History of Flight
On May 15, 2017, at approximately 1329 eastern daylight time, a Mitsubishi MU 2B-40, registration N220N, crashed into the Atlantic Ocean 32 miles east of Eleuthera, The Bahamas. The commercial pilot and three passengers sustained fatal injuries, and the airplane was destroyed. The aircraft was registered to and operated by Ithaca Consulting, Inc., under Title 14 CFR Part 91. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and the flight operated under an instrument flight rules flight plan. The airplane departed Rafael Hernandez Airport (BQN), Aguadilla, Puerto Rico, around 1100, destined for Space Coast Regional Airport (TIX), Titusville, Florida.
Radar and voice communication data from the FAA showed that after departure from BQN, the airplane climbed to FL240 (24,000 ft msl) and maintained a consistent heading, airspeed, and altitude for about 2.5 hours. It was handled sequentially by Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZMA), Nassau Approach Control, and Grand Turks Radar. At 1141, the pilot contacted ZMA controller position R62, who cleared the flight “direct Titusville.” After a frequency change, the pilot checked in with ZMA R58 at 1215. At 1235, ZMA R58 attempted twice to provide frequency-change instructions without reply; contact was eventually reestablished at 1244 with assistance from other pilots.
At 1314, ZMA R58 issued a hazardous weather advisory for thunderstorms moving from the northwest at 10 knots with cloud tops to FL390. At 1328, R58 provided a frequency change to the pilot, which he acknowledged. At 1329, the pilot began a call to ZMA R59, but the transmission was cut off, and subsequent attempts to contact the pilot failed. Radar targets transitioning the area at low altitude typically enter “coast” status for about 1 minute before reacquisition; the target for the accident airplane remained in coast status for about 3 minutes, then disappeared. No further radar returns associated with the airplane were observed. A search initiated on May 16, 2017, located floating debris and a fuel sheen beneath the final radar position. The United States Coast Guard searched by air and sea for three days, but the occupants were not found.
Personnel Information
The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued December 12, 2016, and he reported 1,480 total flight hours at that time. Examination of the pilot’s logbook by an FAA investigator revealed that two entries for 1.5-hour flights in a Piper PA-34-300 in 2008 had been altered to show 6.5 hours each; the flight instructor confirmed the actual durations were 1.5 hours each. Between 2010 and July 2015, the pilot flew infrequently, logging only 50.1 hours, and no flight time between July 2015 and December 2016. After obtaining his multiengine rating on April 3, 2008, he did not log another multiengine flight until December 19, 2016, when he began flying a Diamond DA42. On December 23, 2016, he declared 25 total multiengine hours to his insurance company; corrected for the alterations, his logbook showed 9.7 hours.
Before starting training in the Mitsubishi MU-2B in January 2017, the pilot had 21.2 total multiengine hours (14.6 with an instructor). At the time of the accident, he had an estimated 120 multiengine hours, including 100 hours in the accident airplane. Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) requires that all MU-2B training follow an FAA-accepted standardized program, including a minimum of 20 hours of ground instruction and 12 hours of flight instruction (with 6 hours in the airplane, Level C/D simulator), plus a final phase check. The pilot began instructional flights on January 5, 2017, with an FAA-approved training company. During January 2017, he logged 74.5 hours of MU-2B flight training, including 3.2 hours of actual instrument time; nearly all flights were cross-country totaling 42.5 hours. One instructor reported flying 30 to 40 hours with the pilot before formal instruction began, describing the flights as familiarization and demonstration for the pilot and the airplane’s owner (his girlfriend). Both flight and classroom instructors considered the pilot attentive and performing well. The pilot completed 20 hours of aircraft systems instruction, viewed the mandatory Icing Awareness Training Video (AD 2003-22-07), and completed a flight review on February 1, 2017. Records did not indicate instruction on emergency procedures or high-altitude operations; the pilot’s logbook contained an undated high-altitude endorsement. Details of the pilot’s wake/rest activities before the accident are unknown. On the accident day, he emailed his mechanic at 0303 and obtained online weather briefings via ForeFlight at 0310 and 0317. Fuel service was completed at 1000, and the pilot signed the invoice.
Aircraft Information
The airplane, manufactured in 1981, had its most recent annual inspection on December 30, 2016, at 4,634.2 total aircraft hours. The avionics could receive and display NEXRAD weather imagery, but whether it was used during the flight could not be determined. The airplane was registered to Ithaca Consulting on January 23, 2017. Flight history indicated the pilot was familiar with the BQN-to-TIX route, having flown it several times in the preceding four months. The maintenance operator reported the airplane was due for a 100-hour inspection on May 16, 2017, along with installation of a Garmin GTN-750 Navigator, Garmin GMA-35 Audio Panel, dual ADS-B transponders, Garmin GDL-69 XM Receiver, Garmin GSR-56 Satellite Transceiver, and Honeywell KHF-950 HF System.
Mitsubishi MU-2B airplanes have specific icing limitations and equipment. The airplane flight manual, pilot’s operating manual, and checklist provide procedures for known-icing flight and inadvertent or severe icing encounters. Options under supplemental type certificates (STCs) or service bulletins include an Ice Detector System, Automatic Autopilot Disconnect System, Trim-In-Motion Alert System, Pneumatic De-Ice Monitoring System, and Auto-Ignition System. The accident airplane was not equipped with the Ice Detector System but had the Pneumatic De-Ice Monitoring System and Trim-In-Motion Alert System. It is unknown whether the Automatic Autopilot Disconnect System or Auto-Ignition System were installed.
Meteorological Information
The pilot obtained text weather briefings from Leidos via ForeFlight at 0310 and 0317, including standard route information for the accident flight and a later proposed flight from Titusville to New York. It is unknown if he checked further weather before or during the flight. At 1400, surface weather at Nassau (MYNN), about 80 miles west of the accident site, reported calm wind, light rain, visibility 5.6 miles, scattered cumulonimbus at 1,200 ft agl, broken ceiling at 3,000 ft agl, overcast at 10,000 ft agl, temperature 26°C, dew point 23°C, altimeter 29.97 inHg. A pilot report (PIREP) from a Boeing 737 at FL250 at 1340 indicated light to moderate rime icing near the accident site. SIGMET Echo 2, issued at 1300, warned of frequent thunderstorms with tops to FL440 moving eastward at 25 knots. Satellite imagery showed cloud tops up to FL400. Upper air soundings indicated supercooled liquid water likely between 15,000 and 26,000 ft msl in the cloud cover. No weather radar imagery was available for the site. Forecast Icing Potential (FIP) and Current Icing Potential (CIP) products from the National Weather Service’s Aviation Weather Center, valid for 1400, forecast a 10–30% probability of icing at 23,500–24,500 ft msl, with moderate-to-heavy intensity. FIP showed 70–90% supercooled large drops (SLD) potential southwest of the accident area and unknown directly over the site; CIP gave similar probabilities of 60–80% for SLD. The FIP product was available on the AWC website before departure.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The wreckage was not recovered, and no examination was possible.
Medical and Pathological Information
The pilot was not found, so no post-mortem examination or toxicological testing could be performed.