Accident Overview
On April 30, 2016, about 1624 Pacific daylight time, an EXTRA Flugzeugproduktions-und Vertriebs EA-300/L airplane, registration N330MT, was destroyed when it impacted terrain approximately 10 miles south of Henderson Executive Airport (HND) in Las Vegas, Nevada. The airline transport pilot and a passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by Vegas Extreme Adventures LLC, doing business as Sky Combat Ace (SCA), under 14 CFR Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local instructional flight, which had departed HND about 1603.
Flight Profile
The accident airplane departed and rendezvoused with two other company airplanes to conduct a simulated air-to-air combat mission. The mission profile involved two airplanes maneuvering against each other while the third observed from a higher altitude and safe distance. After the air combat mission, all three airplanes began the return flight to HND, during which they flew a planned low-level bombing run simulation. Upon landing at HND, the pilots of the first two airplanes noticed the third had not returned. The operator's pilots notified HND tower and the company, which initiated an aerial search. The wreckage was located shortly thereafter.
Cockpit Recordings and Flight Data
The accident airplane was equipped with a GoPro Hero camera (mounted on the front seat instrument panel, facing backwards) and a Garmin VIRB camera (forward-facing, mounted on the right side of the rear seat instrument panel). Both cameras were recovered and sent to the NTSB's Vehicle Recorder Laboratory for download. The GoPro Hero card contained two files capturing the accident flight; the Garmin VIRB card captured the flight and cockpit communications. The recorded data began on the airport ramp, showing scattered clouds and a high overcast layer. The pilot and passenger discussed recent weather as rain droplets collected on the airplane's surfaces. Both wore parachutes; the passenger sat in the front seat, the pilot in the rear.
Another company airplane (Ace 4) checked the formation in on the radio and called for taxi clearance for the three airplanes. The accident airplane (Ace 1) began taxiing behind Ace 4, the lead airplane; the other airplane was Ace 2. At 08:55 elapsed time, the accident airplane took off from runway 35L. After reaching about 200 ft agl, the pilot initiated a hard left turn. The airplane climbed to a cruise altitude of 3,500 ft msl. At 11:40, the three airplanes flew south towards the practice area and performed a simulated gun check. The accident pilot led the passenger through shallow bank maneuvers simulating setting up to shoot another airplane at 3,900 ft msl.
At 15:00, the accident airplane watched Ace 4 and Ace 2 maneuver for a simulated dogfight between 5,000 ft and 7,000 ft msl. After the first dogfight ended at 18:30, the accident airplane set up for its first simulated dogfight at 19:38, during which the passenger appeared to be manipulating the controls. After about 2 minutes, that engagement was terminated, followed by another. At 23:15, the pilot asked the passenger how he was doing; the passenger replied he was "doing pretty rough" and confirmed he was ready for one more engagement. At 23:35, the third simulated engagement began, achieving a successful "kill" at 24:38. The pilot then indicated he would stop dogfighting and watch the other airplanes. The accident airplane climbed to 7,000 ft msl, and the passenger expressed he was "not feeling well." The pilot responded he would not do any crazy turning.
At 25:35, Ace 4 radioed that he was calling off the next dogfight and the flight would return to HND, with the accident airplane as the last in trail in a "fighting wing" position. Another pilot radioed they would finish with a low-level bomb run. The accident pilot informed the passenger he would keep it smooth, then radioed the formation he would "keep it pretty PG back here." The other pilots acknowledged, replying "sounds good, you guys tame it down to however you like it."
As the accident airplane descended, the passenger readied an airsickness bag. The pilot restated he would keep it smooth. The passenger became actively airsick and adjusted his headset microphone away from his face. The accident pilot transmitted "One's code three" over the radio. At 28:51, the airplane was flying low level over the desert floor at 2,750 ft msl and 185 knots indicated airspeed. Rain beaded on the windscreen; the sky was overcast with a high ceiling. At 29:26, the airplane began climbing as it approached a ridgeline. Forward visibility appeared unobstructed; the ridgeline was not obscured. At 29:37, the airplane was in a shallow climb, and the pilot transmitted about vapor trails. The pitch increased slightly, rain continued beading but did not obstruct view. Airspeed was about 175 knots, altitude 3,150 ft msl. The pilot stated, "I'm going to take it nice and easy here." The Garmin VIRB stopped recording about 15 seconds before impact as the airplane approached the ridgeline.
The GoPro recorded the airplane perform three check turns before crossing the ridgeline and one after. The airplane crossed the first ridgeline, leveled off briefly, then began a shallow wings-level descent. Rain beaded but visibility was not degraded. The airplane then rolled into a slight right turn as it descended. Seconds later, the passenger was seen yelling with his microphone away from his mouth. At 30:18, the airplane impacted a small hill that rose from the valley floor, in a slight left bank and shallow climb. The pilot did not indicate any anomalies before impact; the airplane was in stable flight with no attempted maneuver to avoid terrain.
Video from Ace 2 was also reviewed. Ace 2 flew low level near the Jean dry lakebed at about the same altitude above ground. Rain impacted Ace 2's windscreen but did not significantly degrade visibility; Ace 2 remained in VFR conditions. Ace 2 encountered heavier rain than the accident airplane. Ace 2's flight path was east of the accident airplane; weather near the accident airplane appeared better. Ace 2 cleared the ridgeline and performed clearing turns as it descended. Once level, the accident airplane came into view behind, descending towards the valley floor. After crossing the first ridgeline, it was hard to see. A small hill came into view behind and left of Ace 2, where the accident airplane was flying. Moments later, a white plume was observed on top of the hill. Ace 2 had performed 8 clearing turns during low-level flight before the accident. Following the accident, Ace 2 continued flying normally; the pilot and passenger seemed unaware of the impact.
Personnel Information
The pilot, age 37, held an airline transport pilot certificate with single- and multi-engine land ratings, and a flight instructor certificate with single- and multi-engine ratings. He was issued a first-class FAA medical certificate on September 2, 2014, which at the time of the accident was valid only for third-class purposes with no limitations. He reported 7,118 total flight hours, with 200 hours in the previous 6 months. The operator reported the pilot had over 17 years of professional flying experience and 19 years of aerobatic experience, and had been employed by SCA since August 2015. Other pilots in the formation reported the pilot appeared in good health and disposition. He had taken the previous 2 days off; the accident flight was his second of the day.
Aircraft Information
The tandem-seat, low-wing acrobatic-category airplane was equipped with dual controls and manufactured in 2011. The most recent annual inspection was completed January 2, 2016, at 619.9 hours; the engine received a 100-hour inspection on February 23, 2016, at 719.3 hours. Due to tandem seating, forward visibility from the rear seat was restricted by the forward portion of the airplane. Utilizing manufacturer drawings, forward visibility from the rear seat during level flight was estimated to be limited between 7.5° left and right of centerline, and below more than about 8° below the nose. The Pilot Operating Handbook states solo flights are accomplished from the rear seat.
Meteorological Conditions
At 1636, HND's automated weather reported wind from 120° at 8 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, few clouds at 4,100 ft, scattered clouds at 7,000 ft, overcast at 9,500 ft, temperature 16°C, dew point 9°C, altimeter 29.79 inHg. Remarks: precipitation discriminator, wind shift at 1555, lightning >10 miles north and northeast, thunderstorm ended 1630, rain began 1559 and ended 1620, trace precipitation. Two unofficial stations near the accident site reported winds at 1625 and 1627. Weather radar imagery indicated high reflectivity consistent with heavy rain and convection moving through the accident site immediately before the accident. At 1632, a small area of light reflectivity was over the accident location. One AIRMET for mountain obscuration below 8,000 ft was active; no SIGMETs; several convective SIGMETs were active for thunderstorms moving into the area.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The airplane impacted terrain near the top of a hill at about 3,101 ft msl. The hill comprised dark-brown lava rocks, about 650 ft long by 350 ft wide, with a peak of about 3,109 ft, oriented northeast/southwest. The desert floor southwest of the hill, from which the airplane approached, was 40-50 ft lower than the hill elevation. The hill was about 3,000 ft northeast of the dry lake bed ridgeline. The first identified point of contact was an area of disturbed rocks and dirt near the top of the hill, measuring about 4 ft by 3 ft by 6 inches deep, southeast of the main wreckage. Numerous small pieces and paint transfer were observed. The debris path was about 800 ft long oriented on a heading of about 030° magnetic. Most debris consisted of small fragments. The wings separated; large wing fragments were found northwest of the hill about 200 ft from the initial impact point. The left aileron remained attached to an aft wing section; the right aileron separated. The fuselage and tail section came to rest upright about 400 ft from the initial impact point on a heading of about 250° magnetic, leaning left. The engine separated and came to rest inverted about 400 ft past the main wreckage, breaching a wire fence. Propeller blades separated; fragments were near initial ground scars. Control continuity was established to all flight control surfaces. Engine examination revealed no pre-impact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
Medical and Pathological Information
The Clark County Coroner's Office conducted an autopsy of the pilot; cause of death was "blunt force injuries." FAA toxicological testing on the passenger was negative for carbon monoxide, volatiles, and tested-for drugs. For the pilot, results were negative for carbon monoxide and volatiles; however, 9.4 ng/ml of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) was identified in cavity blood, and THC was also detected in lung, liver, and brain. Additionally, 10 ng/ml of tetrahydrocannabinol carboxylic acid (THC-COOH), the active metabolite, was identified in cavity blood and also in lung, liver, and brain. THC is the primary active metabolite of marijuana and may impair mental and/or physical ability required for hazardous tasks. THC is stored in fatty tissues and may leach after death, so postmortem levels may be higher than antemortem. There is no direct relationship established between blood levels of THC and impairment.
Organizational and Management Information
SCA was founded in 2011, operating at HND and Gillespie Field Airport in San Diego/El Cajon, California. The company offered aerobatic and aerial dogfighting flights as flight instruction. Its website stated: "You fly the plane, you are at the controls and you execute the air-to-air combat tactics." The operator used four EA-300 airplanes. The company had a training syllabus required for all pilots, covering advanced aircraft handling, aerial dogfighting, and advanced air combat maneuvering, each ending with a check ride. Weather and NOTAMS were required briefing items; pilots were required to maintain VFR at all times. SCA low-level standards required a minimum airspeed of 140 knots and minimum terrain clearance of 30 ft agl. Pilots maintained 1-mile separation. Check turns were standard procedure to clear for terrain given limited visibility from the rear seat. Codes were used: Code 1 (customer good to go), Code 2 (customer feeling poorly, ease up), Code 3 (customer vomiting or preparing to vomit; go to spectator mode). No further guidance on "spectator mode" was provided. SCA flights were instructional under 14 CFR Part 61. Organizations under Part 61 are not certificated air agencies and are not subject to same FAA oversight as Part 141 or 142 schools. FAA surveillance of Part 61 flight schools is outlined in FAA Order 1800.56; only required inspection is for Level 4 or 5 flight training devices (none at SCA). A review of FAA records showed 9 records in the 3 years preceding the accident, including complaint investigations, ramp inspections, enforcement action, near mid-air collision investigation, and a waiver.
Additional Information
According to an FAA legal interpretation, flights carrying persons or property for compensation or hire generally require a Part 119 certificate and operations under Part 121 or 135, but exceptions include student instruction (Part 119.1(e)(1)) and training flights (Part 119.1(e)(3)). Title 14 CFR 1.1 does not define "student instruction" or "training flights." The interpretation states that "student instruction" is interpreted broadly as an operation in which a person receives instruction.