History of Flight
On June 19, 2016, at approximately 1149 Pacific daylight time, a Piper PA-23-150, registration N1270P, was destroyed when it collided with a building after a loss of engine power during an approach to land at Hayward Executive Airport (HWD) in Hayward, California. The airline transport pilot, the sole occupant, sustained fatal injuries. The flight was conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a local personal flight that had departed HWD about 1035. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed; no flight plan was filed.
Federal Aviation Administration air traffic control audio recordings captured multiple communications between ATC and the pilot, who had requested taxi tests on runway 28L over approximately two hours. No anomalies were reported by the pilot.
Radar data showed the airplane departed HWD southbound, turned east, crossed a mountain range, and turned north. It maneuvered over the north end of San Francisco Bay before reversing course toward HWD. At 1145:06, about 10.5 nautical miles southeast of the airport, the pilot contacted the HWD tower for landing clearance. The controller instructed a straight-in approach for runway 28L and asked to be advised when 3 miles from the airport.
At 1147:30, about 6.5 nautical miles from the airport and approaching several grass fields, the pilot reported difficulty with the left engine and inability to maintain altitude. The pilot stated he was alone with about 60 gallons of fuel remaining and soon indicated he could not reach the airport. The controller asked about landing sites. At 1148:51, the pilot reported a field near Bay Area Rapid Transit tracks and would attempt to land there. Radar data showed the airplane passed the grass fields around 1148:33, then turned about 45° left. During the left turn, groundspeed was recorded at 59 knots at 375 feet mean sea level; it later dropped to a minimum of 52 knots at about 225 feet msl (173 feet above ground level) about 20 seconds before the last radar return.
Three witnesses were interviewed. Witness 1, near the inbound leg 9 nautical miles southeast of HWD, heard an abnormal sound and saw the airplane losing altitude with a sputtering or cutting out engine sound. Witness 2, about 10 miles southeast, observed the airplane on a southeast heading at about 1,750 feet, heard engine backfiring, and later saw the airplane again heading toward the airport with louder popping and backfiring sounds. Witness 3, about half a mile from the accident site, saw the airplane abnormally low in a wings-level descent, then a steep left turn with the right wing about 70° to the horizon. About 10 seconds later, he heard a loud impact and saw smoke.
BART surveillance video showed the airplane in a slight left-wing-low attitude that increased as it crossed railroad tracks. The forward fuselage and right wing impacted the east wall of a small building. A mist covered the right wing, empennage, and tail as they fell, and a postcrash fire ensued.
Personnel Information
The pilot held an airline transport certificate with multi-engine land and flight instructor ratings. He held a first-class medical certificate issued January 13, 2016, with a restriction requiring glasses for near vision. At that time, he reported 2,161 total flight hours. According to his logbook, he had about 19 hours in the accident airplane, with 1.4 hours in the 90 days preceding the accident. His first flight in the airplane was in August 2015. The flight instructor who administered his most recent flight review in March 2015 noted that during simulated left engine failures, the pilot's yaw control was good, and the descent was smooth. The pilot successfully kept airspeed above minimum controllable airspeed.
Aircraft Information
The airplane, a 1955 Piper PA-23-150, was registered to the pilot on September 2, 2015. It was powered by two Lycoming O-320-A normally-aspirated 150-horsepower engines. The most recent 100-hour inspection was completed on July 15, 2015, with left engine tachometer at 4,051 hours and right at 4,059 hours. The left and right engines had approximately 1,955 and 1,957 hours since major overhaul, respectively; overhaul records could not be located. The airplane's total time at the accident was estimated at about 4,077 hours based on the right tachometer.
Fuel purchase records from a fixed base operator at HWD showed the pilot had not purchased fuel on the day of the accident; last purchase at HWD was in September 2015. A logbook entry indicated the pilot flew to Nut Tree Airport on May 1, 2016, purchasing about 15 gallons of 100LL gasoline. A previous purchase of 28 gallons occurred on September 27, 2015.
The airplane's aeronautical flight manual included a feathering procedure for an inoperative engine: throttle closed, prop control feathered (cannot be feathered under 700 RPM), mixture idle cut-off, ignition switches off, electric fuel pump off, main valve off. The published Vmc was 85 mph.
Meteorological Information
The recorded weather observation at HWD at 1152 included wind 280° true at 11 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, clear skies, temperature 27°C, dew point 8°C, and altimeter setting 30.06 inches of mercury.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The wreckage came to rest at the base of a fiberglass railroad car wash building about 5 nautical miles southeast of HWD. All major structural components were accounted for within a 35 ft by 25 ft area. The fuselage was inverted on a heading of 095° magnetic and destroyed by fire. The empennage was intact with some thermal damage, connected by rudder control cables. The right wing was destroyed by fire; the left wing was near vertical against the building and smelled of fuel. Left engine propeller blades were feathered and undamaged; right engine blades were in low pitch with nicks, gouges, and tip curling.
Left aileron control continuity was confirmed; the left fuel cap rubber seals were rusted and did not seal. The left fuel selector lever showed 3/4 inches of space, consistent with an auxiliary tank setting. A trace amount of fuel from the left engine gascolator tested positive for water contamination. The left electric fuel boost pump was not recovered. The right electric fuel boost pump was disassembled; internal components showed carbon coloring from fire, but the pump was void of fuel and screen debris-free.
The flap actuator measured about 20 inches, consistent with partial flap deployment (full extend: 18.35 inches; full retract: 25.50 inches). The rudder trim jackscrew was at neutral. The elevator trim showed near full nose-up position, but cables were loosely fixed, indicating possible movement during the accident.
Left Engine Examination
Mechanical continuity was confirmed. Thumb compression and suction were present on all cylinders; valves operated in proper firing order. Magnetos were timed within 1° of each other and produced spark. Spark plugs were oil-soaked but consistent with normal operation. The carburetor had debris-free screen; floats intact; trace fuel in bowl and accelerator pump tested positive for water contamination. White powdery residue (corrosion) was observed on the accelerator pump plunger. The engine-driven fuel pump had trace fuel with water and significant internal corrosion.
Right Engine Examination
The right engine showed significant fire damage. Mechanical continuity was established. Compression and suction were achieved, but borescope inspection revealed little intake valve rocker arm movement for all cylinders; exhaust rockers moved normally. Internal inspection through drilled holes showed concentric wear on intake cam lobes for cylinders No. 3 and 4, and about 90% wear on cylinders No. 1 and 2, with spalling on tappet faces. Mandatory Service Bulletin SB301B provides guidance for inspections; no record of compliance was found. Both magnetos were thermally damaged and could not be functionally tested.
Medical and Pathological Information
An autopsy performed by the Alameda County Sheriff's Office determined the cause of death as extensive blunt trauma. Toxicological tests by the FAA were negative for carbon monoxide and ethanol; ibuprofen was present in urine.
Additional Information
The FAA Airplane Flying Handbook defines Vmc as minimum control speed with critical engine inoperative. Engine-inoperative flight with wings level requires large rudder input toward the operative engine, inducing sideslip and reducing climb performance. Published Vmc assumes certain conditions; with wings level, Vmc is higher than published because there is no horizontal lift component to assist the rudder.