History of Flight
On October 21, 2017, at 1612 Pacific daylight time, an EXTRA Flugzeugproduktions-und Vertriebs-GmbH EA 300/L, registration N414MT, collided with terrain within the watershed of the El Capitan Reservoir, near Four Corners, California. The flight instructor and passenger sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was destroyed. The aircraft was operated by California Extreme Adventures, LLC, doing business as Sky Combat Ace (SCA), as a 14 CFR Part 91 instructional flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The local flight departed Gillespie Field Airport (SEE), San Diego/El Cajon, California, at 1557.
SCA's website described the company as an "extreme aviation attraction," offering experiences including aerobatics, air combat, and flight training. The accident flight was a 25-minute "Top Gun" experience that included "Advanced Aerobatics," "Basic Aerobatics," a "Low Level Bombing Run," "You Fly Maneuvers," and "You Fly Departure."
Ground-based radar tracking data from the FAA indicated the airplane departed from runway 17 at SEE and initiated a climbing left turn, reaching about 4,700 ft mean sea level (msl) approximately 5 nautical miles (nm) northeast of the airport. Over the next 10 minutes, the airplane tracked northeast along the San Diego River, then east of El Capitan Reservoir and north toward Four Corners. The track depicted a meandering path at varying airspeeds and altitudes between 4,300 and 6,300 ft msl, consistent with aerobatic maneuvers. Multiple witnesses reported seeing an airplane performing aerobatic maneuvers.
At 1610, the airplane was about 15 nm from SEE, north of the reservoir, and began tracking southwest, climbing from 5,000 ft msl to 6,900 ft msl over 90 seconds. About 15 seconds later, the last radar return was recorded at the northern edge of the reservoir at 3,800 ft msl (about 3,000 ft above ground level).
A witness piloting a motorglider inbound for SEE at 4,500 ft msl observed an airplane trailing white smoke and performing aerobatic maneuvers. The airplane was ahead at about 3,500 ft msl at the northern end of the reservoir. As the glider approached, the airplane was leveling out at the bottom of a loop when the smoke stopped. The witness banked left to increase conspicuity, passed the airplane, and did not see it again. The maneuvers appeared standard, and the airplane did not appear in distress.
Another witness, about 3 miles north of the accident site, stated she was familiar with aerobatic operations in the area. She noticed the airplane was flown faster, more "recklessly," or more "intense" than usual, with sharper turns. White smoke was thicker and lasted longer. Shortly after, noise stopped, and she saw smoke rising from the ground.
A witness also about 3 miles north saw the airplane perform two "giant" loops, then climb and "corkscrew" toward the ground, disappearing behind a ridge. He initially saw nothing unusual, but a few minutes later saw smoke rising from behind the ridge.
A witness at a camping area about 1 mile northeast heard a "dive" sound, then engine noise stopped, followed by a "pop pop" sound and then an impact. He saw a rising plume of black smoke.
Personnel Information
The flight instructor was hired by SCA in May 2017 and was considered one of the company's most dependable and reliable pilots. He was described as a good mentor, conservative in nature, and provided supervision for younger pilots. He was suited to work unsupervised at SCA's SEE location.
The pilot's resume included experience in manufacturing and engineering until 2002, when he began working as a flight instructor and commercial air tour pilot in Southern California. His experience included aerobatic, tailwheel, and emergency maneuver training in Pitts and Extra 200 series airplanes.
He held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single- and multiengine land and instrument airplane. He also held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single- and multiengine, instrument airplane, and ground instructor (advanced).
His most recent FAA medical examination was on December 12, 2016, issuing a second-class medical certificate with the limitation to wear corrective lenses.
His last flight logbook entry was dated October 15, 2017, documenting 4,289.3 total flight hours, with 2,246.2 as a flight instructor. He had accrued about 113 hours in the Extra 300 series since May 2017. There were no entries indicating he had flown the accident airplane; SCA records indicated the accident flight was likely the third time he flew it. The Extra 300 he usually flew was in Florida for an event, as it had a heater and autopilot.
SCA's base was at Henderson Executive Airport (HND) in Nevada. The pilot was based in San Diego. The day before the accident, he flew to Las Vegas by commercial airline and had dinner with SCA employees. He slept on a couch at SCA's sleeping quarters, as all rooms were taken. He retired about 2200. No witnesses observed his wake-up time, but one stated he sometimes rose at 0600 to run. All reported he was in good spirits.
About 1000 on the accident morning, the pilot flew a customer on a group combat mission from HND in an Extra 300. He then flew back to SEE in the accident airplane with the company's director of marketing. The accident flight was his third flight of the day.
The passenger did not hold any FAA pilot or medical certificates. He had flown with SCA on a similar flight in December 2015 out of HND.
Aircraft Information
The tandem-seat normal and aerobatic category airplane was manufactured in 2009, imported into the US in 2013, and purchased by KD Leasing on May 10, 2017. It was equipped with dual flight controls, a Lycoming six-cylinder AEIO-580-B1A engine, and a three-blade hydraulic constant-speed propeller by MT Propellers. FAA and maintenance records showed no modifications beyond a remote oil filter kit. At the last 100-hour inspection on October 1, 2017, the airframe and engine had 186.57 flight hours.
The airplane had a basic empty weight of 1,513 lbs and a maximum takeoff weight (MTOW) of 2,095 lbs. The maneuvering speed (Va) in the aerobatic category was 158 knots indicated (KIAS). The never-exceed speed (Vne) was 220 KIAS. A placard stated: "CAUTION: Particular caution must be exercised when performing maneuvers at speeds above Va (158 KIAS). Large or abrupt control inputs above this speed may impose unacceptably high loads which exceed the structural capability of the aircraft."
The g limitations in the aerobatic category were +/-10 g with one person onboard at MTOW of 1,808 lbs. In two-person configuration, limits were +/-8 g at 1,918 lbs MTOW and +/-6 g at 2,095 lbs MTOW.
For the accident flight, the pilot (173 lbs) and passenger (195 lbs) plus 30 lbs of parachute equipment and 25 gallons of fuel resulted in an estimated weight of 2,061 lbs.
The airplane had a mechanical accelerometer (g-meter) with a sweep range of -6 g to +10 g, with maximum and minimum needles that could be reset.
The canopy was a one-piece plexiglass and composite unit, hinged on the right side, with forward and aft interior locking handles painted bright red on the left side. Squeezing the handles unlocked three locking pins. According to the information manual, if unlatched during flight, the canopy will open automatically due to low pressure. The canopy can be jettisoned by pushing it forward while opening.
The manufacturer issued service bulletins SB 300-1-15 (May 5, 2015, throttle cable inspection/replacement) and SB 300-1-11 (July 18, 2011, transponder safety clamp). The FAA issued SAIB CE-12-01 (October 24, 2011, rudder cable inspection). Maintenance records contained no record of compliance with these bulletins or the SAIB. Federal Aviation Regulations do not require compliance for Part 91 operations.
Multiple parties contacted the NTSB regarding rudder pedal AD 98-24-07, but it was not applicable to this airplane based on serial number.
The airplane's service manual stated that the manufacturer should be contacted for unscheduled maintenance after exceedances of load factor or never-exceed speed. No logbook entries documented such exceedances or inspections.
Meteorological Information
A weather sounding at 1600 from Miramar MCAS Airport, about 2 miles west of the accident site, indicated 7 to 12 knot winds generally from the northwest at altitudes from 2,000 ft to 8,500 ft.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The accident site was in a valley on a hillside slope at about 775 ft msl, about 1,000 ft east of the last radar target. The primary wreckage was a 4-ft-deep by 6-ft-wide crater containing fragmented engine and airframe components. The outboard left wingtip rib and red position light shards were about 14 ft west; the right wingtip rib and green position light shards were about the same distance east. The debris field continued about 75 ft downhill to the north, containing the engine crankcase, instrument panel components, fragmented tubular airframe material, crumpled steel tail section, and burnt composite structure.
Most composite structure was consumed by fire, except for a few skin fragments scattered in trees and near the impact site. The impact ignited a brush fire that burned about 45 acres northeast of the site.
A secondary debris field was in a dry riverbed about 400 ft north of the crater, oriented east-west, about 800 ft long, containing the left and rear arch sections of the canopy frame, multiple plexiglass pieces, and parts from the passenger's headset. No items in this debris field showed evidence of fire or bird strike.
Airframe and engine examination revealed that all steel airframe tubing members were fragmented and deformed. Composite components not ejected were consumed by fire. Remnants of all flight control surfaces were located; no bird remnants or feathers were found.
Left and right rudder cables were continuous from the aft rudder pedal assembly to the rudder base. Forward of the aft rudder pedals, cables had separated into multiple pieces. The left cable remained attached to the rudder control arm; the right cable had detached at a melted attach point. There was no indication of cable degradation at locations referenced in SAIB CE-12-01.
Elevator and aileron control system components sustained extensive fragmentation. All located bellcranks, tube fittings, hinges, and wing spades had bending damage consistent with impact overload.
Most wing primary structure and fuel tanks were consumed by fire. Left and right main spar attachment flanges remained partially attached, with main wing bolts and flange bushings in place. Burnt remnants of wing spar were sandwiched between spar attachment flange assemblies.
Both front and rear main seatbelt latches were accounted for, along with supplementary lap belt ratchets; all were in the belt-locked position. Eight seatbelt mount points were located and firmly bolted. Remnants of both parachutes were found with D-rings, springs, and locking buckles in latched configuration.
Avionics and instruments had extensive crush and/or fire damage, preventing assessment of settings.
Four rear seat assembly adjustment pins were in their fixtures. The front seat was fixed.
Examination of the left canopy frame, lock and lock pin assembly, rear arch, and shattered plexiglass from the secondary debris field showed that forward and aft canopy lock handles were intact, but interconnecting rods were bent, resulting in indeterminate lock positions.
All canopy hinge and lock sleeve assemblies were in the main impact crater and surrounding area. Hinge pins and barrels sustained bending damage.
The engine separated from the airframe with significant impact damage. Most ancillary components were liberated, including starter, governor, alternator, fuel injection servo, magnetos, and all but one push rod. Cylinder heads from Nos. 1 and 2 detached; barrels were bent aft. Oil sump fragmented. No indication of pre-impact catastrophic internal engine failure.
Spark plugs from cylinders Nos. 4, 5, 6 (top) and Nos. 3, 5, 6 (bottom) exhibited normal to worn-out-normal wear. Borescope inspection of combustion chambers in cylinders Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 showed no evidence of catastrophic internal damage; dark grey deposits.
The propeller hub remained attached to the crankshaft. All blades had separated, with only partial remnants of splintered wood and twisted leading edge caps recovered.
Additional Information
The president of SCA stated he had considered operating under Part 91.147 but understood that passengers would not be able to operate the controls under that provision. After discussing it with the FAA, he felt it would be a better fit under Part 91.