History of Flight
On March 4, 2017, about 1330 eastern standard time, a Beech B-60, registration N39AG, was destroyed by impact and a postcrash fire after an uncontrolled descent in Duette, Florida. The private pilot and the flight instructor were fatally injured. The aircraft was owned by the pilot and operated under 14 CFR Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the instructional flight that departed from Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport (SRQ) about 1240.
According to friends and family, the pilot had recently purchased the airplane, and the flight was the second of two days of ground and flight training to meet insurance requirements.
Air traffic control (ATC) voice and radar data indicated that about 10 minutes after departure, the pilot cancelled flight following. For the next 30 minutes, radar showed overlapping left and right 360° turns and figure-eight patterns consistent with airwork in a rural area northeast of SRQ. The last 30 seconds of radar data showed the airplane traveling northwest at about 1,000 ft above ground level at 104 knots groundspeed.
Witnesses at a farm less than 1 mile away observed the airplane. They heard a loud but smooth engine sound. One witness demonstrated the airplane in straight and level flight, slowing, with the nose gradually pitching up, then suddenly banking and entering a spiraling descent. The engine sound was smooth and continuous, increasing until impact, and after the airplane disappeared behind trees, the witness heard the sound of impact. Two other family members gave similar accounts. A fourth, an engine mechanic, heard smooth and continuous engine sounds.
A group of motorcyclists on a nearby highway saw the airplane depart straight and level flight into a near-vertical, spiraling descent.
Personnel Information
The pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single- and multi-engine land, but no instrument rating. His most recent FAA second-class medical was issued April 4, 2016. On an insurance application dated January 30, 2017, he reported 1,120 total flight hours, including 800 multi-engine and 200 in the accident make and model.
The flight instructor held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for single- and multi-engine land and instrument airplane, and a flight instructor certificate with ratings for single-engine, multi-engine, and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA second-class medical was issued October 6, 2014. He had 20,900 total flight hours, with 165 in the accident make and model. He was a gold-seal flight instructor with experience in high-performance aircraft.
Aircraft Information
The six-seat, twin-engine, low-wing, retractable-gear airplane was manufactured in 1977 and equipped with two Lycoming 380-horsepower reciprocating engines. The most recent annual inspection was completed on March 2, 2017, at 3,271.6 total aircraft hours.
Meteorological Information
At 1350, the automated weather observation at Lakeland Regional Airport (LAL), 23 nautical miles north of the accident site, reported clear skies, 10 statute miles visibility, wind from 005° at 10 knots gusting to 20 knots, temperature 24°C, dew point 8°C, and altimeter setting 30.39 inches of mercury.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The wreckage was examined at the site, and all major components were accounted for. Angularly cut tree branches were found above the wreckage. The airplane came to rest adjacent to three craters, each about 3 ft deep, spaced consistently with the nose and both engines. A postimpact fire consumed most of the airplane, including cockpit instruments and switches. Flight control cable continuity was confirmed from flight controls to the cockpit. Flaps and landing gear were retracted. Trim actuators were within normal operating range.
The fuel selector handle panel was separated. The left fuel selector handle was near the "ON" position, but the cable was pulled out of the valve, leaving the valve in a non-operating position. The right fuel selector was in the "ON" position.
Both engines were partially separated. All three propeller blades from each engine were found separated from their hubs in the impact craters. One left propeller blade had a large impact to its leading edge; all blades showed similar bending and cambered side polishing.
Engine examinations at a recovery facility revealed significant impact and fire damage. Neither engine could be rotated by hand. Accessories were destroyed. The fuel servo of each engine contained a small amount of fuel; oil sumps were consumed by fire. Turbocharger compressor housings had radial scuff marks; starter noses had rotational scoring. Internal components showed normal wear and lubrication.
Additional Information
The pilot's insurance required biennial ground and flight training, and he contracted training through Access Flight Training Services, LLC. The company maintained a directory of instructors; the accident instructor was an independent contractor who maintained his own qualifications. The company did not provide training manuals; instructors used FAA Practical Test Standards or the specific aircraft flight manual.
Conversations with friends revealed that the pilot had expressed concerns about the instructor's techniques. One friend reported that the pilot mentioned the instructor had him land on crosswind runways and that during a practice power-off stall with a turn, the instructor advanced power, leading to a spin with a loss of 1,000 ft; recovery occurred at 2,000 ft. Another friend said the pilot was concerned about the instructor's non-standard practice of not advancing propeller or mixture controls before landing, and a stall recovery method that added power first. This technique during a power-off stall with a turn resulted in a spin of one and a half turns; the instructor stated it was not a spin because fewer than three turns had occurred. A third friend reported the pilot's account of a slow-flight to power-on stall where the instructor reduced the right engine to idle, causing the airplane to go inverted; recovery was from 3,000 to 1,800 ft.
FAA guidance in the Airplane Flying Handbook states that for multiengine airplanes, the primary stall recovery step is to reduce the angle of attack, then level wings and add power. Single-engine stalls or stalls with asymmetric power should not be attempted. Stalls should be practiced at altitudes allowing recovery no lower than 3,000 ft AGL. No multiengine airplane is approved for spins.
Medical and Pathological Information
Autopsies by the District Twelve Medical Examiner determined the cause of death for both occupants as blunt impact injuries. Toxicological testing by the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory was negative for all tested substances for the pilot. The flight instructor's results were positive for alcohol consistent with postmortem production, not consumption.