History of Flight
On February 7, 2014, about 1930 eastern standard time, a Piper PA-28-161, registration N2571U, was destroyed when it struck the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Stuart, Florida. The private pilot was fatally injured. Night instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The flight originated from The Florida Keys Marathon Airport (MTH) around 1730, destined for Vero Beach Municipal Airport (VRB). The personal flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.
The pilot had rented the airplane for one week while visiting from Europe. On the accident day, he flew from VRB to MTH. Fueling receipts from MTH showed he added 16 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel at 1717 before departing for VRB.
Radar and voice communication data from the FAA indicate the pilot contacted ATC after departure around 1734, requesting VFR flight following to VRB. The flight was radar-identified and flew north along the eastern Florida coastline. About an hour later, the pilot was approved to transit Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport (FLL) airspace at or below 500 feet. When asked, the pilot chose to remain low.
Around 1852, the pilot requested and received approval to transit Palm Beach International Airport (PBI) airspace below 500 feet, about 12 nautical miles southeast of the airport. At 1853, ATC informed another aircraft that IMC prevailed at Witham Field (SUA) in Stuart, and that aircraft requested an IFR clearance. About a minute later, the accident pilot asked ATC for weather at Vero Beach. The controller provided the 1753 VRB weather (overcast 800 feet, 10 miles visibility) and then the 1853 observation (overcast 600 feet, 10 miles). The pilot then asked about St Lucie County International Airport (FPR) weather; the controller gave 1853 conditions (scattered 700 feet, overcast 1,000 feet, 10 miles). The pilot decided to divert to Fort Pierce.
At 1901, the pilot reported to another PBI controller that he was at 450 feet. Six minutes later, he asked to briefly leave the frequency to check SUA weather. Upon return, the controller noted Stuart was IFR. The pilot stated he was already diverting to Fort Pierce. At 1909, about 20 nautical miles southeast of SUA, the controller asked if he planned to circumnavigate the airspace to maintain VFR; the pilot confirmed. The controller advised him to report if he needed to change altitude for VFR.
At 1914, about 15 nautical miles southeast of SUA, the controller asked about weather. The pilot replied the ceiling was low but otherwise okay. Shortly after, radar services were terminated, and the pilot was given a frequency for SUA tower. The tower controller told him to return to PBI approach.
Around 1916, the pilot recontacted PBI approach. The controller advised him to circumnavigate SUA airspace and, if possible, climb to 2,000 feet. The pilot said he would circumnavigate but doubted he could reach 2,000 feet. Asked about the ceiling to the northeast, the pilot said it looked improving. The controller suggested transitioning through SUA airspace 2–3 miles offshore at 1,000 feet, but the pilot declined, saying he could not get a handle on the ceiling. When asked what altitude he could maintain, the pilot said 700 feet. The controller then told him to proceed northbound along the shoreline.
PBI approach radar tracked the flight until about 1922. The last known position was at 1922:47, about 4 nautical miles east of SUA at a pressure altitude of 400 feet. At 1924, the controller tried to contact the pilot without response. Another aircraft relayed a request for the pilot to contact Miami ARTCC. The pilot contacted Miami Center at 1926, stating he was about 15 miles from FPR at 450 feet. The controller asked if he would remain at that altitude; the pilot affirmed. The controller said he could not provide flight following or vectors at that altitude, noting the minimum safe altitude near Vero Beach was 1,600 feet. The pilot acknowledged at 1927:49, and no further transmissions were received.
The aircraft owner contacted Miami ARTCC around 2247 to report the flight missing. An alert notice was issued on February 8 at 1639. On February 9, a backpack containing the pilot's rental car keys and an identification document was given to the Martin County Sheriff's Office; it had been found on the beach about 3.5 nautical miles northeast of SUA on February 8 around 0730.
Personnel Information
The pilot held an FAA private pilot certificate for airplane single-engine land, issued based on his UK pilot's license. He did not have an instrument rating. According to UK Civil Aviation Authority records, he held a UK private pilot license (PPL(A)) with a single-engine piston land rating, issued in September 2010, and a night qualification obtained in December 2012. His personal flight logs were not recovered. On his application for a US certificate (July 16, 2012), he reported 68 total flight hours, including 1.28 hours at night. UK rental and instruction records showed he flew 6.5 hours between November 2013 and January 18, 2014, all dual instruction, none at night. His total flight experience at the time of the accident could not be determined.
Aircraft Information
The accident airplane was manufactured in 1979. In May 2003, it was modified with Knots 2U, Ltd. components including wing root fairings and aileron, flap, and stabilator gap seals. No additional airworthiness or maintenance history was available. The owner/operator ran a business renting airplanes and accommodations to pilots worldwide. Typically, pilots completed a check flight for day VFR, night VFR, or IFR operations. The accident pilot completed a check flight for day VFR operation, and the owner/operator believed they had a verbal understanding that the pilot would not fly at night or in IMC.
Meteorological Information
A National Weather Service area forecast issued at 1345, valid at accident time, predicted overcast ceiling at 1,000 feet with tops at 12,000 feet and 5 miles visibility in light rain and mist for northern two-thirds of Florida; southern third had scattered clouds at 4,000 feet until 2200, then broken ceiling at 1,000 feet with tops at 4,000 feet and 3 miles visibility in mist. No AIRMETs were valid near the last known position, but an AIRMET issued at 1545 warned of IMC north of SUA, with an outlook extending south after 2200.
Terminal Aerodrome Forecast (TAF) for VRB issued at 1227 predicted VMC with broken ceilings at 1,500 feet until 0100 then 800 feet. A later VRB TAF at 1834 forecast scattered 800 feet, overcast 1,500 feet through 0800, with a temporary period of 400-foot overcast and 3 miles visibility in mist between 0400 and 0800. Shortly before departure from MTH, VRB weather at 1653 included scattered 1,000 feet, broken 1,400 feet, 10 miles visibility. A special observation at 1730 reported overcast 800 feet. The 1853 observation reported overcast 600 feet, 10 miles. At FPR, the 1853 observation reported scattered 700 feet, broken 1,000 feet; a special observation at 1900 reported overcast 700 feet; the 1953 observation reported overcast 600 feet. At SUA, the 1747 observation reported broken 700 feet, 7 miles visibility, persisting beyond 1847; the 2015 observation reported overcast 500 feet, 10 miles. At PBI, the 1843 observation reported broken 4,100 feet, 10 miles, with ceilings above 4,500 feet until 0110 the next day when broken 300 feet was reported.
The sun set at 1807; civil twilight ended at 1831. Moonrise occurred at 1231, moonset at 0207 the following day.
Wreckage and Impact Information
In the days and weeks after the accident, law enforcement in Martin and St. Lucie counties collected wreckage and personal effects that washed ashore or were recovered at sea. Recovered items included a portion of one wing with the fuel filler port and placard (about 2 feet long, with significant impact damage); a piece of a supplemental type certificated flap gap seal identified by manufacturer and part number stamps; a portion of a seat track; a trim control cable; and the engine oil filler tube.
Additional Information
The FAA's Advisory Circular 61-134 (April 2003) discusses general aviation controlled flight into terrain awareness. It notes that continuing VFR flight into IMC is a leading cause of GA accidents, and recommends that noninstrument-rated VFR pilots not attempt to fly in IMC and that pilots fly above minimum safe altitudes. FAA Advisory Circular AC 60-4A discusses pilot spatial disorientation, noting it can take up to 35 seconds for instrument-rated pilots to establish full control after loss of visual reference. The FAA Airplane Flying Handbook states that night flying requires more attention, that outside visual references are limited, and that the vestibular sense can cause false sensations leading to spatial disorientation.
Medical and Pathological Information
About four weeks after the accident, a bone fragment was discovered on a beach near the last known position and provided to the Martin County Sheriff's Department. DNA testing confirmed it was a positive match to the pilot. No other remains were recovered, so toxicological testing was not performed.