Accident Overview
On February 12, 2016, about 1215 mountain standard time, a Piper PA-24-250 airplane, registration N6691P, impacted a light pole and terrain while executing a missed approach at Sturgis Municipal Airport (49B) in Sturgis, South Dakota. The commercial pilot sustained minor injuries, and the passenger sustained serious injuries. The airplane was registered to and operated by the pilot as a day, Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) personal flight under 14 CFR Part 91. Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) prevailed at the time of the accident, and an IFR flight plan was filed. The flight originated from Jamestown Regional Airport (JMS) in Jamestown, North Dakota.
Flight History
The pilot reported conducting the RNAV (GPS) RWY 29 instrument approach procedure. During descent to the Decision Altitude (DA), the autopilot was engaged. Light ice was encountered at 4700 feet mean sea level. The pilot kept the needles centered to the DA of 3530 feet. The passenger stated the runway was in front of them. The pilot looked up from the instruments, did not see the runway, and the passenger said they were above the runway. The pilot then looked out the side window and did not see the runway. Returning his view to the instruments, he noted the airspeed was stable at 120 knots and the wings were level.
The pilot referred to the altimeter but was unable to determine his altitude and told the passenger he did not know his position. The passenger stated the runway was to the left. The pilot went full throttle and began to climb. At that moment, the right wing impacted a light pole located on the airport. The airplane immediately pitched down. The pilot held the ailerons neutral and used severe rudder movements to keep the wings as level as possible, noting a severe left bank tendency. Just prior to impact, he yelled to brace and both crossed their arms in front of their faces and pulled their feet back. The airplane impacted terrain, coming to rest in a ditch about 950 feet north of the departure end of the runway. Substantial damage occurred to both wings and the fuselage. The pilot verified no preimpact mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airframe or engine.
Meteorological Conditions
The closest weather reporting station, Ellsworth Air Force Base (RCA), about 21 nautical miles southeast, reported at the time of the accident: wind 7 knots from 140 degrees, visibility 1 statute mile, and a 200-foot overcast ceiling. Light drizzle and moderate mist were also reported. The pilot reported variable wind, visibility of 0.25 statute mile, 500-foot overcast ceiling, fog, and light ice at the accident site. A photograph taken by an FAA aviation safety inspector showed ice accumulation on the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer and fog.
Wreckage and Impact
The airplane wreckage was located about 950 feet north of the departure end of runway 29. The initial impact point was a 50-foot light pole in the north corner of a ramp, about 1,180 feet southeast of the wreckage. The bottom of the fuselage showed damage consistent with terrain impact. The right wing leading edge had an impact mark about mid-span, consistent with impact marks on the light pole at about 39 feet above ground. The left wing, about 6 feet inboard from the tip, was partially separated, consistent with striking fence posts. The light pole was about 765 feet northeast of the departure end of the runway.
Survival Factors
The pilot reported both he and the passenger had 3-point restraint systems available but used only lap belts. Both sustained head lacerations; the passenger sustained serious neck injuries. The FAA Advisory Circular 21-34 (1993) discusses benefits of shoulder harness use to reduce serious injuries.
Additional Information
FAA-H-8083-15B Instrument Flying Handbook outlines approach minimums: pilots may not descend below DA/DH unless the aircraft is positioned for a normal landing, flight visibility meets prescribed minimums, and specific visual references are identifiable. Missed approaches should be executed immediately when requirements for operating below DA/DH are not met or upon reaching the missed approach point.
As a safety recommendation, the pilot stated that when the runway was not visible at decision altitude, an immediate missed approach should have been executed, and excessive head movement should be avoided during transition from IMC to VMC.