1 fatality

3 Aug 2016: PIPER PA 34-200T 220T (N82806) — Flagstaff, AZ

Flagstaff, AZ, United States

On 3 Aug 2016, a PIPER PA 34-200T 220T (registration N82806) was involved in an aviation accident near Flagstaff, AZ. One person was killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: A departure flight path that consisted of several unexplained turns during the initial climbout, and terminated in a high-speed descent and ground impact. The reason(s) for the turns and descent could not be determined due to lack of definitive evidence. This summary draws on records from NTSB; 12 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

A Piper PA-34-200T Seneca II, N82806, crashed shortly after night takeoff from Flagstaff Pulliam Airport on August 2, 2016. The airline transport pilot received fatal injuries. The aircraft was destroyed. No flight plan was filed.

History of Flight

On August 2, 2016, at about 2122 mountain standard time, a Piper PA-34-200T Seneca II airplane, registration N82806, was destroyed when it impacted trees and terrain shortly after takeoff from Flagstaff Pulliam Airport (FLG), Flagstaff, Arizona. The airline transport pilot received fatal injuries. The personal flight was operated as a medical delivery mission for the volunteer organization Flights for Life (FFL) under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at FLG at the time, and no flight plan was filed for the cross-country flight to Falcon Field (FFZ), Mesa, Arizona.

The pilot owned the airplane and based it at FFZ. Commercial flight tracking data indicated the airplane departed FFZ about 0945 and landed at Show Low Regional Airport (SOW) about 1030. It departed SOW about 1055 and arrived at FLG about 1140. According to the line service technician who met the airplane upon arrival, it was "pouring" rain. The technician reported that the pilot did not want fuel, and that the pilot unloaded some personal items about 30 minutes after landing, once the rain stopped. The pilot spent the day in the fixed-base operation (FBO) working on his computer while awaiting a United Blood Service (UBS) delivery expected about 2100.

About 1900, the pilot and technician relocated the airplane closer to the terminal, and the pilot began cleaning and rearranging contents to make room for cargo. The technician again asked if the pilot needed fuel, and he declined. The technician and FBO owner reported a "dark night" with cloudy conditions but no rain when they left before the accident airplane departed.

The UBS employee who delivered the cargo reported a total of four large boxes and two small boxes. She stated that full large boxes weigh about 30 pounds each, small boxes about 10 pounds each, and two large boxes were not full. The pilot loaded all boxes via the aft left-side cargo door. He placed large boxes on the aft cabin floor and two small boxes on top. The employee reported that the pilot did not restrain the boxes with a net or any other means.

The FLG air traffic control tower was closed when the pilot was ready for departure. While still on the ground, the pilot contacted Phoenix approach control and requested VFR flight following for a flight to FFZ. The controller provided altimeter and transponder information, and the airplane departed shortly after.

At 2119:44, the pilot radioed that he was "off runway two one" and climbing to 11,500 feet. At 2120:17, the controller advised radar contact one mile south of FLG and instructed to maintain VFR. The pilot acknowledged at 2120:21, the last radio transmission. At 2122:57, the controller advised the pilot that radar contact was lost and instructed him to report leaving 9,000 feet. No response was received, and no distress calls were made. The controller attempted multiple contacts, as did Albuquerque ARTCC (ZAB), without response.

The first radar return at 2119:49 showed the airplane near midfield at an indicated altitude of 7,300 feet, consistent with a departure from runway 21. The track initially maintained runway heading, then turned right about 30°, then left nearly 90° to a southerly track, then made a near-180° right turn to the north before radar contact lost. The last return at about 2122:19 showed the airplane descending through 7,400 feet.

Radar data indicated a climb rate of about 1,000 feet per minute (fpm) for the first 60 seconds, consistent with normal two-engine climb. The climb rate then decreased to about 400 fpm for the next 60 seconds. The airplane reached a maximum altitude of 8,400 feet, then descended at about 3,000 fpm over the next 20 seconds, ending at an altitude similar to terrain elevation. The final radar track segment and debris field location were consistent.

The impact site was about 2.6 miles southwest of FLG. The airplane was highly fragmented. Earwitnesses reported engines operating at high power just before impact. Ground scar and propeller signatures were consistent with both engines operating at impact. Initial post-recovery evaluation revealed no mechanical anomalies or fire.

Personnel Information

The 76-year-old pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with multiengine land rating, and an FAA second-class medical certificate dated March 1, 2016, with the limitation that glasses must be available for near vision. He reported 11,858 total flight hours, including 77 hours in the previous 6 months.

According to the pilot's son, a major airline pilot, the pilot flew 4 to 5 FFL missions per month and about 200 hours per year. The son reported the pilot usually hand-flew to cruise altitude before engaging the autopilot, and hand-flew descents. He used the autopilot's wing leveling/navigation and altitude hold functions. The son stated the airplane was "a very stable platform." To his knowledge, the pilot only operated VFR, partly because FFL "did not allow IFR." The pilot's instrument and night currency could not be determined.

Aircraft Information

The airplane was manufactured in 1980 and equipped with two Continental Motors TSIO-360-series engines rotating in opposite directions. The pilot purchased it in March 2015. The most recent annual inspection was completed in May 2016, with airframe total time about 7,453 hours. Left engine total time about 3,993 hours (342 hours since overhaul). Right engine total time about 353 hours since new.

The airplane was equipped with a KFC 200 two-axis autopilot and flight director, which the pilot's son reported worked well. All annunciators worked normally, and the horizontal situation indicator had recently been overhauled. The son stated the pilot was "a stickler" for proper mechanical condition and was not aware of any vacuum issues. Maintenance records for the previous 16 months revealed no uncorrected deficiencies. Weight and balance records indicated the airplane was within its envelope for the accident flight.

Meteorological Information

The 2057 FLG automated weather observation included calm winds, visibility 10 miles, scattered clouds at 10,000 feet agl, temperature 15°C, dew point 14°C, altimeter 30.35 inches of mercury. The 2157 observation included winds 240° at 3 knots, visibility 10 miles, broken clouds at 11,000 feet, with unchanged temperature and dew point.

The National Weather Service surface analysis at 2000 indicated light westerly wind about 5 knots, clear skies, temperature 16°C, dew point 12°C. Composite radar at 2125 for Flagstaff showed only very light echoes from a dissipating area. The WSR-88D radar 41 miles southeast indicated no significant weather echoes. GOES-15 data showed a broken to overcast layer of altocumulus to altostratus clouds over Flagstaff, with cloud tops near 29,000 feet msl.

The terminal area forecast for FLG called for light and variable winds at 5 knots or less, visibility better than 6 miles, scattered clouds at 6,000 feet, broken ceiling at 10,000 feet, with a temporary period of light rain showers and broken ceiling at 7,000 feet between 1700 and 2000. The area forecast for northern Arizona was for a broken ceiling between 12,000 and 14,000 feet msl, cloud layers to 25,000 feet, with widely scattered light rain showers and thunderstorms.

Local sunset occurred at 1928, civil twilight ended at 1756. Moon rose at 0527 and set at 1922, phase new (unilluminated).

Enroute and destination weather: The 12-hour surface prognostic chart valid for 0500 August 3 depicted a high-pressure system over northern Arizona with a thermal low over southeastern California and a trough extending southward. A large area of scattered thunderstorms and rain showers was depicted over almost all of Arizona. No TAFs are issued for FFZ; the closest airport TAF (Phoenix-Mesa Gateway Airport, IWA) valid from 1900 August 2 to 1700 August 3 forecast wind 350° at 18 knots gusting to 30 knots, visibility 6 statute miles, thunderstorms in vicinity, scattered clouds at 6,000 feet, scattered cumulonimbus at 10,000 feet, broken ceiling at 12,000 feet, with a temporary period from 1900 to 2100 of wind variable at 20 knots gusting to 40 knots, visibility 3 statute miles, thunderstorms and rain, broken cumulonimbus ceiling at 8,000 feet, overcast at 12,000 feet. From 2200: wind 120°, visibility 6 statute miles, showers in vicinity, scattered clouds at 10,000 feet, broken ceiling at 20,000 feet.

The 2125 composite radar depicted a band of light to moderate echoes from eastern Arizona southwestward through Phoenix. GOES-15 imagery showed a large area of cumulonimbus clouds over Phoenix and Mesa, with anvil extending northward to Sedona.

Wreckage and Impact Information

The accident site was on Coconino National Forest land east of Arizona Hwy 89A, about 2.6 nautical miles on a bearing of 236° from the FLG runway 3 threshold. Elevation about 6,950 feet msl. The debris field was oriented on a true heading of 042°. Terrain was level with moderately spaced pine trees 60 to 100 feet tall and sparse undergrowth. A residential neighborhood with widely spaced homes and a golf course was about 1/3 mile east.

The wreckage was highly fragmented. The debris field measured about 60 feet by 600 feet. The airplane cut or broke the tops off eight trees, with some tree trunks 12 to 15 inches in diameter at separation points. Some limbs up to 4 inches in diameter displayed clean angular cuts consistent with propeller severance.

The largest wreckage elements included the mid-forward fuselage, right-wing root and aft nacelle section, and a section with left firewall, engine mount, wing spar, and left main landing gear assembly. Engines separated from the airplane; propellers separated from engines. Each propeller hub retained all three blades, all significantly damaged, consistent with both engines developing power at impact. A few flight and engine instruments were identified; damage to gyroscopic instruments precluded determination of functionality or whether they were operating during flight or impact.

Several hundred pages of maintenance records and documentation were scattered throughout. Multiple computers and portable electronic devices were present, some intact in bags, some extensively damaged.

Left-side components were generally on the left side of the debris field, right-side on the right, consistent with the airplane not being inverted at impact. A two-dimensional layout of some wreckage accounted for all flight control surfaces. Flap setting could not be determined. Damage precluded determination of flight control continuity or pre-accident condition. All major airframe, engine, and propeller components were accounted for, and damage patterns consistent with all being present and intact at impact. No evidence of pre-impact mechanical deficiencies or failures. No evidence of in-flight or post-impact fire.

Additional Information

Flights for Life (FFL) is a non-profit providing free air transportation for blood for UBS. The pilot had been a member since 2006, served as Mission Safety Officer for 4 years, and was FFL President for 3 years at the time of the accident.

The January 2016 FFL Member Handbook specified conditions, requirements, limitations, and recommendations for pilots. The pilot's status as President did not relieve him from compliance. Several instances of non-compliance with the handbook were noted for the accident flight.

Pilot requirements for day cargo flights: 100 hours minimum PIC time, 5 hours minimum in make/model (10 if high-performance), 25 hours minimum cross-country, and active status. For night cargo flights: 300 hours minimum PIC (or 200 with instrument rating), 50 hours minimum cross-country, 30 hours minimum night flight (or 15 with instrument rating). The handbook did not specify instrument currency requirements. All FFL flights were to be conducted under VFR, except marginal VFR and IFR to VFR on top permitted only during daylight hours. Forecast and observed weather were consistent with potential IFR conditions en route.

The handbook strongly recommended filing flight plans for distances greater than 50 nautical miles. The straight-line distance between FLG and FFZ was about 101 nm, but no flight plan was filed. Two pilots were recommended for night flights, but the pilot was the only pilot onboard. FFL records since 2008 indicated repeated occurrences of solo night flights for this pilot.

Gyroscopic flight instruments: The Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH) described the instrument air pressure system with pumps on each engine, check valves, and a pressure manifold allowing operation during single-engine operation. Pressure was monitored by a pressure gauge on the instrument panel. There was no specific procedure for failure of one pump; only for pressure below 4.5 inches of mercury, which would typically not occur with one pump failure. The POH guidance for low pressure: increase engine speed to 2,575 rpm and descend to an altitude where 4.5 inches can be maintained. No records of recent pre-accident problems were located. Damage to gyroscopic instruments precluded determination of functionality.

The instrument air pressure pumps were examined at Tempest in June 2017. The left pump's vanes were "worn well beyond" service limits, and powdery residue indicated it was inoperative at impact. The right pump condition was consistent with operating at impact. Impact damage to air system lines and components precluded determination of pre-accident system functionality.

Medical and Pathological Information

The pilot reported using amlodipine, valsartan, levothyroxine, and aspirin on his FAA medical applications. None are considered impairing. An autopsy determined cause of death as "multiple injuries due to aircraft accident." Examination for natural disease was limited by injury severity; neither brain nor heart were available. The autopsy report contained no findings on pre-impact health. Toxicological testing identified metoprolol (a beta blocker) in muscle and lung tissue.

No probable cause was stated in the source.

Contributing factors

PilotContributed to outcomeOperator