History of Flight
On January 15, 2018, at approximately 1136 eastern standard time, an MD Helicopters Inc. 369HM helicopter, registration N4QX, was substantially damaged after impacting terrain near Perrysburg, Ohio. The commercial pilot and crewmember were fatally injured. The aircraft was owned and operated by Vista One Inc. under 14 CFR Part 91 as an aerial observation flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The local flight departed Wood County Airport (1G0) in Bowling Green, Ohio, at 1024.
According to the owner of Vista One Inc., the pilot departed from the company base at Wayne County Airport (BJJ) in Wooster, Ohio, that morning, landing at 1G0 to pick up a powerline inspector. The pilot fueled the helicopter with 20.68 gallons of Jet A fuel. This flight was the first leg of aerial inspections on transmission towers for the Toledo Edison power grid, with the team scheduled to work from Bowling Green to the Indiana/Ohio border over the following four weeks.
Personnel Information
The pilot, at the time of his most recent medical certificate application, reported no chronic medical conditions and no medications. His certificate required corrective lenses. His logbook showed at least 1,219.4 hours in helicopters, including 212.7 hours in the accident model. He had 97.9 hours of simulated instrument time but none in actual conditions. The last simulated instrument flight was on September 30, 2015. He began working at Vista One Inc. on September 6, 2017, logging 309.3 hours with the company through December 28, 2017. No company training records were provided. The owner recalled a training flight the week before the accident but gave no specifics; that flight was not logged. The owner noted the pilot had difficulty recalling how to clear the GPS track and operate the throttle past the detent.
The crewmember, a powerline inspector, had worked for Vista One Inc. for two to three years. He had been flying from platforms for line inspection and maintenance since 2004, according to family.
Aircraft Information
The helicopter was certificated for day and night VFR operations. It was not equipped with a radar altimeter or emergency locator transmitter, and none were required. The RFM prohibited flight into known icing. Flight in falling or blowing snow was permitted only with the automatic engine reignition kit and engine failure warning system installed and operable. The helicopter was equipped with these systems, including the reignition kit. It also had an anti-ice airframe fuel filter.
The Rolls-Royce M250-C20 engine manual included warnings about operations in snow and ice, stating that at ambient temperatures below 4°C (40°F), anti-ice protection is required to prevent engine flameout. A 1968 study indicated that as little as 30 grams of snow or slush can induce a flameout in Allison 250-series engines.
Meteorological Information
The National Weather Service surface analysis for 1000 local showed a low-pressure system over southern Wisconsin and a high over central Virginia. The accident site was between them. Station models indicated air temperatures in the mid to high teens Fahrenheit, dew points in the low teens, visibility of 5°F or less, east-southeast wind 5–10 knots, overcast skies, and light snow. Satellite imagery showed abundant cloud cover with cloud tops at 13,000 ft msl.
A meteorological impact statement valid for the accident site warned of marginal VFR and IFR conditions with light snow, and light to patchy moderate ice between 1,500 and 10,000 ft msl. AIRMETs Sierra and Zulu indicated IFR conditions due to precipitation and mist, with moderate icing below 15,000 ft msl. The pilot did not request a weather briefing through Leidos or DUATS. ForeFlight had no record of a briefing, but the pilot accessed a Doppler radar loop at 0958:07.
Security camera video at 1G0 showed reduced visibility and snow. Witnesses reported 1 to 1½ miles visibility with moderate snow. The flight departed into IMC.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The wreckage was in a dormant corn/bean field at 620 ft msl, about 120 ft west of power lines. No evidence of impact with lines or towers was found. No postcrash fire or ground scars were observed. The ground was frozen and snow-covered. The helicopter came to rest on its left side, nose heading 256°. Main rotor blades showed damage consistent with excessive coning and downward flapping. The tail boom was partially separated. Control continuity was confirmed for cyclic, collective, and pedals. The engine examination revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operations. The fuel filter and system were unremarkable except for some water and particulates. The auto reignition panel showed the RE-IGN light bulb filaments intact and stretched, indicating the system had activated.
Additional Information
Weight and balance calculations showed a takeoff weight of 1,900 pounds. Power available was sufficient for the planned flight. The helicopter was operating within the cross-hatched area of the height-velocity diagram, which represents hazardous airspeed/altitude combinations for autorotation.
According to 14 CFR 91.155, helicopters in class G airspace at 1,200 ft or less above the surface during day require ½ mile visibility and clear of clouds.
The FAA's Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin SAIB SW-08-03R4 described procedures to reduce the probability of engine in-flight shutdown due to ice or snow ingestion. The HAI Utilities, Patrol and Construction Committee Safety Guide noted that detailed power line patrols require extended periods in hovering or slow flight.