3 fatalities

22 Feb 2014: BEECH 95-B55 (N36638) — EXECUTIVE AIRCRAFT STORAGE LLC — LaGrange, GA

LaGrange, GA, United States

On 22 Feb 2014, a BEECH 95-B55 (registration N36638) operated by EXECUTIVE AIRCRAFT STORAGE LLC was involved in an aviation accident near LaGrange, GA. 3 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilot's overreaction to a perceived conflict with a tow plane and glider on an intersecting runway, which resulted in a loss of control during an attempted aborted landing. This summary draws on records from NTSB; 12 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On February 22, 2014, a Beech 95-B55 (N36638) was destroyed after losing control during an aborted landing on runway 31 at LaGrange-Callaway Airport, Georgia. The three occupants sustained fatal injuries. The flight was a local instructional flight conducted under Part 91.

History of Flight

On February 22, 2014, at 1405 eastern standard time, a Beech 95-B55, registration N36638, was destroyed when it collided with terrain following a loss of control during an aborted landing on runway 31 at LaGrange–Callaway Airport (LGC), LaGrange, Georgia. The three occupants—a commercial pilot, a flight instructor, and a pilot-rated passenger—sustained fatal injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local instructional flight conducted under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

The airplane was based at Dekalb-Peachtree Airport (PDK), Atlanta, Georgia. The purpose of the flight was for each pilot to perform an instrument proficiency check with the instructor. The airplane arrived at LGC and purchased fuel. After fueling, the accident pilot moved from the back seat to the left front seat, and the airplane departed on the accident flight.

Several witnesses provided consistent accounts of the events. Glider tow operations by the Civil Air Patrol (CAP) were being conducted on intersecting runway 03/21. Many witnesses noticed the accident airplane when it was fueled at 1335. The occupants entered the terminal, spoke with others, and departed.

Witnesses described the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) as constant due to glider operations. Some did not recall hearing an inbound call from the accident airplane or a departure call from the tow plane. Several witnesses heard the accident airplane announce "inbound on the ILS runway 31" and later heard an "Abort! Abort!" transmission.

One witness observed the airplane on final approach, stating it was "sort of hot and landing long." About 2,000 feet past the threshold, the airplane was still airborne, "bobbling" and "searching for the ground." The engines suddenly accelerated to full power, the airplane pitched up into a steep climb, banked left, and rolled inverted. The turn continued until the airplane struck the ground in an 80- to 90-degree nose-down attitude. The witness added that the airplane never touched down; it was in a flare and floated excessively due to excessive speed.

Other witnesses were drawn to the rapid engine acceleration. At that time, they noticed a tow plane and glider departing from runway 03, with the tow plane still on the runway and the glider on tow above the runway. One witness believed a left turn to sidestep the runway would have resolved the perceived conflict.

A witness in a hangar with CTAF on loudspeaker heard the accident airplane depart after fueling, then make an inbound call. He did not hear the tow plane announce its takeoff but heard the "abort" call. He watched the airplane pitch up to about 60 degrees and 150 feet above ground, then "stall," roll inverted, and descend nose-down with engines "wide open." He saw the glider released and stop before the runway intersection, and the tow plane cross the intersecting runway then taxi back.

The tow-plane pilot stated he called "abort" when he perceived a potential conflict with the accident airplane over runway 31. Both he and the glider pilots reported stopping before the intersection.

Personnel Information

The pilot held a commercial certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued October 21, 2013, and he reported 1,642 total hours. His logbook showed 1,706.7 total hours as of August 7, 2013, with 1,124.2 hours in multiengine airplanes. His most recent flight review was performed in the accident airplane on May 20, 2012.

The flight instructor held ratings for airplane single and multiengine land and an airline transport pilot certificate with multiple type ratings. His logbooks were not recovered. He reported 12,100 total hours on the date of his most recent second-class medical certificate, issued October 4, 2011. His medical certificate was expired, but regulations did not require currency while instructing a certificated pilot.

Aircraft Information

The airplane was manufactured in 1980. Its most recent annual inspection was completed July 2, 2013, at 5,109.6 aircraft hours, and it accrued 17.8 flight hours afterward. The manufacturer's Pilot's Operating Handbook indicated that, given atmospheric conditions and maximum takeoff weight, the estimated landing distance from 50 feet above the threshold was 2,200 feet, and a landing performed as prescribed would stop the airplane approximately 2,300 feet prior to the intersection of runways 03/21.

Meteorological Information

At 1355, LGC reported calm winds, clear skies, 10 miles visibility, temperature 19°C, dew point -4°C, and altimeter 30.09 inHg.

Aerodrome Information

LGC is located about 6 miles southwest of LaGrange, Georgia, at an elevation of 693 feet. The airport is not tower-controlled. Runway 13/31 is 5,599 feet long and 150 feet wide; runway 03/21 is 5,001 feet long and 100 feet wide. Instrument approaches (ILS, RNAV, VOR) are published for runway 13/31.

Runways 31 and 03 were in use. Due to terrain and trees, the approach end of runway 31 could not be viewed from the ground from the approach end of runway 03, and vice versa.

The "Glider Operations" symbol was depicted on the VFR sectional chart. The Airport Facilities Directory advised of glider operations on weekends. Airport rules required a local NOTAM and a ground spotter during glider operations. At the time, no NOTAM was posted and no spotter was present; airport staff had not ensured compliance. The flight instructor in the glider stated he was unaware of these rules and that the airport authority had never corrected glider operators for not placing spotters.

Wreckage and Impact Information

The wreckage was examined on February 23, 2014. All major components were accounted for. The wreckage path was oriented 245 degrees magnetic and was 77 feet long. The main wreckage came to rest on its main landing gear in a nearly vertical nose-down attitude. The nose compartment, instrument panel, and cockpit area were destroyed. Left and right engine tachometers indicated 2,810 rpm and 2,650 rpm, respectively.

The airplane had fully functioning dual flight controls. Flight control continuity was established from the cockpit to all surfaces. The main landing gear was down and locked, and the flaps were in the 30-degree down position. A detailed examination of the airframe and both engines on February 24, 2014, revealed no preimpact mechanical anomalies.

Medical and Pathological Information

The FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory performed toxicological testing for the pilot and flight instructor. In the pilot, chlorpeniramine, ephedrine, and pseudoephedrine were detected in blood and urine but in quantities too small to quantify. In the flight instructor, amlodipine (urine only), methadone (liver and cavity blood), and metoprolol (liver and cavity blood) were detected. The flight instructor's wife reported his cancer diagnosis, treatment, and subsequent remission, resulting in nerve damage and chronic pain managed with medication, though she could not recall the specific drugs.

Autopsies performed by the Georgia Office of the Chief Medical Examiner listed the cause of death for both as "blunt impact injuries."

Additional Information

Title 14 CFR Part 91 grants right-of-way to aircraft on final approach or landing over other aircraft in flight or on the surface. FAA Advisory Circulars and the Airplane Flying Handbook discuss collision avoidance, excessive speed causing floating, the need for timely go-arounds, and the critical nature of emergency go-around procedures in multiengine airplanes. The manufacturer's balked landing procedure specifies propeller low pitch, maximum power, climb speed of 88 knots, flaps up, gear up, and cowl flaps as required.

Contributing factors

Causes

PilotCapability exceeded

Other contributing factors

Pilot of other aircraftAirport