Casualties unknown

2013-05-10: Antonov AN2 (YR-LRA) — Ciochiuța-Strehaia, Mehedinți, RO

Ciochiuța-Strehaia, Mehedinți, RO

On May 10, 2013, an Antonov AN2 (registration YR-LRA) was involved in an aviation accident near Ciochiuța-Strehaia, Mehedinți, RO. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: Engine shutdown caused by fuel starvation in the left fuel tank group, resulting from the pilot's failure to verify that the fuel quantity indicator was set to display total fuel rather than the fuel level in the active left tank during pre-flight preparation. This summary draws on records from the Romanian Safety Investigation and Analysis Authority for Civil Aviation (AIAS).

Sourcesthe Romanian Safety Investigation and Analysis Authority for Civil Aviation (AIAS)Primary reportUpdated 1782080268Data APIEditorial standards

An Antonov AN-2 operated by Aero Scoroget S.R.L. suffered an in-flight engine failure due to fuel starvation near Ciochiuța, Romania, resulting in a forced landing with no injuries.

What happened

On May 10, 2013, at approximately 07:20 UTC (10:20 local time), an Antonov AN-2 aircraft registered YR-LRA was conducting an aerial forestry treatment mission in the vicinity of Ciochiuța, Strehaia, Mehedinți County, Romania. The flight had departed from Balota airfield around 06:30 UTC with a crew of two and one passenger representing the beneficiary.

Approximately 50 minutes into the flight, the crew noticed a drop in fuel pressure. The pilot initiated an immediate return to the departure aerodrome. During a 180-degree left turn, the engine ceased operation due to fuel exhaustion. Unable to select a suitable landing site from low altitude with no wind advantage, the pilot executed a forced landing on adjacent agricultural fields. The aircraft touched down with a tailwind of 2–3 m/s and rolled for 130 meters before the left main landing gear collapsed. This caused the left lower wing to strike the ground and brush vegetation, bringing the aircraft to a stop.

The investigation

The Romanian Civil Aviation Safety Investigation Commission (CIAS) examined the flight history, wreckage, and cockpit procedures. Key findings included:

  • The aircraft was equipped with an ASh-62IR engine and had accumulated 6,598 total flight hours.
  • There were no fatalities; all three occupants sustained minor or no injuries.
  • The check-list document onboard was printed on A4 paper in a protective sleeve, indicating it was treated as a formal display item rather than a functional operational tool.
  • Analysis of the cockpit controls revealed a critical discrepancy in fuel system management. The fuel selector valve was set to draw from the left fuel tank group, but the fuel quantity indicator switch was positioned to display total fuel across all tanks.

Findings

The primary cause of the accident was engine shutdown due to fuel starvation in the active fuel tank group. Contributing factors included:

  • Human error: The pilot failed to verify the correspondence between the fuel selector valve position and the fuel quantity indicator switch before takeoff.
  • Misleading instrumentation: Because the indicator displayed total fuel rather than the fuel remaining in the left tank (the active source), the crew believed sufficient fuel remained when only the left tank was being depleted.
  • Operational environment: The forced landing occurred on uneven agricultural terrain with ditches, which contributed to the collapse of the left main landing gear upon impact.

Safety action

The investigation commission issued recommendations to the Romanian Civil Aviation Authority (AACR):

1. Inform all AN-2 operators about this event and recommend installing warning labels near the pilot's station clarifying the correspondence between the fuel valve position and the tank group switch. 2. Require all AN-2 operators to review their check-list formats and ensure that verifying the alignment of the fuel selector and indicator switch is a distinct item in pre-flight checks.

Probable cause

Engine shutdown caused by fuel starvation in the left fuel tank group, resulting from the pilot's failure to verify that the fuel quantity indicator was set to display total fuel rather than the fuel level in the active left tank during pre-flight preparation.