History of Flight
On May 23, 2012, at approximately 1547 eastern daylight time, a Canadair Challenger 601-3R (CL-600-2B16), registration N207JB, experienced a separation of the main passenger door while in flight near Hallendale, Florida. The airplane, operated by Majestic Jet Inc. under 14 CFR Part 91 as a positioning flight, had departed Opa Locka Airport (OPF) at 1543 en route to Pompano Beach Airpark (PMP). Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed.
About three minutes into the flight, a loud bang was heard, and a rush of air entered the cabin. The pilots realized the main passenger door had separated. The flight was approximately 4 nautical miles south of Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport (FLL), and the pilot elected to land there. The noise in the cockpit was so loud that radio communication was impossible. The pilot landed the airplane on runway 10L without further incident.
The co-pilot reported that during ground operations, he closed the main passenger door and checked for a green light to confirm it was secure. He performed the takeoff and was at the controls when the door separated. The pilot then took over and executed an emergency landing.
Personnel Information
The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with multiple type ratings and reported 12,300 total flight hours, including 3,500 hours in the accident airplane make and model. The co-pilot held a commercial pilot certificate and reported 2,550 total flight hours, including 65 hours in the same make and model. According to an FAA inspector, the co-pilot was hired in October 2011 and assigned to the CL-600 in February 2012. He completed initial in-house training administered by the pilot on February 25, 2012, but had no formal training on the CL-600 other than that. Training records did not specifically indicate training on the operation of the main cabin door. The co-pilot had logged 14 flights as a required crewmember, totaling 19.9 hours in the accident airplane type.
Aircraft Information
The airplane was a low-wing, retractable tricycle landing gear transport category airplane with two General Electric CF34-3A1 engines. It had undergone maintenance at the Bombardier facility in Hartford, Connecticut from June 20, 2008, to January 5, 2012. Five repairs were documented in the area of the main passenger door, including a pressurization leak and a failure of the main door closed green light (PASS DR READY light). The airplane was released for service after these repairs.
Meteorological Information
The 1550 surface weather observation at FLL included wind from 110 degrees at 10 knots, visibility 10 miles or better, few clouds at 2,000 feet, temperature 28°C, dew point 22°C, and altimeter setting 29.87 inches of mercury.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The main passenger door and associated hardware were found on a golf course in Hallendale, Florida. Impact marks indicated the top of the door struck the ground first. The door sustained structural damage from ground impact. Examination of the airframe door interface components—including latch spigots, cams, rollers, tension buttons, and proximity switches—showed no evidence of visible anomalies or structural failure. The door's mechanical hinge was severed, and the electrical harness was damaged. About two feet of electrical wiring dangled from connector P2MB; four power wires were exposed and could contact the airframe. According to the manufacturer, such contact could create a short circuit and potentially trip circuit breakers CB-D17 and CB-B160, integral to the door warning system. Both circuit breakers were found open during post-accident examination.
A puncture in the external fuselage skin matched the size and shape of the door pull-out handle. The pull-out handle exhibited a bend of approximately 20 degrees opposite its contour and was found stowed but difficult to extend. Its linkage to the internal and external handles was severed from tension loads. A horizontal impression on the fuselage skin was consistent with the door's external handle in the closed position. The forward end had a gouge 0.016 inches deep; the aft end had a gouge 0.005 inches deep. Paint smudging indicated motion toward the closed position.
Examination of the recovered door revealed the upper half crushed from ground impact, compromising latch mechanism rigging. The forward and aft upper latch cams and proximity switches showed no anomalies; green alignment marks were visible. The internal and external handles operated normally when manipulated by hand. The pushrod connecting upper and lower latch cams was severed at the lower rod end with evidence of bending overstress; it was sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory. The VHF antenna on the belly was severed, and a round impression consistent with the door support leg was found on the fuselage. Minor damage was noted on the right wing leading edge.
Additional Information
Flight crew checklists from FlightSafety International included items for doors checked/secured and annunciator recall. System descriptions from the maintenance manual outlined the door warning system with amber and green lights for door status. The cabin pressurization mode selector was in AUTO mode, and the EMER DEPRESS switch was not selected.
The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) captured a thunk and click at 15:31:38 consistent with door closing. No mention of door warning lights by either crewmember followed. At 15:34:18, engine start sounds were recorded. During ground operations, no checklist items regarding doors or door warning lights were mentioned. During the "Before Takeoff" checklist, the co-pilot mentioned the annunciator, but the pilot did not respond with "Recall" as per checklist. The flight data recorder (FDR) indicated a takeoff heading of about 92 degrees, maximum pressure altitude of 3,033 feet, and a landing about 6.5 minutes later on a heading of 95 degrees.
Tests and Research
Integrity checks of the door warning system and master caution system revealed no anomalies for the green READY light or amber UNLKD light. The PASS DR NOT RDY amber light had a ground anomaly and would not illuminate when tested. According to the manufacturer, this would not affect the green READY light circuit. Examination of wiring splices from the door warning system showed no evidence of wiring having been present on both sides. The integrity of the severed door wiring harness could not be verified. The pushrod failure analysis showed bending overstress without other failure modes such as corrosion.
Ramp security video showed a crewmember entering and then the door momentarily opening partially and closing again. The co-pilot reported re-closing the door because it did not secure on the first attempt.
Probable Cause
No probable cause was determined in the source.