History of Flight
On June 17, 2012, at approximately 1608 Pacific daylight time, JetBlue Airways flight 194, an Airbus A320-232 (registration N552JB), experienced a loss of two of its three hydraulic systems after departure from Las Vegas McCarran International Airport (LAS). The flight, a regularly scheduled passenger service to John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), was operating under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed.
The flight was delayed due to a late inbound aircraft and departed at 1606 with a takeoff weight of 168,724 pounds, about 1,000 pounds below the maximum allowable takeoff weight.
During landing gear retraction, the Green hydraulic system lost pressure. The flight warning computer detected a flaps system fault, followed by a Yellow hydraulic system reservoir overheat two minutes later. A flight attendant reported a loud screeching sound, which the captain attributed to the hydraulic power transfer unit (PTU) operating in overdrive. Warnings were inhibited until the aircraft climbed above 1,500 feet, after which multiple alerts inundated the flight deck.
The captain, pilot flying, transferred control to the first officer and executed ECAM procedures, which included switching off the Green and Yellow engine-driven pumps and the PTU. This resulted in Yellow system low pressure, reversion to alternate law, and autopilot and autothrust disconnection. The flaps remained at position 1 after an attempted retraction.
Only the Blue hydraulic system remained pressurized. The crew coordinated with air traffic control to hold at 12,000 feet while running checklists and communicating with company dispatch and maintenance. The Yellow system was recovered, and the flight operated with Blue and Yellow hydraulic systems for the remainder of the flight. The flap position indicator appeared locked between 0 and 1.
The captain calculated landing distances: initially over 11,000 feet with two systems inoperative, later revised to 8,500 feet after Yellow system recovery. Due to Green system failure, normal braking and nosewheel steering were lost, and the landing gear could not be retracted after extension. The crew held to burn fuel, landing at LAS at 1937 at a weight of 140,640 pounds. The aircraft was towed to the gate; passengers and crew deplaned via jetway.
Injuries
There were no injuries to the 149 passengers and 5 crewmembers (2 pilots, 3 flight attendants).
Damage to Aircraft
The airplane sustained minor damage to the hydraulic system.
Personnel Information
The captain, 36, was hired by JetBlue in 2006, upgraded to captain in 2011, and had 9,187 total flight hours (4,687 on A320, 510 as pilot-in-command). He held an ATP certificate with multiple type ratings and a current first-class medical certificate with a corrective lenses limitation. He reported no fatigue and had 5 hours flight time in the previous 24 hours.
The first officer, 54, was hired in 2006 and had 13,700 total flight hours (4,800 as SIC on A320, 2,500 as PIC). He held an ATP certificate with multiple type ratings and a current first-class medical certificate with corrective lenses. He reported typical 7-8 hours of sleep.
The incident occurred on the first leg of the last day of a 3-day trip.
Aircraft Information
The Airbus A320-232 (serial number 1861) was equipped with two International Aero Engines V2500 turbofan engines and had 38,705 total airframe hours. The most recent inspection was June 13, 2012. The aircraft operated with a deferred maintenance item: the slat/flap control system 2 flap channel was inoperative per the FAA-approved minimum equipment list.
The aircraft has three hydraulic systems: Green (left engine-driven), Yellow (right engine-driven), and Blue (electric). A post-incident examination found a leak in the right main landing gear door retraction flexible hydraulic line in the Green system.
The PTU transfers power between Green and Yellow systems without fluid transfer; it activates automatically when pressure differential exceeds 500 psi. The flap/slat system is electrically controlled and hydraulically actuated; flaps are powered by Green and Yellow systems, slats by Green and Blue. The incident flight relied solely on flap channel 1 (Green system) due to the deferred flap channel 2.
The ECAM presents alerts, some inhibited during takeoff and initial climb up to 1,500 feet.
Meteorological Information
Surface winds at LAS were from the southwest at 11-13 knots with gusts to 22-24 knots. At 1856, wind from 220° at 14 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, clear skies, temperature 39°C, dew point -11°C, altimeter 29.74 inHg. The crew reported turbulence; QAR data showed vertical accelerations between 0.7 and 1.5 G.
Communications
No issues with air traffic control. The crew used radio and ACARS to contact company dispatch; radio quality was poor and required repeated transmissions.
Airport Information
McCarran International Airport is 5 miles south of Las Vegas at elevation 2,181 feet. Runway 25R is asphalt, 150 feet wide and 14,510 feet long with a displaced threshold of 1,397 feet and declared available landing distance of 12,755 feet.
Flight Recorders
Cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder data were overwritten. Data from the QAR and AIRMAN system were used; they recorded the sequence of events including loss of Green pressure, flap faults, autopilot/autothrust disconnect, and Yellow overheat and subsequent recovery.
Organizational and Management Information
JetBlue Airways Corporation, headquartered in Long Island City, New York, is a Part 121 air carrier operating approximately 700 flights daily. As of June 30, 2012, its fleet included 123 A320-232s. The incident aircraft was owned by Wells Fargo Bank Northwest NA trustee and operated by JetBlue.
Additional Information
Training: The company provided training on hydraulic malfunctions during qualification and continuing qualification training. Dual hydraulic system failures were only covered in qualification training; continuing training focused on single system failures. The captain could not recall when he last received training on multiple emergencies.
Previous corrective actions: Airbus had issued service bulletins (SB A320-29-1115, -1147, -1126, -1145) to introduce PTU inhibit logic that automatically prevents activation when a low pressure condition is detected for more than 6 seconds, preventing overheating and loss of the other system. These SBs had not been incorporated on the incident aircraft at the time of the event. Subsequently, Airbus released SB A320-29-1156 as an optimized retrofit.
Previous NTSB recommendations from a 2007 accident recommended best practices for multiple emergency training (A-09-24 and -25). The FAA later proposed rulemaking requiring scenario-based training, but only for stall prevention; the NTSB classified these recommendations as "Closed Unacceptable Action."