted in a wooded area and came to rest inverted with the empennage elevated, on a magnetic heading of approximately 250 degrees. The accident site was at 37°33'03.9"N, 087°16'37.2"W, about 1,000 feet and 225 degrees from the departure end of runway 27. All components necessary for flight remained attached or were in close proximity; there was no pre- or post-crash fire. Flight control cable continuity was confirmed for roll, pitch, and yaw; elevator and rudder cables were cut for recovery. All primary and secondary flight control surfaces remained attached. Both engines remained attached; the right propeller remained attached while the left propeller was separated but found nearby. The landing gear was extended, and flaps were symmetrically extended approximately 15 degrees (approach setting).
Examination of the left wing revealed a section of the outer fuel cell with attached fuel cap separated; no fuel was detected in the remaining cells. An aluminum fuel line from the auxiliary fuel pump to the fuel strainer was partially fractured with no fuel stains. The fuel sump/strainer was not safety wired; upon removal, rust-colored water and heavy corrosion were noted. The strainer filter was also corroded, and the fuel strainer drain line was nearly completely blocked internally by rust debris. No obstructions were found in the inboard baffled cell drain, but the box section cell sump drain holes were plugged by unknown debris. The fuel selector was in the on position with no obstructions to the engine. The fuel cap and adapter were retained for examination. The aileron trim measured 1.75 inches extended, equating to about 6 units tab trailing edge down.
Examination of the right wing showed fuel leakage from the installed right fuel cap during recovery. Approximately 11 gallons of blue fuel consistent with 100 low lead were drained from the right wing tank. No fuel was found at the fuel sump/strainer; rust-colored water was noted, and the interior of the strainer bowl was heavily corroded. The strainer filter was corroded, and the fuel strainer drain line was nearly completely blocked internally by a white powdery substance consistent with corrosion at the 90-degree fitting. A sample from the auxiliary fuel pump to the strainer contained fuel admixed with water. No obstructions were found in the inboard baffled cell drain or the impact-damaged box section cell sump drain. The fuel selector was on, with no obstructions. The fuel cap and adapter were retained.
Cockpit examination showed the elevator trim indicator at 6 units nose up, aileron trim neutral, rudder trim at 6 units left, both fuel selectors on, both fuel boost pump switches in the high position, and the control throw-over yoke positioned to the left seat consistent with right roll input. The rudder interconnect rod was fractured near the co-pilot's rudder bellcrank and exhibited chafing from contact with a lighting hole in a structural member.
Empennage examination revealed left elevator trim actuator extension of 1 1/8 to 1 3/16 inches, corresponding to 7 to 8 degrees tab trailing edge down; right elevator trim actuator extension of 1.0 inch, corresponding to 2 to 3 degrees tab trailing edge down; and rudder trim actuator extension of 3 ¾ inches, corresponding to 5 degrees trailing edge tab right.
Engine examinations were conducted. The left engine was operated for about 9 minutes in a test cell after replacing impact-damaged components and repairing a cracked oil pump housing. Due to a cracked crankshaft, full operational testing was not possible. Magneto drops at 2,100 rpm were about 40 rpm, full throttle rpm was about 2,550 (specification 2,700), and throttle checks showed no discrepancies. No oil pressure at the oil transfer collar was attributed to impact damage. Post-run compression checks at 80 psi were 69 psi or greater in all cylinders. The right engine was operated in two runs totaling 11 minutes after replacing impact-damaged components and welding a crankshaft crack. Magneto drops were about 60 rpm, full throttle rpm about 2,572, and throttle checks normal. No oil pressure at the transfer collar was again attributed to impact damage. Post-run compression checks were 70 psi or greater.
Medical and Pathological
A postmortem examination of the pilot was not performed, and specimens for toxicological testing were not taken before embalming began about 30 minutes after the body was received at the funeral home. The coroner noted fractures of the right radius and ulna, three cervical vertebrae, the skull near the left eye, the left index finger, and a possible right ankle fracture. Bruising was noted on the abdomen and right side. The pilot's estimated weight was 260 pounds. After embalming, vitreous fluid, blood, and urine specimens were obtained for toxicological testing. Tests for carbon monoxide, cyanide, and drug screen were not performed. Vitreous testing showed negative for ethanol, but 2 mg/dL isopropanol and 36 mg/dL methanol were detected. Blood and urine specimens were insufficient for analysis.
Tests and Research
Examination of the fuel caps revealed both left and right caps were Gabb Special Products, Inc., part number 37810-1. The left cap showed impact damage, extensive embedded corrosion on the adapter sealing surface, and a handle that would not remain flush when closed. The adapter was damaged, precluding assembly testing. When the cap was placed in a test fixture, leakage was noted at 0.01 psig, with bubbles from the lock and outer seal at 0.02-0.03 psig. At 0.09 psig, leakage occurred from the lock and entire perimeter; the fixture could not hold pressure above 5.0 psig due to excessive leakage. Water poured onto the cap drained into the fixture in 1 minute 36 seconds. The outer o-ring was hard and corroded. An exemplar o-ring of the same part number installed per maintenance records (MS29513-338) was tested, but this part number is incorrect for this cap; proper outer o-ring is MS29513-339. With the incorrect o-ring, leakage at 0.18 psig occurred from the lock and three areas. With a new correct o-ring, leakage at 0.08 psig was only from the center of the lock; at 5.0 psig, no perimeter leakage but heavy lock leakage. The handle could not be removed by normal methods; it was submersed in acetone to free corrosion.
No statements of probable cause are included in the source.