History of Flight
On July 24, 2016, about 1500 central daylight time, a Beech 95-B55 airplane, N55NE, impacted terrain near Leshara, Nebraska. The commercial pilot and the designated pilot examiner were fatally injured, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was owned by the United States Air Force and operated by the LeMay Aero Club under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as an airline transport pilot (ATP) checkride. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and flight following services were provided. The local flight departed from Millard Airport (KMLE), Omaha, Nebraska, about 1430.
According to radar and air traffic communication information from the FAA, at 1433 the pilot contacted air traffic control and reported departing from KMLE. At the pilot's request, the controller cleared the flight to proceed to and enter the west practice area. Radar tracked the flight as it transitioned into the west practice area, about 17 miles northwest of KMLE. The airplane made a level, left 360° turn followed by a level, right 360° turn. The airplane then tracked north-northwest and began slowing while at 5,500 ft mean sea level (msl). The airplane drifted slightly left as it slowed. At 1458:10, the airplane was at 5,500 ft msl, and 9 seconds later, it was at 4,700 ft msl, indicating a descent rate of about 5,000 ft per minute (fpm). Ten seconds after that, the airplane was at 3,600 ft msl and had reversed heading. The last radar return with an associated altitude occurred 9 seconds later when the airplane was at 2,500 ft msl, indicating a descent rate of about 6,000 fpm. No distress calls were received.
A private-pilot-rated witness near the accident site heard an airplane and then heard "the engine[s] drop to idle" for about 2 to 3 seconds. The engine sound then increased for about 5 seconds. He heard sputtering and then the sound decreased again. At that point, the witness looked for the airplane and saw it "descending in a spiral, nose pointed downward, like a stall spin." He lost sight of the airplane as it descended behind trees and buildings; as he ran to notify emergency services, he heard the impact and saw black smoke.
Personnel Information
Commercial Pilot
The commercial pilot, age 27, held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. He was issued a first-class medical certificate on May 19, 2016, with the limitation "must wear corrective lenses." He was a US Air Force pilot based at Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha and his most recent flight review was completed in a military Boeing RC-135 airplane on June 28, 2016. He had accumulated military flight experience of 672.6 hours in RC-135s and 265.1 hours as a military student pilot. His civilian pilot logbook had 7 entries from July 6 to July 23, 2016, indicating at least 14.3 hours in the accident airplane.
Designated Pilot Examiner (DPE)
The DPE, age 61, held an ATP certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. He also held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. In addition, he was a ground instructor and a DPE, employed as a flight instructor and DPE for the LeMay Aero Club. His pilot logbook was not made available during the investigation. A Contractor Crewmember Record indicated that the DPE's total flight experience as of July 15, 2016, was 12,777 hours, of which 10,799 hours were in multi-engine airplanes. He listed a combined time in Beech 95-B55 and Cessna 310 airplanes of 412 hours, of which 271 hours were as an instructor. His most recent flight review was conducted in a Fairchild Swearingen SA227 on July 15, 2016. He was issued a first-class medical certificate on March 24, 2016, with the limitation "must wear corrective lenses."
Aircraft Information
The airplane was manufactured in 1968 as a Beechcraft T-42A Cochise, serial number TF-5. It was acquired by the LeMay Aero Club in December 1988 and registered with the FAA as a Beechcraft 95-B55. According to the Aero Club, the airplane logbooks were kept in the airplane. Fire-damaged logbooks were located in the wreckage. According to the logbooks, the airplane's last inspection was a 100-hour inspection completed on July 16, 2016. As of that inspection, the airframe had accumulated 16,066 total hours, and each engine had accumulated 2,128 total hours and 434 hours since overhaul.
The airplane was equipped with two auxiliary fuel tanks. The fuel pickup points for the auxiliary tanks are located in the forward inboard corners of the tanks. According to the airplane operator's manual, the auxiliary fuel and crossfeed systems are for use in level flight only. Regarding the stall warning indicator, the manual states, "As an impending stall is approached, a stall warning indicator triggered by a sensing vane in the left wing sounds a warning horn while there is ample time for the pilot to correct his attitude." The performance specifications and limitations section states that the single-engine minimum controllable airspeed is 80 knots (kts), and the power-off stall speed for a 5,100-pound airplane in level flight with landing gear and flaps extended is 51 kts. The normal operating procedures section notes that the T-42A airplane is intended for only nonaerobatic passenger and cargo operations, and only maneuvers incidental to normal flying including stalls (except whip stalls) and turns with bank not exceeding 60° are permitted. If a spin is entered inadvertently, the procedure is to cut power on both engines, apply full rudder opposite the direction of rotation, and move elevator forward until rotation stops.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The airplane impacted a bean field about 17 miles northwest of KMLE. A postimpact fire consumed a majority of the fuselage and the inboard portions of both wings. The left propeller had separated from the left engine and was partially buried in the soil at the initial impact point. The airplane came to rest about 4 ft from the left propeller aligned with a magnetic heading of 020°. The empennage was twisted about 80° to the right. The full length of the leading edges of both wings exhibited light upward and aft crushing. Flight control continuity was established to all primary flight controls. The landing gear actuator was in the landing gear extended position. Flap position could not be determined due to fire damage. The fuel selector handles were broken, and the fuel selectors were opened to determine the selector valve positions; both valves were selected to their respective auxiliary tanks.
The left propeller was removed from the soil. All three blades remained intact and attached to the propeller hub. One blade was bent rearward near the blade root; the other two blades were relatively undamaged. All three blades displayed leading edge polishing near the blade tips. The right propeller remained attached to the right engine. One blade was relatively undamaged; one blade was partially consumed by fire; and one blade was fractured near the blade root. The separated blade exhibited leading edge polishing and chordwise scratches.
The engines were removed and transported to the engine manufacturer's facility for further examination. Both engines had sustained damage that precluded running them on a test bed, but they were completely torn down and examined. The examinations found no evidence of any preimpact malfunctions or anomalies with either engine that would have precluded the normal production of power.
The airplane's stall warning switch and JPI EDM 760 Engine Analyzer were removed and shipped to the NTSB laboratory. The stall warning switch failed an initial continuity check; the electrical contacts appeared fouled by an undetermined substance. The switch's continuity was checked a second time, and it passed testing. The reason for the failure of the first continuity check could not be determined. The EDM 760 exhibited heavy thermal damage; as of June 2018, attempts to retrieve data have been unsuccessful but will be continued.
Additional Information
After the accident, members of the LeMay Aero Club found a planned flight profile for the accident flight that included the following practice area maneuvers: clearing, steep turns, stalls, unusual attitude, and engine fail/feather/restart.
Another pilot who completed his ATP certificate about the same time and took his checkride in the accident airplane with the DPE 2 days before the accident reported that the DPE was very thorough, used only the most current pilot training standards, and always used a checklist. During his checkride, they performed airwork that included three stalls, during which the stall warning system failed to operate. They used the auxiliary tanks during all the airwork maneuvers, which included an engine shutdown. During the final landing, the stall warning system activated just before touchdown. This pilot reported that the stall warning system worked during the preflight and had always worked during his prior training flights in the airplane.
Medical and Pathological Information
The Douglas County Morgue conducted autopsies on both occupants. The commercial pilot's cause of death was massive blunt trauma; no preexisting conditions that could have contributed were identified. Forensic toxicology was negative for ethanol and drugs.
The DPE's cause of death was massive blunt trauma. The autopsy noted atherosclerotic coronary artery disease (focal 51% to 75% narrowing of the mid-left anterior descending coronary artery) and myocardial hypertrophy, but no evidence of an acute coronary thromboemboli. Forensic toxicology was negative for ethanol; Valsartan was detected in the liver and urine. On the pilot's most recent FAA medical application, he reported the use of aspirin, atorvastatin, and valsartan. Valsartan is a prescription medication used to treat high blood pressure and is not generally considered to be impairing.
Tests and Research
Airplane performance modeling using radar and weather information was conducted by the NTSB Vehicle Performance Division. The modeling determined that the airplane's heading fluctuated as the airplane slowed. The airplane began a rapid descent and heading change when the airplane's airspeed dropped below the airplane's single-engine minimum controllable airspeed of 80 kts.