1 fatality

21 Jun 2015: CZECH SPORT AIRCRAFT AS PIPER SPORT (N35EP) — Holly Ridge, NC

Holly Ridge, NC, United States

On 21 Jun 2015, a CZECH SPORT AIRCRAFT AS PIPER SPORT (registration N35EP) was involved in an aviation accident near Holly Ridge, NC. One person was killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilot’s failure to maintain airplane control after the cockpit canopy opened during initial climb. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s failure to securely lock the canopy before takeoff. This summary draws on records from NTSB; 12 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On June 21, 2015, about 1532 EDT, a Czech Sport Aircraft Piper Sport, N35EP, was substantially damaged after a loss of control during climb after departing from Topsail Airpark, Holly Ridge, North Carolina. The private pilot was fatally injured.

History of Flight

On June 21, 2015, at approximately 1532 eastern daylight time, a Czech Sport Aircraft Piper Sport, registration N35EP, sustained substantial damage when it collided with trees and terrain after a loss of control during climb following departure from Topsail Airpark (01NC) in Holly Ridge, North Carolina. The private pilot, who was the sole occupant, was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the personal flight conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 to Albert J. Ellis Airport (OAJ) in Jacksonville, North Carolina.

According to the pilot's wife, on the day of the accident, the pilot went to the airport after lunch to check on the airplane. He met with a mechanic who was completing the condition inspection, paid for services, and received a receipt. The pilot returned home but planned to later fly the airplane back to its base at OAJ. Around 1500, his wife dropped him off at the airport. Temperatures were in the upper 90s Fahrenheit with high humidity and little breeze. Due to the airplane's clear canopy, it would become hot inside, and the pilot typically left the canopy open until departure.

The pilot called his wife before takeoff at 1524, stating the flight would take 15 minutes and advising her to meet him in the air-conditioned office at OAJ. When she arrived, he was not there. At 1711, one of the mechanics received a call from the airport owner reporting that the pilot had not arrived. The mechanic confirmed the airplane was not at 01NC and alerted 911. A search by federal, state, and local authorities began, and the wreckage was discovered about 2130 in a wooded area approximately 1.1 miles west of 01NC.

Personnel Information

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on July 24, 2013, at which time he reported 1,850 total hours of flight experience.

Aircraft Information

The light-sport airplane was a single-engine, low-wing monoplane of conventional metal construction. It featured a fixed-tricycle undercarriage with a castering nose wheel and was powered by a 100-horsepower Rotax 912 ULS engine driving a three-bladed Woodcomp ground-adjustable propeller. The fuselage was semi-monocoque, with cockpit and canopy frames made of carbon fiber. The Plexiglass canopy was hinged at the front and equipped with sliding windows on each side. The aircraft included a ballistic recovery system (BRS) with a parachute designed for emergency descent at 1,000 to 1,500 feet per minute. The BRS activation handle was located to the right of the pilot's seat on the instrument panel.

The airplane was manufactured in 2010 and had accumulated 74.7 total hours at the time of its most recent condition inspection, completed on the day of the accident. According to one of the mechanics, the pilot flew the airplane to 01NC on June 19, 2015, under a ferry permit because his illness prevented him from flying it elsewhere for inspection. On June 20, the mechanics began the condition inspection. The pilot reported accidentally putting oil into the coolant fill port, so the cooling system was flushed and new coolant added. The mechanics also replaced cracked bushings holding the radiator. The pilot declined an oil change, stating it had been done 23 hours earlier. Spark plugs were found dirty, and the pilot opted to install new plugs instead of cleaning the old ones. On the accident day, the mechanics opened and closed all inspection panels, returning the airplane to service around 1400, then secured the hangar and left.

Meteorological Information

At 1556, weather recorded at New River Marine Corps Air Station (NCA) in Jacksonville, North Carolina, located 16 nautical miles northeast of the accident site, included wind from 230° at 6 knots, 10 miles visibility, scattered clouds at 5,000 feet, temperature 34°C, dew point 22°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.94 inches of mercury.

Wreckage and Impact Information

Examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane struck trees in a steep, nose-low attitude, and the pilot was ejected from the cockpit. The airplane then fell nose-first to the ground, impacting in a 90° nose-down attitude, nosed over, and came to rest inverted. Numerous areas of crush and compression damage to the fuselage and wings were noted, along with fuel staining on the leading edges of the wings. No evidence of inflight structural failure, fire, or explosion was found.

The cockpit canopy was detached and lying under the aft portion of the inverted fuselage. Most of its clear bubble was broken but collocated with the frame. One canopy lift strut was missing. Damage patterns on the canopy frame and cockpit sill did not correlate. The canopy latching mechanism hooks were partially retracted, the locking mechanism and activation handle were in the open position, and the slots in the canopy frame showed no evidence of tear-out. Both wing fuel tank caps were closed, wing locker doors secured, inspection panels closed, and the pitot tube clear. Wing flaps were up, and flight control continuity was established. The pilot's four-point harness was intact but unlatched at the center buckle. The emergency locator transmitter was not armed, and the BRS safety pin with a "REMOVE BEFORE FLIGHT" flag was still in place. The master switch, strobes, landing light, and electric fuel pump were on; the magneto switch was in the both position; the throttle was full; the choke off; the fuel selector on the right tank; and the carburetor heat off. The propeller speed reduction unit was impact damaged and breached, with evidence of rotation and torsional smearing. The engine was impact damaged, with carburetors and float bowls separated, and portions of air intake, exhaust, and ignition harnesses detached.

Medical and Pathological Information

The 89-year-old pilot was 68 inches tall and weighed 187 pounds at his last FAA medical exam. His medical history included coronary artery disease with a stent in 2002, coronary artery bypass grafting in 2004, hypertension, and recurrent atrial fibrillation. He held a special issuance third-class medical certificate with limitations, but at the time of the accident, he was flying a light-sport aircraft requiring only a valid driver's license. An autopsy determined the cause of death as multiple extreme injuries due to aircraft crash, and the manner as accident. The heart was mildly enlarged (430 grams), with significant coronary artery narrowing. Toxicology testing detected ethanol (likely postmortem) and prescription medications for hypertension and atrial fibrillation, none of which are impairing.

Tests and Research

The Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH) for the airplane stated that before engine starting and before takeoff, the canopy should be closed and locked, and the safety harness tightened. Supplement 03 to the POH indicated that if a canopy inadvertently opened in flight, it would not be possible to close it, but the airplane would remain fully controllable under most conditions, with the canopy opening about 2 inches during takeoff and 2-3.2 inches during climb, descent, or horizontal flight at 60-80 knots. The supplement recommended manually checking the canopy lock before takeoff and cautioned against performing slips with the canopy open.

Contributing factors

Causes

PilotPerformance/control parameters — Not attained/maintained

Other contributing factors

Incorrect use/operation