Occurrence
On 11 January 2017, the crew of an Embraer 170-200 was conducting a flight from Warsaw Chopin Airport (EPWA) to Zurich Airport (LSZH). Due to loading problems in Warsaw, the departure was delayed, resulting in a later-than-planned landing in Zurich. The crew aimed to expedite the turnaround for the return flight. The captain performed a walkaround and supervised refueling, while the first officer prepared the flight management computer (FMC) and obtained the ATIS, which included the active runway for departures and arrivals.
After the captain returned to the cockpit, passenger boarding began. The crew received an air traffic control clearance for the DEGES 3L departure: "Climb straight ahead. At D2 KLO turn right to stabilize on TR330. At D4 KLO turn left to 244 TRK (max IAS in turn 210 knots). Cross D4 KLO at 3500 feet ALT or above. Stabilize on TR244 until intercept R190 TRA. Intercept R268 KLO. Continue via KLO, KOLUL to DEGES." The crew performed pre-flight checks, including verifying that the cleared departure matched the selected SID in the FMC, and obtained meteorological information.
Following takeoff from runway 32, the aircraft was handed over to approach control. As anticipated, the aircraft encountered turbulence and icing during climb. The approach controller issued an instruction to turn left toward KOLUL. The crew acknowledged this instruction. However, at that moment the aircraft was already established in a right turn. The pilot flying switched to heading mode, setting a left turn to initiate navigation mode after inserting KOLUL into the FMC, aiming for the required left turn.
At 4500 feet ALT, the crew began accelerating to 210 knots IAS and retracted the flaps. The approach controller again advised the crew that they were still in a right turn and instructed them to turn to a new heading of 150 degrees, which the crew executed as a continuation of the right turn. After several heading changes, the crew was transferred to area control, and the remainder of the flight proceeded without further incident.
Investigation
The investigation commission determined that the crew had programmed a different standard instrument departure (SID) procedure into the FMC than the one issued in the air traffic control clearance. Furthermore, the commission found that the crew was unaware of the reason for the left vectoring after takeoff and subsequent heading changes. Despite verifying the correctness of the SID in the FMC, they did not detect that an incorrect SID had been entered, and the aircraft, under autopilot, was executing a right turn. The air traffic controller did not inform the crew about the reason for the vectoring.
Conclusions
The incident was caused by the programming of a different SID procedure into the FMC than the one issued in the ATC clearance. The operator has taken preventive actions, including recording the event in the SMS database, using it as training material during recurrent pilot training, and issuing an informational notice to all Embraer fleet pilots.