History of Flight
On May 28, 2012, at approximately 1610 central daylight time, a Bell 206-L4 helicopter, registration N7077F, was substantially damaged when it collided with the Ensco 99 oil rig derrick while on approach to the South Timbalier (ST67B) production platform in the Gulf of Mexico. The commercial pilot, the sole occupant, was fatally injured. The helicopter was registered to and operated by PHI INC, Lafayette, Louisiana. A company visual flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight that originated at Grand Isle, Louisiana, at 1514, with destinations including the Mississippi Canyon (MC397) and ST67B oil platforms. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the on-demand offshore flight conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135.
The pilot had landed at MC397 at 1541, dropped off a box, and departed for ST67B at 1543 to pick up a passenger. The ST67B platform had a 24-foot by 24-foot helipad with a 3-foot safety fence. The Ensco 99 mobile jack-up oil rig was connected on the north side of ST67B. Its 65-foot diameter helipad was used for operations. The oil derrick extended about 7 feet over the ST67B helipad, and the pad was supposedly closed due to this encroachment.
A witness, the passenger awaiting pickup on Ensco 99, reported hearing a public announcement for a "Green deck on 67B" and a response. He watched the helicopter circle and then approach the ST67B helipad. The pilot's approach was slow and steady. Numerous workers tried to wave the pilot off. The main rotor blades struck the rig side, the engine revved, and the helicopter backed out or lost control, striking the rig a second time. The tail rotor struck the helipad, and the helicopter fell inverted into the water. The helicopter sank quickly; a lifeboat was deployed by the Alliance I lift boat.
The captain of the Alliance I heard the helicopter approach, was alarmed due to the loud noise and his understanding that the helipad was closed. He saw a worker trying to wave the pilot off. The main rotor blades struck the southeast corner of the derrick; the helicopter spun, tail boom separated, and it descended inverted into water. Emergency floats were not deployed. The captain activated the general alarm; a rescue boat was launched within a minute, but the helicopter had sunk.
The first mate heard the helicopter, saw skids passing, and heard "pop, pop, pop" as the main rotor blades struck the derrick base. The helicopter spun, tail rotor struck the helipad, and it fell along the northeast side of the platform. He assisted in rescue attempts.
Another witness heard the helicopter make two passes, then heard it approach the ST67B helipad. Shortly after, he heard impact and saw the tail boom separated and both sections descending.
Personnel Information
The pilot was hired by PHI INC on January 5, 2012, and completed ground and flight training in the Bell 206 on January 18, 2012, and water survival training on January 14, 2012. He held a commercial pilot certificate for rotorcraft-helicopter and instrument helicopter. His last FAA First Class medical certificate was issued July 18, 2011. Company records and logbooks indicated he had about 1,645.1 total hours, with 363 hours in Bell 206-L3/4 models. The week before the accident, he completed transition training in the Bell 407 and passed an FAA Part 135 check ride on May 24, 2012.
Company flight manifest records showed the pilot had been dispatched to ST67B on several occasions, most recently on May 26, 2012. The passenger on that flight stated the pilot obtained a "green deck" before landing and made two passes before landing on the Ensco 99 helipad. No discussion about which helipad occurred. That passenger had flown to ST67B 2-3 times per month and never saw a pilot attempt to land on the ST67B helipad.
Interviews with other PHI INC pilots based in Grand Isle indicated no conversations with the accident pilot about the ST67B helipad.
Aircraft Information
The helicopter was a Bell 206-L4, serial number 52038. An FAA inspector reviewed maintenance records and found all required inspections completed, with no discrepancies.
Meteorological Information
Weather at Fourchon, Louisiana (K9F2), about 15 miles north of ST67B, at 1700: wind from 240° at 12 knots, visibility 7 miles, few clouds at 3,000 feet, temperature 32°C, dewpoint 25°C, altimeter 29.87 inches of mercury.
Helipad Information
The height from the ST67B helipad to the bottom of the Ensco 99 derrick was about 30-35 feet. According to Energy XXI, the ST67B helipad was closed due to the encroachment, but at the time of the accident, there were no markings indicating it was closed. Energy XXI reported that a tarp with a red "X" had been placed over the helipad in January 2012, but it blew away. A red tape "X" also disappeared. The day after the accident, a red "X" was painted on the helipad. No NOTAM declaring the helipad closed had been issued prior to the accident; a company NOTAM was issued on May 29, 2012.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The helicopter wreckage was recovered hours after the accident and examined on May 30, 2012. Damage included impact on the left side of the nose and fuselage, crushed roof, and spread skids. The tail boom separated from the fuselage and had minor damage. The tail rotor assembly was undamaged. Main rotor blades were fragmented; about four feet of each blade remained attached. Flight control continuity was established. No mechanical discrepancies were found in the airframe or engine that would have contributed to the accident.
Medical and Pathological Information
An autopsy on May 29, 2012, determined the cause of death as asphyxia due to drowning and multiple blunt force injuries. Toxicological tests by the FAA were negative for all items tested.
Survival Aspects
The pilot was found inside the cockpit with his seatbelt/shoulder harness unfastened. The pilot's seat was intact, the door functioned normally, and the restraint system worked when tested. The pilot wore a company life vest. The left bladder cartridge had been activated but the bladder had a 3-inch tear (later determined to be cut by rescue personnel). The right bladder cartridge was not activated and functioned properly when tested. The helicopter's external float system was manually activated during examination and all but the middle right rear float expanded.
Additional Information
Energy XXI contracted PHI INC for transportation. Interviews with PHI INC pilots revealed the derrick over the ST67B helipad was a known safety hazard, but it was never reported to management or via the internal safety reporting system. One pilot reported landing on the ST67B helipad on April 17, 2012, at a passenger's request, when the derrick extended only 4 feet. The derrick was moved to 7 feet the next day. The pilot told an administrative assistant, who called the platform to close the helipad and posted a memo in the pilot lounge. The pilot did not recall conversations with the accident pilot.
A review of safety meeting notes from January 2012 to the accident date showed no mention of the ST67B helipad hazard. The Master Service Agreement between PHI INC and Energy XXI did not require Energy XXI to inform PHI of helipad closures. Energy XXI relied on pilots' professional judgment.
The Ensco 99 rig clerk stated that a PHI administrative assistant called on the day of the accident to verify a "green deck" for the pilot, assuming it was for the Ensco 99 helipad. The clerk confirmed the green deck. Flight manifest records listed ST67B as the designated location, not Ensco 99. The supervisor of the passenger to be picked up stated he requested transport assuming the pilot would use the Ensco 99 helipad, as the ST67B pad was considered out of service. He had not seen any written notice of closure.
PHI INC's FAA-accepted Operations Manual had no restrictions preventing the pilot from landing on the ST67B helipad.