What happened
On May 30, 2014, an Embraer 170 landed on runway 14 at Zurich Airport (LSZH). After vacating the runway via taxiway H2 and proceeding onto taxiway H, the crew failed to establish timely contact with the Apron North controller. Instead, the first officer mistakenly contacted the Ground controller on frequency 121.9 MHz, rather than the required 121.85 MHz.
In response to the delayed communication, the air traffic controller activated a red light intermediate taxiway holding point on taxiway H. The crew did not observe the illuminated signal. At the time of the incident, the crew was engaged in radio communications with Ground and was managing a high workload in the cockpit. The aircraft continued taxiing, crossing the illuminated holding point without realizing it had been signaled to stop. No other ground traffic was in the vicinity, and the event did not result in an actual collision risk.
The investigation
The investigation established that the correct frequency for Apron North was clearly documented in the Jeppesen aeronautical charts (10-1P3 and 10-9), as well as in the NOTAM and ATIS information. The investigation found that the crew had discussed the correct communication procedures during their pre-approach briefing, but a mistake occurred during the high-workload phase of taxiing.
Regarding the failure to notice the red light, investigators determined that the light activated very close to the nose of the taxiing aircraft. The visibility of the signal was likely compromised by high solar intensity. Furthermore, the investigation noted that information regarding the existence of these specific light-based intermediate taxiway holding points at Zurich is not included in Jeppesen aeronautical publications.
Findings
- The primary cause was human error involving the incorrect selection of the radio frequency by the first officer.
- High cockpit workload during the transition from runway to taxiway contributed to the communication error.
- The crew failed to observe the red light holding point due to high sunlight intensity and the proximity of the light to the aircraft's nose.
- The crew was distracted by active radio correspondence with the Ground controller.
- The lack of information regarding these specific light-based holding points in standard Jeppesen charts was noted as a factor.