History of Flight
On April 1, 2013, at 1635 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 402C, Turks and Caicos Islands registration VQ-TIN, operated by Caicos Express Airways, was substantially damaged when the nose landing gear collapsed during landing rollout at Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport (FXE), Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The airline transport pilot was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an IFR flight plan was filed for the positioning flight destined for Providenciales International Airport (MBPV), Providenciales, Turks and Caicos Islands. The flight was conducted under the provisions of Article 14 of the United Kingdom Air Navigation (Overseas Territories) Order 2007.
According to the pilot, the airplane had just completed maintenance, and the purpose of the flight was to return it to MBPV for service. After departing from runway 26 at FXE, the pilot selected the landing gear to the "UP" position. The main landing gear retracted, but the nose landing gear did not. The pilot completed the emergency check and immediately selected "gear down." He then observed three "gear down and locked lights." After discussing the situation with air traffic control, the pilot decided to return for landing on runway 13. The touchdown was normal; however, during the rollout, as the airplane decelerated through 60 knots, the nose landing gear collapsed, and the airplane's nose and propellers made contact with the pavement. The pilot also advised that prior to the collapse, he never heard a gear warning horn.
Personnel Information
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and pilot records, the pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for airplane multi-engine land. His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued on October 23, 2012. He reported 10,566 total hours of flight experience, with 3,507 hours in the accident airplane make and model.
Aircraft Information
According to Turks and Caicos Islands Civil Aviation Authority (TCI-CAA) and CEA records, the airplane was manufactured in 1980. Its most recent annual inspection was completed on March 16, 2013. At the time, the airplane had accrued 8,524 total hours of operation.
Meteorological Information
The recorded weather at FXE at 1653 included wind 180 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 10 miles, sky clear, temperature 26 degrees C, dew point 17 degrees C, and altimeter setting 29.97 inches of mercury.
Wreckage and Impact Information
Examination of the airplane revealed that the fuselage nose structure behind the radome had been substantially damaged. Examination of the nose landing gear assembly showed that the nose landing gear actuator was intact, extended, and undamaged, but the rod end with its castellated nut still threaded onto it was not connected to the nose landing gear drag brace. Further examination revealed that it would have been difficult for the pilot to discover the disconnection, as the disconnected actuator was in an area difficult to see or access.
Tests and Research
Review of Maintenance Records: According to FAA and TCI-CAA records, the repair station EA Management Services Inc. (EAMS) was authorized to perform airframe and powerplant repair on CEA aircraft. Review of the airplane's maintenance records revealed no evidence of any maintenance being performed on the nose landing gear assembly. Review of EAMS defect work cards also did not show evidence of such maintenance. Additional worksheets (Form CEA-124) given to EAMS indicated that the nose landing gear drag brace (Supplemental Inspection Number 32-20-00) was requested to be performed, but the documents were not filled out by EAMS. A work order (Work Order 2013-0051) from Ultimate NDT Inc. indicated that non-destructive testing (NDT) had been performed on the nose landing gear drag brace via fluorescent penetrant inspection, and no cracks were noted.
Chief Inspector's Statements
According to EAMS's chief inspector, on March 24, 2013, the accident airplane arrived at FXE with the pilot and a CEA mechanic for maintenance including an engine change and numerous supplemental inspections. One of the repair station's mechanics was contracted by CEA for assistance. The chief inspector prepared a list of NDT inspections based on his knowledge of the airplane. The list included additional inspections not originally on the work order. After discussions with the CEA mechanic and the pilot, it was decided that the repair station did not need to be involved in inspecting the nose landing gear drag brace because it did not necessitate dismantling or separating parts. The chief inspector stated that this discussion occurred on March 24, 2013, but he could not recall specific details, though he affirmed "it was unequivocal that we had agreed that our help will not be needed in the performance of this inspection at this time." On previous inspections, the drag brace had always been completely removed from the airplane. The chief inspector also mentioned discussing the unavailability of paint stripper; after being informed it was not required, he did not transfer that inspection to the out shop defect work cards.
The chief inspector stated they completed the inspections, installations, and additional maintenance as required. He was responsible for supervising all tasks and performed a final inspection, ground runs, and control adjustments before release to service. After the accident, initial questioning of all parties involved in the maintenance yielded no one who remembered working on the nose landing gear or disconnecting the bolt. Further questioning revealed that a mechanic had disconnected and removed the bolt at the request of the NDT technician to facilitate an inspection. The mechanic and NDT technician did not communicate this to anyone and took no further actions that might have alerted others. The chief inspector noted they had performed this inspection numerous times with the drag brace removed and paint-stripped on a table, and they were unaware that the inspection could be carried out in-situ on the aircraft. Since it was not on their discrepancy sheet and they did not remove the drag brace for maintenance, it did not occur to him to inspect the drag brace before release to service.